Results for contracts translation from Spanish to Italian

freelance contracts
freelance contracts

a shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd
shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd

esp sell also support contracts for cups and printpro.
esp sell also support contracts for cups and printpro.

ad shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd hampshire international business park
to shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd hampshire international business park chineham, basingstoke

shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd basingstoke, rg24 8ep, reino unido
shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd basingstoke, rg24 8ep, regno unito

directorate general of contracts and purchasing. dirección: p.o.
directorate general of contracts and purchasing.

a ad shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd hampshire international business park chineham, basingstoke
shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd

260201 procedures for awarding and advertising public supply, works and services contracts
260201 procedures for awarding and advertising public supply, works and services contracts

shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd hampshire international business park chineham basingstoke hampshire rg24 8ep reino unido
shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd hampshire international business park chineham basingstoke hampshire rg24 8ep regno unito

(14) the company status allows investbx 2 to enter into contracts in its own right.
(14) the company status allows investbx 2 to enter into contracts in its own right.

titular de la autorización de comercialización shire pharmaceutical contracts limited hampshire international business park chineham, basingstoke hampshire rg24 8ep reino unido
produttore titolare dell’ autorizzazione all’ immissione in commercio wasdell packaging limited shire pharmaceutical contracts limited upper mills estate hampshire international business park bristol road, stonehouse chineham, basingstoke gloucestershire hampshire gl10 2bj rg24 8ep regno unito regno unito

review by the commission and advisory committee for public contracts in 2007; if necessary, additional evaluation exercises will be considered.
review by the commission and advisory committee for public contracts in 2007; if necessary, additional evaluation exercises will be considered.

1 january to 31 december 2009 , contracts awarded without publication of a notice 1 august 2007 to 31 december 2008 , contracts awarded without publication of a notice
1 january to 31 december 2009 , contracts awarded without publication of a notice 1 august 2007 to 31 december 2008 , contracts awarded without publication of a notice

new rules and procedures have been adopted for the principal budgetary process : calls for tenders , grants , commitments , contracts and payments .
new rules and procedures have been adopted for the principal budgetary process : calls for tenders , grants , commitments , contracts and payments .

126 « optimal contracts in dynamic costly state verification model » , por c. monnet y e. quintin , febrero 2002 .
126 optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model , di c. monnet e e. quintin , febbraio 2002 .

ac la comisión europea concedió una autorización de comercialización de dynepo válida en toda la unión europea a la empresa farmacéutica shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd el 18 de marzo de 2002. riz la autorización de comercialización fue renovada el 18 de marzo de 2007.
il 18 marzo 2002 la commissione europea ha rilasciato alla shire pharmaceutical contracts ltd un’ autorizzazione all’ immissione in commercio per dynepo, valida in tutta l’ unione europea.

no. icc-01/04-01/06 77/5 93 14 march 2012 investigators or their abduction.359 156. it was considered that all the witnesses – not just from the prosecution – were at risk, regardless of whether individual threats were credible. 360 given these clear dangers, the witnesses quickly expressed their anxiety lest their identities or the fact that they were in contact with the investigators became known. 361 this led to the adoption of a very specific and rigorous policy for investigators and witnesses362 – which slowed down the work of the otp363 – because the priority was their security.364 157. a team was established, called the gcu (the gender and children’s unit), 365 which dealt with psychological support and other issues relating to witnesses. 366 however, p-0582 indicated that the operational support unit (“osu”) was specifically responsible for witness protection, although it did not become operational until mid 2005 as regards assessing security and witness protection.367 p-0582 suggested that prior to its establishment, the osu nonetheless existed in an early form with responsibilities that were limited to providing 359 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 38, lines 21 – 25. 360 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 41, lines 13 – 15. 361 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 39, lines 7 – 11. 362 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 39, lines 11 – 12. 363 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 39, lines 18 – 20. 364 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 39, lines 20 – 21. 365 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 43, lines 1 – 3. 366 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 42, lines 3 – 4. 367 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 43, lines 9 – 13 and 16 – 17. icc-01/04-01/06-2842 14-03-2012 77/624 sl t no. icc-01/04-01/06 78/5 93 14 march 2012 support for investigations in the field.368 158. the victims and witnesses unit (“vwu”), as a unit of the registry, was created at the outset, 369 and it worked with the prosecution’s investigation team in bunia. 370 the system proposed by the investigators, if there were risks or threats to witnesses following an assessment into the security situation, was to react by way of an initial rapid response by the otp followed by intervention on the part of the witness protection unit of the registry.371 p-0582’s work, particularly in 2006, was to resolve any difficulties between the otp and the registry as regards witness protection, 372 and there were some notable disagreements between the vwu and the otp as to the protection to be provided to certain individuals.373 159. several militias were investigated for threatening witnesses. 374 however, the real problem was not the threat from the various groups but rather the risk of an individual being identified by members of his or her community, village or family as having cooperated with the court.375 in particular, those who assisted were worried about being identified by the people they had spoken about,376 given most of the 368 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 43, lines 13 – 17. 369 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 43, lines 21 – 22. 370 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 43, lines 22 – 23. 371 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 44, lines 2 – 5. 372 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 44, lines 7 – 9. 373 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 44, lines 21 – 25. 374 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 46, lines 23 – 25. 375 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 47, lines 11 – 13. 376 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 47, lines 13 – 16. icc-01/04-01/06-2842 14-03-2012 78/624 sl t no. icc-01/04-01/06 79/5 93 14 march 2012 witnesses mentioned the names of the militia leaders who did not want to be implicated. 377 the witnesses were at risk from these individuals, who were in a position to threaten them.378 160. the otp did not normally contact the families of witnesses, given the danger that information would be provided to the political or military leaders who were still in bunia, 379 thereby exposing the witness to the risk of immediate abduction.380 security became the primary concern of the investigation team.381 161. for similar reasons, the investigators did not go to the schools the children had allegedly attended and they did not try to secure any school records.382 the hema community in bunia had a reputation as being the best educated and they ran well-organised schools.383 the investigators did not want to raise the suspicions of the hema intellectuals who may have had links with the political or military movements, 384 and the investigators would have been immediately identified if they had visited the neighbourhoods.385 162. there was no field office in 2004 and 2005 at the time when p-0582 377 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 47, lines 17 – 22. 378 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 47, line 22 to page 48, line 3. 379 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 32, line 13 to page 33, line 6. 380 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 33, lines 1 – 3. 381 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 33, lines 8 – 11. 382 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 33, lines 12 – 23. 383 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 33, lines 15 – 19. 384 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 33, lines 20 – 21. 385 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 33, lines 21 – 23. icc-01/04-01/06-2842 14-03-2012 79/624 sl t no. icc-01/04-01/06 80/5 93 14 march 2012 went to interview the first group of witnesses.386 the office was set up over a period until it was fully operational in 2006.387 at the outset, it was necessary, but not always easy, to find premises that were sufficiently discreet for meetings with the witnesses.388 until the field office was set up, the investigators identified a variety of different places for the interviews. 389 churches were sometimes used, but caution had to be exercised because of the role of clergy in the political life in ituri and the need not to attract attention,390 and locations such as libraries, schools, deserted areas and rented houses were utilised.391 although the un refused to provide space, the investigators nonetheless needed to be protected by an armed force such as monuc.392 eventually, a solution was found.393 163. some ngos refused to cooperate with the court,394 whilst others were interested in assisting either informally or formally. 395 ngos asked the investigators to treat the information they provided on a confidential basis.396 some representatives of the un, in contrast with certain members of the organisation’s hierarchy, provided the 386 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 72, lines 14 – 18. 387 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 72, lines 18 – 19. 388 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 73, lines 2 – 3. 389 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 77, lines 5 – 7. 390 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 77, lines 8 – 11. 391 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 77, lines 12 – 15. 392 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 72, lines 20 – 22. 393 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 72, line 23 to page 73, line 1. 394 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 70, lines 16 – 23 and page 71, lines 3 – 4. 395 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 71, lines 4 – 6. 396 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 71, lines 7 – 9. icc-01/04-01/06-2842 14-03-2012 80/624 sl t no. icc-01/04-01/06 81/5 93 14 march 2012 investigators with considerable assistance.397 164. the investigators relied on un flights since they could not use the internal congolese airlines.398 at the beginning, they rented cars rather than utilise un vehicles because the latter were immediately identifiable.399 eventually, the court purchased vehicles similar in type to the sizeable number used by ngos, which were unidentifiable.400 165. on average an investigator stayed in the field for ten days, although this varied because, for instance, some interviews lasted longer than others; on occasion the interviews were cancelled at the last minute; or a new witness needed to be interviewed urgently.401 the investigators lost motivation given the absence of a field office and the need to find apartments,402 which sometimes provided them with only a floor and a duvet, and no shower; these were not the best long-term conditions, although things improved considerably after the field office was built.403 166. the investigation teams tried to work in rotation. there was a team member in the field as frequently as possible during the first months,404 but because there were only a few investigators it was not possible to have someone in the field permanently. this would have been the 397 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 71, lines 9 – 13. 398 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 73, lines 6 – 9. 399 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 74, lines 18 – 21. 400 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 74, lines 21 – 25. 401 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 75, lines 3 – 6. 402 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 75, lines 8 – 10. 403 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 75, lines 10 – 13. 404 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 75, lines 14 – 16. icc-01/04-01/06-2842 14-03-2012 81/624 sl t no. icc-01/04-01/06 82/5 93 14 march 2012 correct approach, according to p-0582.405 167. to summarise, from the outset of the investigation, human rights activists gave the investigators the names of potential witnesses, since they had “seen these people and they knew what they were going to say”.406 because of their long-term presence,407 it was considered that the activists were better placed than the investigators, and particularly it did not cause any surprise when the activists spoke with representatives of monuc or had discussions with villagers.408 the investigators could not move about freely without being threatened409 and witnesses were endangered if the investigators spoke directly with them. as a result, the investigating team or some of the activists suggested the latter should act as intermediaries.410 therefore, from early on, even with the assistance of the intermediaries, the investigators were restricted as to the timing and the location of any meetings,411 and they had to act discreetly.412 p-0583 gave evidence that the only solution to the security problem was to use intermediaries, who enabled the team to contact witnesses.413 168. the implications of the choices made in the course of the investigation are discussed as necessary in the relevant sections. many 405 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 75, lines 16 – 18. 406 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 48, lines 9 – 13. 407 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 48, lines 13 – 15. 408 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 48, lines 15 – 20. 409 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 48, lines 21 – 22. 410 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 48, line 22 to page 49, line 2. 411 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 49, lines 3 – 5. 412 transcript of deposition on 16 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 49, lines 5 – 7. 413 t-334-red2-eng, page 13, lines 9 – 11. icc-01/04-01/06-2842 14-03-2012 82/624 sl t no. icc-01/04-01/06 83/5 93 14 march 2012 – although by no means all – of the evidential difficulties in this case as far as the prosecution is concerned have been the result of the involvement of three particular intermediaries (p-0143, p-0316 and p- 0321), in the circumstances that are described below. g. determining the ages of children 169. a recurring issue in the context of this part of the evidence is whether some of the intermediaries encouraged a number of young witnesses to lie about aspects of their past, including their ages. 170. p-0582 indicated that at the relevant time, the civil administration in the drc functioned only to a limited extent,414 and the conditions the team were operating under were not ideal for establishing, with ease, the age of the alleged child soldiers.415 this issue was the subject of ongoing internal discussions within the otp as to the policy to be adopted for collecting evidence in this context. 416 p-0582, as an investigation leader, was not alone in considering that a prosecution forensic expert should be instructed immediately, in order to provide at least an approximate idea of age. 417 however, the executive committee within the otp was of the view that the statements given by the witnesses sufficiently indicated that the relevant individuals were below 15 years of age.418 it was also anticipated that confirmation would be provided in the interviews with the officers (or with others with responsibility) that there was general awareness that children 414 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 14, lines 20 – 21. 415 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 14, line 22 to page 15, line 1. 416 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 15, lines 1 – 4. 417 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 15, lines 11 - 23. 418 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 15, line 21 to page 16, line 2. icc-01/04-01/06-2842 14-03-2012 83/624 sl t no. icc-01/04-01/06 84/5 93 14 march 2012 under 15 years were involved.419 p-0582 indicated that there was an important debate within the otp on this problem once the forensic expert raised the issue at the very start of the investigations (at the end of 2004).420 171. when the investigators had finally identified 5 or 6 children who came within the classification of child soldiers on the basis of their statements, it was considered necessary to confirm their ages through objective evidence. 421 the investigators requested civil status documents, although they did not personally collect them from the relevant offices of the civilian administration in bunia422 (this issue is developed elsewhere). 423 a doctor saw the children, 424 and the investigators were informed that, within the hema community, children could not be baptised before a certain age.425 172. against the background that p-0582 was involved personally, as a team leader, with 5 or 6 alleged former child soldiers, it is important to note that the investigators did not speak with their families to arrange interviews with the children or their relatives.426 the main concern of the investigators was the security of the children, particularly if they were attacked because of their contact with the investigators. 427 419 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 16, lines 3 – 5. 420 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 16, lines 6 – 9. 421 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 16, lines 14 – 17. 422 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 16, lines 17 – 23. 423 see para. 173. 424 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 16, line 24. 425 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 17, lines 1 – 6. 426 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 17, lines 8 – 12. 427 transcript of deposition on 18 november 2010, icc-01/04-01/06-rule68deposition-red2-eng, page 17, lines 21 – 25. icc-01/04-01/06-2842 14-03-2012 84/624 sl t no. icc-01/04-01/06 85/5 93 14 march 2012 therefore, the policy of the otp was to not meet with the families in order to avoid endangering them: it was feared that a member of the extended family might reveal to the militia leaders the identity of the individual who had provided the information. 428 this policy was applied to all the witnesses and it was only varied on an exceptional basis.429 173. p-0582 did not ask the village chiefs (chefs de collectivite) about the child soldiers, given their close association with the militias that were under investigation (although there were some discussions on other issues).430 additionally, the investigators did not request the files of the alleged child soldiers from the headmasters or directors of the relevant schools, in order to cross-check their ages.431 however, intermediary 143 (who was one of the principal intermediaries), in the context of the general problems relating to children, was asked by the investigators whether he was aware of school registers that listed the children, thereby potentially establishing whether individual children could be linked with particular classes of students within identified age ranges.432 intermediary 143 carried out some research and provided certain documents, which were photocopied.433 he was directed not to try to obtain birth certificates from the mayor’s office in bunia or 428 transcript of
© ste un