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Town

Town

Última actualización: 2014-10-04
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Gohar Textile Mills | 208 Chak Road, Zia Town, Faisalabad |
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Le [...] 14:01:ES:HTML

Gohar Textile mills | 208 Chak Road, Zia Town, Faisalabad |
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Le [...] 14:01:EN:HTML

Última actualización: 2014-10-31
Tema: Jurídico y notarial
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Referencia: MatteoT

New Town Development Corporations (Corporaciones de desarrollo de nuevos centros urbanos),

New Town Development Corporations,

Última actualización: 2014-10-31
Tema: Ciencias sociales
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Referencia: Translated.net

Cuando se sospecha una fractura mandibular aislada, la evaluación radiográfica rutinaria puede consistir en una radiografía panorámica y una vista postero- anterior adicional de la mandíbula, por lo general una radiografía de de boca-abierta de Towne.21 Una radiografía panorámica es la imagen individual más completa y por lo general permite la visualización satisfactoria de todas las regiones de la mandíbula (cóndilo, ramus, cuerpo y sínfisis) (Fig.

When an isolated mandibular fracture is suspected, the routine radiographic assessment may consist of a panoramic radiograph and one additional postero-anterior view of the mandible, usually an open-mouth Towne's radiograph.21 A panoramic radiograph is the single most comprehensive image and usually allows for satisfactory visualization of all regions of the mandible (condyle, ramus, body, and symphysis) (Fig. 42.6).

Última actualización: 2014-04-17
Tema: Medicina
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La vista de Towne añade otra dimensión anatómica y es especialmente útil para descartar las fracturas subcondíleas.

The Towne's view adds another anatomic dimension and is especially useful in ruling out subcondylar fractures.

Última actualización: 2014-04-17
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Trial Chamber I (“Trial Chamber” or “Chamber”) of the International Criminal Court (“Court” or “ICC”), in the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (“Lubanga case”), issues the following Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute: I. THE CHARGES 1. On 29 January 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued its Decision on the Confirmation of Charges. 1 It confirmed that there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that: Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is responsible, as co-perpetrator, for the charges of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities within the meaning of articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 25(iii)(a) of the Statue from early September 2002 to 2 June 2003.2 Additionally, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed that there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that: Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is responsible, as co-perpetrator, for the charges of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities within the meaning of articles 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute from 2 June to 13 August 2003.3 2. Under the Rome Statute (“Statute”)4 and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”), the charges include a description of the relevant facts and circumstances, and the facts are legally characterised. Therefore the charges are made up of factual and legal elements. 3. Pursuant to Article 74(2) of the Statute, the judgment “shall not exceed the facts and circumstances, described in the charges and any amendments to the charges”. The charges and any amendments thereto establish the factual scope of the Decision pursuant to Article 74(2). 4. By Regulation 55(1) of the Regulations of the Court (“Regulations”), “the Chamber may change the legal characterisation of facts to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or to accord with the form of participation of the accused under articles 25 and 28”. However, it shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges. 5. Regulation 52(b) of the Regulations establishes what needs to be included in the document containing the charges: “[a] statement of the facts, including the time and place of the alleged crimes, which provides a sufficient legal and factual basis to bring the person or persons to trial, including relevant facts for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court”. 6. The Appeals Chamber has defined what are “the facts” in this context: In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the term 'facts' refers to the factual allegations which support each of the legal elements of the crime charged. These factual allegations must be distinguished from the evidence put forward by the Prosecutor at the confirmation hearing to support a charge (article 61 (5) of the Statute), as well as from background or other information that, although contained in the document containing the charges or the confirmation decision, does not support the legal elements of the crime charged. The Appeals Chamber emphasises that in the confirmation process, the facts, as defined above, must be identified with sufficient clarity and detail, meeting the standard in article 67 (1) (a) of the Statute.5 7. It follows that the accused cannot be convicted on a basis that exceeds the factual circumstances that were identified in the Confirmation Decision as supporting each of the legal elements of the crimes charged. 8. The two paragraphs of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges cited above contain the legal characterisation of the facts, including the mode of liability, the temporal framework of the crimes and the fact that the alleged conscription and enlistment was “into” the Force Patriotique pour la Liberation du Congo (“FPLC”). The Pre-Trial Chamber, in this section, did not expressly identify the facts that supported each of the legal elements of the crimes charged. However, they were referred to in other sections of the Decision and the Trial Chamber has ensured that the present Judgment does not exceed the facts and circumstances established by the Pre-Trial Chamber. II.BRIEF CASE HISTORY, JURISDICTION AND PARTICIPATION BY VICTIMS Jurisdiction 9. Pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute, the “Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it.”6 The Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) became a State party on 11 April 2002 and, pursuant to Article 14, President Kabila referred the situation in the DRC to the Prosecutor in March 2004. 7 Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded that the case falls within the Court’s jurisdiction,8 and the Appeals Chamber confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision on the accused’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court.9 The personal, temporal, territorial and subject-matter elements that are relevant to the Court’s jurisdiction have not altered since the Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, and the issue has not been raised by the parties or any State before the Trial Chamber. Case history 10. The first status conference before the Trial Chamber was held on 4 September 2007, and thereafter there were 54 status conferences prior to the commencement of the trial.10 A list of the main decisions of the Chamber is set out in Annex A. However, it is appropriate to mention in this section four major procedural events which had a significant impact on the course of the proceedings: i) On 13 June 2008, the Chamber stayed the proceedings inter alia as a consequence of the failure by the Office of the Prosecutor (“prosecution” or “OTP”) to disclose a significant body of potentially exculpatory evidence covered by certain confidentiality agreements that had been entered into on the basis of Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute.11 After a considerable delay, the materials that had been withheld were disclosed, and following a review of them by the Chamber, the stay of proceedings was lifted on 18 November 2008.12 The prosecution called its first witness on 28 January 2009 after the parties and legal representatives of the victims had completed their opening statements on 26 and 27 January 2009.13 ii) The presentation of oral evidence by the prosecution concluded on 14 July 2009, 14 and thereafter the Majority of the Chamber (Judge Fulford dissenting) issued a Decision notifying the parties and participants that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change, pursuant to Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court.15 The Chamber granted leave to appeal the Decision on 3 September 200916 and adjourned the presentation of evidence and any further consideration of Regulation 55 pending the outcome of the interlocutory appeal.17 The Appeals Chamber issued its judgment reversing the 14 July 2009 Decision on 8 December 2009. 18 The presentation of evidence resumed on 7 January 2010 with the testimony of the third expert called by the Chamber.19 28 witnesses testified before the Chamber between 7 January and 8 July 2010, including 3 victims called by their legal representative and 3 prosecution witnesses (see below). The presentation of the defence evidence commenced on 27 January 2010. iii) On 8 July 2010, the Trial Chamber imposed a second stay of proceedings because of the prosecution’s non-compliance with an order for the disclosure of the name of Intermediary 143. 20 The Appeals Chamber concluded that the orders of a Chamber are binding and the Prosecutor is obliged to comply with them (the Prosecutor’s “wilful non-compliance constituted a clear refusal to implement the orders of the Chamber”), 21 but it reversed the stay of proceedings on 8 October 2010 (indicating that a different sanction, namely a financial penalty, should have been considered).22 The presentation of evidence resumed on 25 October 2010. Seven witnesses testified between 25 October and 1 December 2010. iv) On 10 December 2010, the defence filed an application seeking a permanent stay of proceedings, arguing, inter alia, that four of the intermediaries used by the prosecution had prepared false evidence and the Prosecutor was aware that some of the evidence connected to these individuals was untruthful, and moreover he failed in his obligation to investigate its reliability.23 Prior to receiving the application, the Chamber had heard 30 witnesses relevant to this issue, including 3 intermediaries. The Chamber issued a Decision dismissing the defence application on 23 February 2011. 24 The presentation of the defence evidence resumed on 28 March 2011 and five final defence witnesses testified before the evidence formally closed on 20 May 2011. 11. As set out above, the presentation of evidence in the case started on 28 January 2009 and was formally closed on 20 May 2011.25 The Trial Chamber heard 67 witnesses, and there were 204 days of hearings.26 The prosecution called 36 witnesses, including 3 experts,27 and the defence called 24 witnesses.28 Three victims were called as witnesses following a request from their legal representatives. Additionally the Chamber called four experts.29 The prosecution submitted 368 items of evidence, the defence 992, and the legal representatives 13 (1373 in total). In addition to the written submissions, 30 the oral closing arguments of the parties and participants were heard on 25 and 26 August 2011. Since 6 June 2007, when the record of the case was transmitted to the Trial Chamber,31 the Chamber has delivered 275 written decisions and orders and 347 oral decisions.32 12. Article 76(2) provides that “the Trial Chamber may on its own motion and shall, at the request of the Prosecutor or the accused, hold a further hearing to hear any additional evidence or submissions relevant to the sentence”. The defence requested that the Chamber holds an additional hearing in the event of a conviction.33 In an oral Decision delivered on 25 November 2008, the Chamber decided there would be a separate sentencing hearing if the accused is convicted.34 Participation by victims 13. The Rome Statute permits victims to participate in proceedings before the ICC. In accordance with Article 68(3) of the Statute, victims have participated in the present case, and in particular they have applied to introduce evidence, they have questioned witnesses and they have advanced written and oral submissions (with the leave of the Chamber), assisted by their legal representatives. 14. In the “Decision on victims’ participation” (Judge Blattmann separately and partially dissenting), the Chamber issued general guidelines concerning the participation by victims during the trial.35 This Decision was appealed. 36 The Appeals Chamber partially confirmed and partially reversed the Decision.37 The following overall criteria have been established in the decisions of the Trial and the Appeals Chambers: i) Bearing in mind the current situation in the DRC and the potential difficulties in obtaining or producing copies of official identity documents, applicants may establish proof of their identity by way of a range of official and non-official documents.38 ii) Using Principle 8 of the Basic Principles 39 as guidance, a victim is someone who experienced personal harm, individually or collectively with others, directly or indirectly, in a variety of different ways such as physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss. 40 iii) Participation by victims at trial will first and foremost take place by way of the procedure established in Rule 89(1) of the Rules. iv) Only those who suffered harm as a result of the crimes charged may be considered victims in the case. Applicants need to demonstrate a link between the harm they suffered and the crimes faced by the accused,41 and they should demonstrate in written applications that they are victims of these offences. v) “[P]ursuant to Article 68(3) of the Statute, victims will first have to demonstrate that their personal interests are affected by the trial in order to be permitted to present their views and concerns at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.” 42 Participation is to be decided on the basis of the evidence or issues under consideration at any particular stage in the proceedings and victims wishing to participate should set out in a discrete written application the nature and the detail of the proposed intervention. 43 vi) In accordance with Rule 131(2) of the Rules, victims have the right to consult the record of the proceedings, including the index, subject to any restrictions concerning confidentiality and the protection of national security information. In principle, victims have the right to access and receive notification of all public filings and those confidential filings which concern them (as identified by the parties), insofar as this does not breach any protective measures that are in place. 44 vii)Victims may request the Chamber to use its broad powers to call all the material it considers relevant for the determination of the truth, in order that the evidence identified by victims concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused is introduced (to the extent appropriate). Victims may tender evidence, examine witnesses and challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence during the trial so long as: (i) they submit a discrete application; (ii) notice is given to the parties; (iii) the personal interests of one or more victims are affected by the evidence; (iv) there is compliance with their “disclosure obligations and [any] protection orders”;45 (v) the Chamber determines this course is appropriate and (vi) there is consistency with the rights of the accused and a fair trial. 46 viii) Victims have the right to participate in public hearings and to file written submissions, and they may be permitted to participate in closed or ex parte hearings or to file confidential or ex parte submissions, depending on the circumstances. 47 ix) Victims’ views and concerns may be presented by a common legal representative in order to provide for the fairness and expeditiousness of the trial.48 x) Victims may apply to the Chamber for leave to call evidence relating to reparations during the trial under Regulation 56 of the Regulations of the Court.49 xi) Anonymous victims may participate in the trial. However, the greater the extent and significance of the proposed participation, the more likely it will be that the Chamber will require the victim to identify himself or herself. 50 15. The total number of individual victims authorised to participate in the proceedings is 129 (34 female and 95 male victims).51 Once the Chamber received the parties’ observations on their applications and reviewed the reports prepared by the Victims Participation and Reparations Section under Regulation 86(5) of the Regulations of the Court, 52 it concluded, on a prima facie basis, that each of these individuals were victims of the crimes charged against the accused.53 In accordance with the Statute the Trial Chamber examined, on a caseby- case basis, the link between the harm allegedly suffered, the victims’ personal interests and the charges against the accused. 16. While all 129 victims claimed they had suffered harm as a result of the enlistment or conscription of children under the age of 15, or their use to participate actively in the hostilities, many also alleged they had suffered harm as a result of other crimes, such as sexual violence and torture or other forms of ill treatment, which are not the subject of charges against the accused.54 17. The victims who have been granted permission to participate in this trial are, in the main, alleged former child soldiers, although some are the parents or relatives of former child soldiers and one is a school. Since some of the victims were still children when they submitted their applications, their parents, relatives or others have acted on their behalf. The Chamber accepted that the individual who acted for a child did not need to be their parent or legal guardian – indeed it permitted children to participate directly without an adult representing them.55 18. Many of the victims in the case were granted protective measures and, in particular, anonymity because of their vulnerable position living in areas of ongoing conflict. Consequently, of 129 victims, the identities of only 23 have been disclosed to the parties and participants in the proceedings. However, the Chamber found that: [w]hile the safety and security of victims is a central responsibility of the Court, their participation in the proceedings cannot be allowed to undermine the fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. The greater the extent and the significance of the proposed participation, the more likely it will be that the Chamber will require the victim to identify himself or herself. Accordingly, when resolving a request for anonymity by a victim who has applied to participate, the Chamber will scrutinise carefully the precise circumstances and the potential prejudice to the parties and other participants. […]56 19. The Chamber formulated certain key principles for those individuals with dual status as victims and witnesses.57 Whilst the Chamber indicated that their security should not be compromised, it also established that individuals with dual status do not accrue rights above and beyond those of someone who is solely a victim or a witness.58 20. Common legal representatives have appeared in court for the participating victims, who have been divided into two groups represented by two teams of external counsel. 59 Additionally, the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (“OPCV”) was authorised to continue representing four dual status victims.60 Through their legal representatives the victims made opening statements, 61 examined witnesses62 and requested leave to introduce evidence.63 They were permitted to make written and oral submissions. 21. The Chamber authorised three victims to give evidence as witnesses during the trial and evidence was presented on behalf of a school.64 These three witnesses, who testified in January 2010, were granted incourt protective measures that included voice and face distortion and%0

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Última actualización: 2012-11-08
Tema: General
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Common Law legal systems have developed principles about modes of liability. However, at their inception, neither of these systems was intended to deal with the crimes under the jurisdiction of this Court, i.e. the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Statute sets out the modes of liability in Articles 25 and 28 and, they should be interpreted in a way that allows properly expressing and addressing the responsibility for these crimes. 977. Articles 25(3)(a) to (d) establish the modes of individual criminal responsibility under the Statute, other than the “[r]esponsibility of commanders and other superiors”, which is addressed in Article 28. Under Article 25(3)(a), an individual can be convicted of committing a crime: (i) individually; (ii) jointly with another; or (iii) through another person. Under Articles 25(3)(b) to (d), an individual can be convicted of: (i) ordering, soliciting or inducing a crime; (ii) acting as an accessory to a crime; or (iii) contributing to a crime committed by a group acting with a common purpose. 978. The Pre-Trial Chamber decided, pursuant to Article 61(7) of the Statute, there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Mr Lubanga committed the crimes charged, under Article 25(3)(a), as a direct co-perpetrator. The Chamber will limit its analysis of Mr Lubanga’s responsibility to this mode of liability. 979. In considering the scope of liability under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, the Chamber notes, as set out above,2685 that the Appeals Chamber has stated that the provisions of the Statute are to be interpreted in conformity with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2686 Hence, the relevant elements of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, that the individual “commits such a crime […] jointly with another […] person”, must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the language of the Statute, bearing in mind the relevant context and in light of its object and purpose.2687 (1) The Common Plan or Agreement 980. Article 25(3)(a) stipulates that a crime can be committed not only by an individual acting by himself or through another person, but also by an individual who acts jointly with another. To establish liability as a co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a), it is necessary there are at least two individuals involved in the commission of the crime. This is evident from the use of terms “jointly with another” in Article 25(3)(a). 981. As the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded, co-perpetration requires the existence of an agreement or common plan between the coperpetrators. This provides for a sufficient connection between the individuals who together commit the crime and it allows responsibility to be established on a “joint” basis.2688 982. As set out above, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided that the plan “must include “an element of criminality”, although it does not need to be specifically directed at the commission of a crime.”2689 In the Confirmation Decision, it was held to be sufficient: (i) that the co-perpetrators have agreed: (a) to start the implementation of the common plan to achieve a non-criminal goal, and (b) to only commit the crime if certain conditions are met; or (ii) that the co-perpetrators (a) are aware of the risk that implementing the common plan (which is specifically directed at the achievement of a noncriminal goal) will result in the commission of the crime, and (b) accept such outcome. 2690 983. While the prosecution supports this interpretation,2691 the defence argues that in order to establish criminal liability on the basis of coperpetration, the common plan must be intrinsically criminal. It is argued that participation in a plan which “in itself is not criminal but merely capable of creating conditions conducive to the commission of criminal acts cannot be regarded as characterising the actus reus of criminal co-perpetration”. 2692 Therefore, it is suggested “mere knowledge ‘of the risk that implementing the common plan will result in the commission of the crime’ is insufficient to engage criminal responsibility by way of co-perpetration.”2693 984. In the view of the Majority of the Chamber, the prosecution is not required to prove that the plan was specifically directed at committing the crime in question (the conscription, enlistment or use of children), nor does the plan need to have been intrinsically criminal as suggested by the defence. However, it is necessary, as a minimum, for the prosecution to establish the common plan included a critical element of criminality, namely that, its implementation embodied a sufficient risk that, if events follow the ordinary course, a crime will be committed. 985. In order to establish the statutory scope of this first objective requirement, the Majority of the Chamber finds guidance in the manner that the plan is mirrored in the mental element. A combined reading of Articles 25(3)(a) and 30 leads to the conclusion that committing the crime in question does not need to be the overarching goal of the co-perpetrators. 986. The conscription, enlistment and use of children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities is said by the prosecution to have been the result of the implementation of the common plan.2694 Under Article 30(2)(b), intent is established if the person is aware that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. Similarly, Article 30(3) provides that “knowledge” of a consequence means awareness that it (the consequence) “will occur in the ordinary course of events”. Hence, in the view of the Majority, the mental requirement that the common plan included the commission of a crime will be satisfied if the co-perpetrators knew that, in the ordinary course of events, implementing the plan will lead to that result. “Knowledge”, defined as awareness by the co-perpetrators that a consequence will occur (in the future), necessarily means that the co- perpetrators are aware of the risk that the consequence, prospectively, will occur. This interpretation is discussed in greater detail below in the section dealing with the mental element. 987. The Majority of the Chamber concludes that as to the objective part of this requirement, this means that the agreement on a common plan leads to co-perpetration if its implementation embodies a sufficient risk that, in the ordinary course of events, a crime will be committed. 988. Furthermore, co-perpetration does not require that the agreement or the common plan is explicit in order for the individual conduct of each co-perpetrator to be connected.2695 Finally, although direct evidence of the plan is likely to assist in demonstrating its existence, this is not a legal requirement. The agreement can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. (2) The Essential Contribution 989. The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that the contribution of the alleged co-perpetrator must be “essential”. 2696 It stated its conclusion as follows: In the view of the Chamber, when the objective elements of an offence are carried out by a plurality of persons acting within the framework of a common plan, only those to whom essential tasks have been assigned – and who, consequently, have the power to frustrate the commission of the crime by not performing their tasks – can be said to have joint control over the crime.2697 990. The prosecution submits that co-perpetration requires that the accused has “functional control” over the crime: This means that, when conceiving the common plan, the Accused must have been assigned a role that was central to the implementation of the common plan, in the sense that the common plan would not have been carried out in the manner agreed upon without that role being performed. This concept has been labelled as “functional control”. 2698 991. However, the prosecution qualifies this suggested requirement by submitting that as long as the accused was assigned a central role in the implementation of the plan, it will suffice if in retrospect it appears his or her contribution was substantial, rather than essential. A “substantial” contribution is said to be established when “the crime might still have occurred absent the contribution of the Accused, but not without great difficulty”.2699 992. The defence contends that a “substantial” contribution is insufficient. It argues the contribution should be conditio sine qua non of the crime and this requirement must be assessed in light of the facts as they actually occurred, rather than assessed on the basis of the “role” assigned to the accused within the framework of a pre-agreed plan.2700 993. An analysis of the accused’s contribution gives rise to two interrelated questions. The first question is whether it is necessary for the prosecution to establish a connection between the accused’s contribution, taken in isolation, and the crimes that were committed. The second question relates to the nature of the contribution that gives rise to joint responsibility: should it be described as either “more than de minimis”, “substantial” or “essential”? 994. In the view of the Majority of the Chamber, the wording of Article 25(3)(a), namely that the individual “commits such a crime […] jointly with another”, requires that the offence be the result of the combined and coordinated contributions of those involved, or at least two of them. None of the participants exercises, individually, control over the crime as a whole but, instead, the control over the crime falls in the hands of a collective as such.2701 Therefore, the prosecution does not need to demonstrate that the contribution of the accused, taken alone, caused the crime; 2702 rather, the responsibility of the co-perpetrators for the crimes resulting from the execution of the common plan arises from mutual attribution, based on the joint agreement or common plan. 995. Article 25(3)(a) must be read in the context of the section establishing the modes of liability, in accordance with the Appeals Chamber’s jurisprudence set out above.2703 996. Both Articles 25(3)(a) and (d) address the situation in which a number of people are involved in a crime. In the judgment of the Majority, the critical distinction between these provisions is that under Article 25(3)(a) the co-perpetrator “commits” the crime, whilst under Article 25(3)(d) the individual “contributes in any other way to the commission” of a crime by a group of individuals acting with a common purpose. The Majority’s view is that a systematic reading of these provisions leads to the conclusion that the contribution of the coperpetrator who “commits” a crime is necessarily of greater significance than that of an individual who “contributes in any other way to the commission” of a crime. 997. Article 25(3)(c) establishes the liability of accessories – those who aid, abet or otherwise assist in the commission or attempted commission of the crime. In the view of the Majority, principal liability “objectively” requires a greater contribution than accessory liability. If accessories must have had “a substantial effect on the commission of the crime”2704 to be held liable, then co-perpetrators must have had, pursuant to a systematic reading of this provision, more than a substantial effect. 998. The conclusion that principal liability must require more than accessory liability is supported, in the view of the Majority, by the statutory provision on attempt liability (Article 25(3)(f) of the Statute). Only those individuals who attempt “to commit” a crime, as opposed to those who participate in a crime committed by someone else, can be held liable under that provision. The same conclusion is supported by the plain language of Articles 25(3)(b) and (c), which require for secondary liability that the perpetrator at least attempt to commit the crime. As such, secondary liability is dependent on whether the perpetrator acts. Conversely, principal liability, which is closer to the violation of the legal interests protected by the norm, is not the subject of such dependence. Hence, the Majority concludes that this confirms the predominance of principal over secondary liability, which, in turn, supports a notion of principal liability that requires a greater contribution than accessory liability. 999. The Majority is of the view that the contribution of the coperpetrator must be essential, as has been consistently and invariably established in this Court’s jurisprudence.2705 The Statute differentiates between the responsibility and liability of those persons who commit a crime (at Article 25(3)(a)) and those who are accessories to it (at Articles 25(3)(b) to (d)). It would be possible to expand the concept of principal liability (or “commission” or “perpetration”), to make it more widely applicable, by lowering the threshold that the accused’s contribution be essential. However, lowering that threshold would deprive the notion of principal liability of its capacity to express the blameworthiness of those persons who are the most responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern. Instead, a notion of coperpetration that requires an essential contribution allows for the different degrees of responsibility to be properly expressed and addressed. 1000. The determination as to whether the particular contribution of the accused results in liability as a co-perpetrator is to be based on an analysis of the common plan and the role that was assigned to, or was assumed by the co-perpetrator, according to the division of tasks.2706 In the view of the Majority what is decisive is whether the co-perpetrator performs an essential role in accordance with the common plan, and it is in this sense that his contribution, as it relates to the exercise of the role and functions assigned to him, must be essential. 1001. Furthermore, the co-perpetrator’s role is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This assessment involves a flexible approach, undertaken in the context of a broad inquiry into the overall circumstances of a case. 1002. The defence submits that co-perpetration requires “personal and direct participation in the crime itself”,2707 and that the responsibility of those who do not participate directly in the execution of a crime is reflected in Article 25(3)(b) rather than Article 25(3)(a).2708 It contends that Article 25(3)(a) requires direct participation in the crime.2709 1003. However, the Chamber agrees with the conclusions, firstly, of the Pre-Trial Chamber that criminal liability in this context is “not limited to those who physically carry out the objective elements of the offence, but also include(s) those who, in spite of being removed from the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether and how the offence will be committed”. 2710 Secondly, the Chamber agrees with the prosecution that “[i]t is not necessary that the accused physically perpetrated any of the elements of the crimes or that he was present at the crime scene”.2711 1004. Those who commit a crime jointly include, inter alia, those who assist in formulating the relevant strategy or plan, become involved in directing or controlling other participants or determine the roles of those involved in the offence. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for the prosecution to establish a direct or physical link between the accused’s contribution and the commission of the crimes. 1005. Hence, the Chamber is of the view that the accused does not need to be present at the scene of the crime, so long as he exercised, jointly with others, control over the crime. 1006. The Majority therefore concludes that the commission of a crime jointly with another person involves two objective requirements: (i) the existence of an agreement or common plan between two or more persons that, if implemented, will result in the commission of a crime; and (ii) that the accused provided an essential contribution to the common plan that resulted in the commission of the relevant crime. These two requirements must be assessed on the basis of all the evidence related to the alleged crime. b) The Mental Element 1007. Article 30 defines the requirement of “intent” by reference to three particular factors: conduct, consequence and circumstance. First, pursuant to Article 30(2)(a), a person has intent if he or she “means to engage in the conduct”. Second, under Article 30(2)(b) and in relation to a consequence, it is necessary that the individual “means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events”. Third, by Article 30(3) “knowledge” “means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events”. 1008. As noted earlier, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided that the subjective elements that the suspect must fulfil2712 are the following: (i) “[t]he suspect and the other co-perpetrators […] must all be mutually aware of the risk that implementing their common plan may result in the realisation of the objective elements of the crime, and […] must all mutually accept such a result by reconciling themselves with it or consenting to it”;2713 and (ii) “the awareness by the suspect of the factual circumstances enabling him or her to jointly control the crime”.2714 1009. The Pre-Trial Chamber decided that the “cumulative” reference to “intent” and “knowledge” in Article 30 means there must be a “volitional element” on the part of the accused. This encompasses not only situations in which the suspect: i) knows that his or her actions or omissions will bring about the objective elements of the crime, and ii) undertakes such actions or omissions with the concrete intent to bring about the objective elements of the crime (also kn

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[1] adidas factory outlet/discount store [2] adidas fashion store [3] Aktiesport [4] All:Sports[5] Athlete's Foot[6] Athlete's World[7] Atmosfera Sport[8] Base-detallsport[9] Brantano[10] Chausport[11] Cisalfa[12] Citadium[13] Clarks[14] Courir[15] Decathlon[16] Decimas[17] Deportes Cronos[18] El Corte Ingles[19] Foot Locker[20] Forum[21] Frontrunner[22] Gilesport[23] Go Sport[24] Grupo 1mima[25] Hargreaves[26] Helderman Sport[27] Icon[28] Indépendant mode[29] Indépendant station[30] Intersport[31] Intersport station[32] Jack Wolfskin[33] JD[34] JJB[35] Karstadt sports department[36] Kaufhof sports department[37] Made in Sport[38] Marks & Spencer sports department[39] Nike factory outlet/discount store[40] Nike fashion store[41] Nike Town[42] Office[43] Offspring[44] Perry Sport[45] Pista Central[46] Prosport[47] Puma factory outlet/discount store[48] Puma fashion store[49] Real Sportwelten[50] Runners Point[51] Schuh[52] Sidestep[53] Size[54] Sneakers[55] Snipes[56] Sole Trader[57] Sport 2000[58] Sport Street[59] Sportscheck[60] Sportsworld[61] Sprinter[62] SuperSport [63] Bata sports department[64] Tennis[65] Tesco[66] Titus[67] Treesse[68] Twinner[69] Universo Sport[70] V&D sports department[71] Velo[72] Voswinkel[73] Otras tiendas que no están en la lista (Especifique, por favor)[74] No sé

[1] adidas factory outlet/discount store [2] adidas fashion store [3] Aktiesport [4] All:Sports[5] Athlete's Foot[6] Athlete's World[7] Atmosfera Sport[8] Base-detallsport[9] Brantano[10] Chausport[11] Cisalfa[12] Citadium[13] Clarks[14] Courir[15] Decathlon[16] Decimas[17] Deportes Cronos[18] El Corte Ingles[19] Foot Locker[20] Forum[21] Frontrunner[22] Gilesport[23] Go Sport[24] Grupo 1mima[25] Hargreaves[26] Helderman Sport[27] Icon[28] Indépendant mode[29] Indépendant station[30] Intersport[31] Intersport station[32] Jack Wolfskin[33] JD[34] JJB[35] Karstadt sports department[36] Kaufhof sports department[37] Made in Sport[38] Marks & Spencer sports department[39] Nike factory outlet/discount store[40] Nike fashion store[41] Nike Town[42] Office[43] Offspring[44] Perry Sport[45] Pista Central[46] Prosport[47] Puma factory outlet/discount store[48] Puma fashion store[49] Real Sportwelten[50] Runners Point[51] Schuh[52] Sidestep[53] Size[54] Sneakers[55] Snipes[56] Sole Trader[57] Sport 2000[58] Sport Street[59] Sportscheck[60] Sportsworld[61] Sprinter[62] SuperSport [63] Bata sports department[64] Tennis[65] Tesco[66] Titus[67] Treesse[68] Twinner[69] Universo Sport[70] V&D sports department[71] Velo[72] Voswinkel[73] Other store not in this list (Please specify)[74] Don't know

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ii) Examen del Convenio relativo a las garantías reales internacionales sobre bienes de equipo móvil, abierto a la firma en Cape Town, Sudáfrica, el 16 de noviembre de 2001, y del proyecto preliminar de protocolo conexo sobre cuestiones concretas relacionadas con la propiedad espacial;

(ii) Consideration of the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, which was opened for signature at Cape Town, South Africa, on 16 November 2001, and the preliminary draft protocol on matters specific to space property;

Última actualización: 2014-10-31
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