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these in turn are dependent not so much on the wahhabis of saudi arabia as on the iranian ayatollahs, from whom they receive weapons and money.
need jõud omakord ei sõltu niivõrd mitte saudi araabia wahhabitest, vaid iraani ajatolladest, kellelt nad relvi ja raha saavad.
abroad it is doing business with castro's cuba, with the ayatollahs in tehran; it is demanding the right to sell arms to communist china.
välismaal teeb ta kaupa castro kuubaga, ajatolladega teheranis; ta nõuab õigust müüa relvi kommunistlikule hiinale.
an intense effort is therefore required from the entire european political community to strike the right balance between opposing the ayatollahs' regime and supporting the moderate and reformist iranian element that exists and is active.
seega on vaja kogu euroopa poliitilise kogukonna tohutut jõupingutust, et tekitada õige tasakaal ayatollah' režiimi vastu olemise ning olemasolevate ja aktiivsete mõõdukate ja reformistlike iraani rühmituste toetamise vahel.
for all that the fundamentalist regime of the ayatollahs proclaims that its intentions are good and that it is pursuing nuclear energy for peaceful ends, the international community is not convinced and, justifiably, views iran as a growing threat.
rahvusvahelist üldsust ei veena ajatollade fundamentalistliku režiimi kinnitused, et tema kavatsused on head ja et tuumaenergiat soovitakse rahumeelsetel eesmärkidel, ning iraanis nähakse - põhjendatult - kasvavat ohtu.
it is isolating taiwan and cosying up to the tyrants in beijing, it is refusing to deal with the anti-castro dissidents in cuba, it is cosying up to the ayatollahs in tehran, and it is funnelling money to hamas.
ta isoleerib taiwani ja poeb pekingi türannide embusse, ta keeldub suhtlemast castro-vastaste kuuba teisitimõtlejatega, ta arendab sooje suhteid teherani ajatolladega ja suunab raha hamasile.