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William Shakespeare

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Shakespeare

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Photo from William Lone's Moonlight Blog.

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Foto dari blog Moonlight milik William Lone.

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She draws inspiration from the nature, the tattoos on her arms and the bright colours of her blouse. Like William Wordsworth's Solitary Reaper, the lady reaps the paddy alone.

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Gambar yang dibuat terinspirasi alam tato di tangannya dan warna cerah pada blusnya.

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Solaris Support Parts derived (by permission) from the sunos5 module of William LeFebvre's "top" utility.

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Dukungan Solaris Suku cadang diderivasi (dengan hak akses) dari modul sunos5 dari utilitas "top" William LeFebvre.

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During one of the notorious Butte County sweeps several years ago, Deputy Sheriff Jacob Hancock came to Williams’ property without a warrant and required him to tear down all but twelve of the plants upon threat of arrest...

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Beberapa tahun yang lalu, dalam penggerebekan tanpa izin Kabupaten Butte, Wakil Sherif Jacob Hancock mengunjungi lahan Williams tanpa surat perintah dan menuntut sang empunya untuk menghancurkan lahan jika dia tidak ingin di tahan…

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Specifically, Williams and six other patients pooled their labor and resources to maintain a 41-plant garden on Williams’ property.

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Lebih tepatnya, Williams dan enam pasien lainnya bekerja sama menumbuhkan 41 tanaman di lahan milik Williams.

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The case is Williams v. Butte County , which involves a small patient collective, which was harassed by the Butte County Sheriff’s Office.

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Kasus Williams melawan Kabupaten Butte, yang melibatkan sekelompok kecil pasien, yang diusik oleh kantor Sherif kabupaten Butte.

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Mr.and mrs. william have got four children.they are sam, linda, tom, mary. the same surname. william. so, you will address mr. sam william.

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mr.and mrs. william have got four children.they are sam,linda, tom, mary. the same surname. william. so, you will address mr. sam william.

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Robert Watson-Watt From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Sir Robert Watson-Watt Born Robert Alexander Watson-Watt 13 April 1892 Brechin, Angus, Scotland, UK Died 5 December 1973 (aged 81) Inverness, Scotland, UK Known for Radar Notable awards • Hughes Medal (1948) • Elliott Cresson Medal (1957) • Fellow of the Royal Society[1] • KCB • FRAeS Sir Robert Alexander Watson-Watt, KCB, FRS, FRAeS (13 April 1892 – 5 December 1973) was a pioneer and significant contributor to the development of radar. Radar was initially nameless and researched elsewhere but it was greatly expanded on 1 September 1936 when Watson-Watt became Superintendent of a new establishment under the Air Ministry, Bawdsey Research Station near Felixstowe, Suffolk. Work there resulted in the design and installation of aircraft detection and tracking stations called Chain Home along the east and south coasts of England in time for the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. This system provided the vital advance information that helped the Royal Air Force win the Battle of Britain.[1][2] Contents • 1 Early years • 2 Early experiments • 3 RADAR o 3.1 The air defence problem o 3.2 Aircraft detection and location o 3.3 Civil Service trade union activities • 4 Contribution to Second World War • 5 Honours • 6 Legacy • 7 Family life • 8 References • 9 Sources • 10 External links Early years Born in Brechin, Angus, Scotland, on 13 April 1892 Watson-Watt (the hyphenated name is used herein for consistency, although this was not adopted until 1942)[3] was a descendant of James Watt, the famous engineer and inventor of the practical steam engine. After attending Damacre Primary School and Brechin High School,[4] he was accepted to University College, Dundee (then part of the University of St Andrews but became the University of Dundee in 1967). Watt had a successful time as a student, winning the Carnelley Prize for Chemistry and a class medal for Ordinary Natural Philosophy in 1910.[5] He graduated with a BSc in engineering in 1912, and was offered an assistantship by Professor William Peddie, the holder of the Chair of Physics at University College, Dundee from 1907 to 1942. It was Peddie who encouraged Watson-Watt to study radio, or "wireless telegraphy" as it was then known and who took him through what was effectively a postgraduate class of one on the physics of radio frequency oscillators and wave propagation. At the start of the Great War Watson-Watt was working as an assistant in the College's Engineering Department.[6] Early experiments In 1916 Watson-Watt wanted a job with the War Office, but nothing obvious was available in communications. Instead he joined the Meteorological Office, which was interested in his ideas on the use of radio for the detection of thunderstorms. Lightning gives off a radio signal as it ionizes the air, and his goal was to detect this signal to warn pilots of approaching thunderstorms. The signal occurs across a wide range of frequencies, and could be easily detected and amplified by naval longwave sets, in fact, lightning was a major problem for communications at these common wavelengths.[7] His early experiments were successful in detecting the signal and he quickly proved to be able to do so at ranges up to 2,500 km. However, there was some difficulty in determining location. This was accomplished by rotating a loop antenna to maximise (or minimise) the signal, thus "pointing" to the storm. However, the strikes were so fleeting that it was very difficult to turn the antenna in time to positively locate one. Instead, the operator would listen to many strikes and develop a rough average location.[7] At first, he worked at the Wireless Station of Air Ministry Meteorological Office in Aldershot, Hampshire. In 1924 when the War Department gave notice that they wished to re-occupy their Aldershot site, he moved to Ditton Park near Slough, Berkshire. The National Physical Laboratory (NPL) was already using this site and had two main devices that would prove pivotal to his work.[7] The first was an Adcock antenna, an arrangement of four masts that allowed the signal to be directed through phase differences. Using these as two separate loop antennas at right angles, one could make a simultaneous measurement of the lightning's direction in two axes. However, displaying the fleeting signals was a problem. This was solved by the second device, the WE-224 oscilloscope, recently acquired from Bell Labs. By feeding the signals from the two antennas into the X and Y channels of the oscilloscope, a single strike caused the appearance of a line on the display, indicating the direction of the strike. The scope's relatively "slow" phosphor allowed the signal to be read long after the strike had occurred.[8] Watt's new system was being used in 1926 and was the topic of an extensive paper by Watt and Herd.[9] The Met and NPL radio teams were amalgamated in 1927 to form the Radio Research Station with Watt as director. Continuing research throughout, the teams had become interested in the causes of "static" radio signals, and found that much could be explained by distant signals located over the horizon being reflected off the upper atmosphere. This was the first direct indication of the reality of the Heaviside layer, proposed earlier but at this time largely dismissed by engineers. To determine the altitude of the layer, Watt, Appleton and others developed the 'squegger' to develop a 'time base' display, which would cause the oscilloscope's dot to move smoothly across the display at very high speed. By timing the squegger so that the dot arrived at the far end of the display at the same time as expected signals reflected off the Heaviside layer, the altitude of the layer could be determined. This time base circuit was key to the development of radar.[10] After a further reorganization in 1933, Watt became Superintendent of the Radio Department of NPL in Teddington. RADAR The air defence problem During the First World War, the Germans had used Zeppelins as long-range bombers over London and other cities and defences had struggled to counter the threat. Since that time aircraft capabilities had improved considerably and the prospect of widespread aerial bombardment of civilian areas was causing the government anxiety. Heavy bombers were now able to approach at altitudes that anti-aircraft guns of the day were unable to reach.[11] With enemy airfields across the English Channel potentially only 20 minutes’ flying-time away, bombers would have dropped their bombs and be returning to base before any intercepting fighters could get to altitude. The only answer seemed to be to have standing patrols of fighters in the air at all times but, with the limited cruising time of a fighter, this would require a huge air force. An alternative solution was urgently needed and in 1934, the Air Ministry set up a committee, the CSSAD (Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence), chaired by Sir Henry Tizard to find ways to improve air defence in the UK. Nazi Germany was rumoured to have a "death ray" using radio waves that was capable of destroying towns, cities and people. In January 1935, H.E. Wimperis, Director of Scientific Research at the Air Ministry, asked Watson-Watt about the possibility of building their version of a death-ray, specifically to be used against aircraft.[citation needed] Watson-Watt quickly returned a calculation carried out by his colleague, Arnold Wilkins, showing that the device was impossible to construct, and fears of a Nazi version soon vanished. However, he also mentioned in the same report a suggestion that was originally made to him by Wilkins, who had recently heard of aircraft disturbing shortwave communications, that radio waves may be capable of detecting aircraft: "Meanwhile attention is being turned to the still difficult, but less unpromising, problem of radio detection and numerical considerations on the method of detection by reflected radio waves will be submitted when required." Wilson's idea, checked by Watt, was promptly presented by Tizard to the CSSAD on January 28.[12] Aircraft detection and location Memorial at the Daventry site of the first successful RADAR experiments. 52.195982°N 1.050121°W Closeup of memorial plaque On 12 February 1935, Watson-Watt sent the secret memo of the proposed system to the Air Ministry, Detection and location of aircraft by radio methods. Although not as exciting as a death-ray, the concept clearly had potential but the Air Ministry, before giving funding, asked for a demonstration proving that radio waves could be reflected by an aircraft.[13] This was ready by 26 February and consisted of two receiving antennas located about 6 miles (9.7 km) away from one of the BBC's shortwave broadcast stations at Daventry. The two antennas were phased such that signals travelling directly from the station cancelled themselves out, but signals arriving from other angles were admitted, thereby deflecting the trace on a CRT indicator (passive radar).[14] Such was the secrecy of this test that only three people witnessed it: Watson-Watt, his colleague Arnold Wilkins, and a single member of the committee, A. P. Rowe. The demonstration was a success; on several occasions a clear signal was seen from a Handley Page Heyford bomber being flown around the site. Most importantly, the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, was kept quietly informed of radar's progress. On 2 April 1935, Watson-Watt received a patent on a radio device for detecting and locating an aircraft. In mid-May 1935, Wilkins left the Radio Research Station with a small party, including Edward George Bowen, to start further research at Orford Ness, an isolated peninsula on the Suffolk coast of the North Sea. By June they were detecting aircraft at a distance of 16 miles (26 km), which was enough for scientists and engineers to stop all work on competing sound-based detection systems. By the end of the year the range was up to 60 miles (97 km), at which point plans were made in December to set up five stations covering the approaches to London. One of these stations was to be located on the coast near Orford Ness, and Bawdsey Manor was selected to become the main centre for all radar research. In an effort to put a radar defence in place as quickly as possible, Watson-Watt and his team created devices using existing available components, rather than creating new components for the project, and the team did not take additional time to refine and improve the devices. So long as the prototype radars were in workable condition they were put into production.[15] They soon conducted "full scale" tests of a fixed radar radio tower system that would soon be known as Chain Home, an early detection system that attempted to detect an incoming bomber by radio signals.[15][16] The tests were a complete failure, with the fighter only seeing the bomber after it had passed its target. The problem was not the radar, but the flow of information from trackers from the Observer Corps to the fighters, which took many steps and was very slow. Henry Tizard with Patrick Blackett and Hugh Dowding immediately set to work on this problem, designing a 'command and control air defence reporting system' with several layers of reporting that were eventually sent to a single large room for mapping. Observers watching the maps would then tell the fighter groups what to do via direct communications.[15] By 1937 the first three stations were ready, and the associated system was put to the test. The results were encouraging, and an immediate order by the government to commission an additional 17 stations was given, resulting in a chain of fixed radar towers along the east and south coast of England.[15][16] By the start of the Second World War, 19 were ready to play a key part in the Battle of Britain, and by the end of the war over 50 had been built. The Germans were aware of the construction of Chain Home but were not sure of its purpose. They tested their theories with a flight of the Zeppelin LZ 130, but concluded the stations were a new long-range naval communications system. As early as 1936, it was realized that the Luftwaffe would turn to night bombing if the day campaign did not go well, and Watson-Watt had put another of the staff from the Radio Research Station, Edward Bowen, in charge of developing a radar that could be carried by a fighter. Night time visual detection of a bomber was good to about 300 m, and the existing Chain Home systems simply did not have the accuracy needed to get the fighters that close. Bowen decided that an airborne radar should not exceed 90 kg (200 lb) in weight, 8 ft³ (230 L) in volume, and require no more than 500 watts of power. To reduce the drag of the antennas the operating wavelength could not be much greater than one m, difficult for the day's electronics. "AI" - Airborne Interception, was perfected by 1940, and was instrumental in eventually ending the Blitz of 1941. Bowen also fitted airborne radar to maritime patrol aircraft (known in this application as "ASV" - Air to Surface Vessel) and this eventually reduced the threat from submarines.[citation needed] Watson-Watt justified his choice of a non-optimal frequency for his radar with his often-quoted “cult of the imperfect,” which he stated as “Give them the third-best to go on with; the second-best comes too late, [and] the best never comes.” Civil Service trade union activities Between 1934 and 1936, Watson-Watt was president of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, now a part of Prospect, the "union for professionals". The union speculates that at this time he was involved in campaigning for an improvement in pay for Air ministry staff.[17] Contribution to Second World War Sir Robert Alexander Watson-Watt, ca. 1944 In his English History 1914–1945, historian A. J. P. Taylor paid the highest of praise to Watson-Watt, Sir Henry Tizard and their associates who developed and put in place radar, crediting them with being fundamental to victory in the Second World War.[18] In July 1938 Watson-Watt left Bawdsey Manor and took up the post of Director of Communications Development (DCD-RAE). In 1939 Sir George Lee took over the job of DCD, and Watson-Watt became Scientific Advisor on Telecommunications (SAT) to the Ministry of Aircraft Production, travelling to the USA in 1941 to advise them on the severe inadequacies of their air defence efforts illustrated by the Pearl Harbor attack. He was knighted in 1942.[19] Sir Robert descends from a plinth in Trafalgar Square, London in 1961 after speaking at a rally protesting at the spread of nuclear weapons Ten years after his knighthood, Watson-Watt was awarded £50,000 by the UK government for his contributions in the development of radar. He established a practice as a consulting engineer. In the 1950s he moved to Canada and later he lived in the USA, where he published Three Steps to Victory in 1958.[citation needed] Around 1958 he appeared as a mystery challenger on the American television programme To Tell The Truth. Watson-Watt reportedly was pulled over for speeding in Canada by a radar gun-toting policeman. His remark was, "Had I known what you were going to do with it I would never have invented it!"[citation needed] He wrote an ironic poem ("Rough Justice") afterwards: Pity Sir Robert Watson-Watt, strange target of this radar plot And thus, with others I can mention, the victim of his own invention. His magical all-seeing eye enabled cloud-bound planes to fly but now by some ironic twist it spots the speeding motorist and bites, no doubt with legal wit, the hand that once created it.[20] Honours • In 1945 Watson-Watt was invited to deliver the Royal Institution Christmas Lecture on Wireless. • In 1949 a Watson-Watt Chair of Electrical Engineering was established at University College, Dundee.[21] • In 2013 he was one of four inductees to the Scottish Engineering Hall of Fame.[22][23] Legacy Memorial to the Birth of Radar, at Stowe Nine Churches, naming Watson-Watt and Arnold Wilkins On 3 September 2014 a statue of Sir Robert was unveiled in Brechin by HRH the Princess Royal.[24] On 4 September Watson-Watt featured in the BBC Two drama Castles in the Sky, with Eddie Izzard in the role. Reviewing the film The Daily Telegraph concluded: "Overall, it all felt a bit worthy. This was history that everybody should know, but the erection of a statue might have done the job just as well."[25] Family life Watson-Watt was married[26] on 20 July 1916 in Hammersmith, London to Margaret Robertson, the daughter of a draughtsman; they later divorced and he remarried in 1952 in Canada.[27] His second wife was Jean Wilkinson, who died in 1964.[28] He returned to Scotland in the 1960s. In 1966, at the age of 72, he proposed to Dame Katherine Trefusis Forbes, who was 67 years old at the time and had also played a significant role in the Battle of Britain as the founding Air Commander of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force, which supplied the radar-room operatives. They lived together in London in the winter, and at "The Observatory" – Trefusis Forbes' summer home in Pitlochry, Perthshire, during the warmer months. They remained together until her death in 1971. Watson-Watt died in 1973, aged 81, in Inverness. Both are buried in the churchyard of the Episcopal Church of the Holy Trinity at Pitlochry. References 1. Ratcliffe, J. A. (1975). "Robert Alexander Watson-Watt 13 April 1892 -- 5 December 1973". Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 21: 548–526. doi:10.1098/rsbm.1975.0018. 2. Watson-Watt, Sir Robert; The Pulse of Radar, Dial Press, 1959 3. London Gazette Issue 35618 published on 3 July 1942. Page 39 4. "Sir Robert Watson-Watt". Dick Barrett. Retrieved 26 February 2008. 5. "100 years ago...". Archives Records and Artefacts at the University of Dundee. Retrieved 12 July 2011. 6. Shafe, Michael (1982). University Education in Dundee 1881–1981: A Pictorial History. Dundee: University of Dundee. pp. 58, 75 and 88. 7. Brown 1999, p. 45. 8. Brown 1999, p. 46. 9. R. A. Watt and J. F. Herd, "An instantaneous direct-reading radiogoniometer", Journal of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, Volume 64 (February 1926), pp. 611-622. 10. O. S. Puckle, "Time Bases, Their Design and Development", Chapman & Hall, 1943 11. Evans, R.J. (18 September 2008). "Hitler and the origins of the war, 1919–1939". Lecture transcript. Gresham College. Retrieved 16 August 2009. 12. Buderi, Robert (1996). The Invention That Changed the World: How a Small Group of Radar Pioneers Won the Second World War and Launched a Technical Revolution (1998 ed.). Simon & Schuster. p. 55. ISBN 0-684-83529-0. 13. "Robert Watson-Watt". The Radar Pages. Retrieved 14 December 2007. 14. "Passive Covert Radar – Watson-Watt's Daventry Experiment Revisited". IET. Retrieved 13 December 2008. 15. Corrigan, R. (24–25 September 2008). "Airborne minefields and Fighter Command's information system" (pdf). Andrés Guadamuz/The University of Edinburgh, School of Law. Retrieved 16 August 2009. 16. "Tribute plan for radar inventor". BBC. 1 November 2006. Retrieved 16 August 2009. 17. "under the Radar?". Prospect. p. 10. Retrieved 4 October 2015. 18. Taylor, A. J. P. (1992). English history, 1914-1945. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. p. 392. 19. London Gazette Issue 35586 published on 5 June 1942. Page 2 20. Administrator. "Microwaves101 – A Rough Justice". microwaves101.com. 21. Shafe, Michael (1982). University Education in Dundee 1881–1981: A Pictorial History. Dundee: University of Dundee. p. 106. 22. "Scottish Engineering Hall of Fame". engineeringhalloffame.org. 23. "Scottish engineering greats inducted into hall of fame". thecourier.co.uk. 24. "BBC News – Statue of radar pioneer Watson-Watt unveiled in Brechin". BBC News. 25. Jake Wallis Simons (5 September 2014). "Cas

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goegle translit inggris-Indonesia

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geogle terjemahan indonesia-englishSpecial Dividends and the Evolution of Dividend Signaling 1. Introduction Dividend signaling plays a prominent role in corporate finance theory, with numerous studies outlining scenarios in which managers use cash dividends to convey information about firm profitability (see, e.g., Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), and more recent papers cited in Allen and Michaely’s (1995) survey of the dividend literature). However, few empirical studies indicate that signaling is pervasively important, although some research suggests it might be important in limited circumstances (see, e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), and many earlier studies cataloged by Allen and Michaely). In their comprehensive survey, Allen and Michaely (1995, p. 825) state that “…the empirical evidence (on dividend signaling) is far from conclusive …. more research on this topic is needed.” The juxtaposition of continued strong theoretical interest in signaling models on the one hand, with limited empirical support on the other, has made the relevance of dividend signaling an important unresolved issue in corporate finance. There are firms in which dividend signaling is inarguably at work, and they are the ones studied by Brickley (1982, 1983), whose managers pay both regular dividends and occasional special dividends (extras, specials, year-ends, etc., hereafter “specials”). As Brickley indicates, the differential labeling of special and regular dividends inherently conveys a warning to stockholders that the “special” payout is not as likely to be repeated as the “regular” payout. Brickley’s evidence indicates that investors treat special dividends as hedged managerial signals about future profitability, in that unanticipated specials are associated with weaker stock market reactions than are regular dividend increases of comparable size. One contribution of the current paper is to provide evidence that the historically prevalent practice of paying special dividends has largely failed the survival test, casting further doubt on the overall importance of signaling motivations in explaining dividend policy in general. We document that special dividends were once commonly paid by NYSE firms but have gradually disappeared over the last 40 to 45 years and are now a rare phenomenon. During the 1940s, 61.7% of dividend-paying NYSE firms paid at least one special, while only 4.9% did so during the first 2 half of the 1990s. In the single year 1950, 45.8% of dividend-paying NYSE firms paid specials, while just 1.4% of such firms paid specials in 1995. In years past, special dividends constituted a substantial fraction of total cash dividends. Among NYSE firms that paid specials, these bonus disbursements average 24.3% (median, 16.8%) of the dollar value of total dividends paid over all years between the firm’s first and last special. Firms that at one point frequently paid specials include such high visibility “blue chip” corporations as General Motors, Eastman K odak, Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Gillette, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, Sears Roebuck, J.C. Penney, Union Pacific, Corning, International Harvester, McGraw Hill, and Boeing. Today, only a handful of NYSE firms continues to pay frequent special dividends, and these firms are generally not well known companies. Why have firms largely abandoned the once pervasive practice of paying special dividends? Our evidence suggests that the evolution of special dividends reflects the principle that dividends are a useful signaling mechanism only when they send clear messages to stockholders. Surprisingly, most firms paid specials almost as predictably as they paid regulars, thereby treating the two dividend components as close substitutes and impeding their ability to convey different messages. Over 1926-1995, more than 10,000 specials were paid by NYSE firms and virtually all of these were declared by firms that announced specials in multiple years. Remarkably, a full 27.9% of the latter firms skipped paying specials in less than one year out of ten on average (i.e., they paid specials in over 90% of the years between their first and last special dividend). Well over half (56.8%) the firms that paid specials in multiple years did so more frequently than every other year on average. We find that the only specials that have survived to an appreciable degree -- and that, in fact, have grown in importance -- are large specials whose sheer size automatically differentiates them from regular dividends.1 When investors view specials and regulars as close substitutes, there is little advantage to differential labeling and so firms should eventually drop the practice of paying two types of dividends and simply embed specials into the regular dividend. Evidence supporting this prediction comes from our 1 Large specials, like large repurchases, are likely to get stockholders’ attention. These large payouts may or may not serve as signals in the conventional sense, however, depending on whether stockholders interpret them as information about the firm’s future profitability as opposed, e.g., to information about the success of its current restructuring efforts. 3 Lintner (1956) model analysis of the dividend decisions of firms that eliminated specials after paying them frequently for many years. This analysis shows that, controlling for earnings, the pattern of regular dividends after the cessation of specials does not differ systematically from the earlier pattern of total (special plus regular) dividends. Other data indicate that these sample firms preserved the relation between earnings and total dividends by substituting into greater reliance on regular dividend increases. We also find that firms generally tended to increase regulars when they reduced specials to a still-positive level (and this tendency becomes more pronounced in recent years), further supporting the view that firms treat specials and regulars as reasonably close substitutes. Finally, our data show that the disappearance of specials is part of a general trend toward simple, homogenous dividend policies in which firms converged on the now standard practice of paying exactly four regular dividends per year. Our event study analysis reveals that the stock market typically reacts favorably to the fact that a special dividend is declared (given a constant regular dividend), but the market response is not systematically related to the sign or magnitude of the change from one positive special dividend payment to another. We observe a significantly positive average stock market reaction of about 1%, both when firms increase specials and when they reduce them to a still-positive level (and leave the regular dividend unchanged). The stock market’s favorable reaction to special declarations is significantly greater than the essentially zero reaction when firms omit specials. These empirical tendencies provide some incentive for managers to pay special dividends more frequently than they otherwise would, even if specials must sometimes be reduced. These findings may therefore help explain why managers typically paid specials frequently, effectively converting them into payout streams that more closely resemble regular dividends than one would think based on the nominal special labeling. We also find some empirical support for the notion that the long term decline in special dividends is related to the clientele effect shift from the mid-century era in which stock ownership was dominated by individual investors to the current era in which institutions dominate. One might reasonably expect this clientele shift to reduce the importance of special dividends, since institutions are presumably more sophisticated than retail investors and are therefore better able to see that most firms treated specials as close substitutes for regulars. At the aggregate level, the secular decline in specials and the increase in 4 institutional ownership occurred roughly in parallel, with both trends proceeding gradually over many years. At the firm level, our logit regressions show a significant negative relation between the level of institutional ownership and the probability that a firm continues to pay special dividends. Finally, we find little support for the notion that special dividends were displaced by common stock repurchases. Theoretically, one mi ght expect a close connection between the disappearance of specials and the adoption of stock repurchases. Both payout methods allow managers to signal their beliefs about company prospects through temporary bonus distributions, with no necessary commitment to repeat today’s higher cash payout in future years. Moreover, repurchases are now widely prevalent (much as specials used to be) although historically they were rare events (as specials are now). However, at the aggregate level, the secular decline in specials began many years before the upsurge in repurchase activity, so that any theory which attributes the disappearance of specials to the advent of repurchases faces the difficult task of explaining the long time gap between the two phenomena. Moreover, at the firm level, the number of companies that repurchased stock after they stopped paying special dividends is significantly less than expected if firms simpl y substituted one for the other form of payout. Finally, repurchase tender offers and large specials both increase in recent years with the upsurge in corporate restructurings and takeovers. Perhaps the most important implication of the findings reported here is the challenge they pose for dividend signaling theories. Specifically, the fact that special dividends once flourished, but have largely failed to survive, is inconsistent with the view that these signals serve an economically important function. We discuss this and other implications of our findings for corporate finance research in section 7. We begin in section 2 by documenting the long-term evolution of special dividend payments. Section 3 analyzes the predictability of special dividends, the evolution of large specials, the behavior of total dividends around the time firms stopped paying specials, and firms’ general tendency to increase regulars when they reduce specials. Section 4 presents our event study analysis of the information content of special dividends. Section 5 examines the relation between institutional ownership and the payment of specials. Section 6 investigates the connection between repurchases and the decline in specials.

Indonesisch

Special Dividends and the Evolution of Dividend Signaling 1. Introduction Dividend signaling plays a prominent role in corporate finance theory, with numerous studies outlining scenarios in which managers use cash dividends to convey information about firm profitability (see, e.g., Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), and more recent papers cited in Allen and Michaely’s (1995) survey of the dividend literature). However, few empirical studies indicate that signaling is pervasively important, although some research suggests it might be important in limited circumstances (see, e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), and many earlier studies cataloged by Allen and Michaely). In their comprehensive survey, Allen and Michaely (1995, p. 825) state that “…the empirical evidence (on dividend signaling) is far from conclusive …. more research on this topic is needed.” The juxtaposition of continued strong theoretical interest in signaling models on the one hand, with limited empirical support on the other, has made the relevance of dividend signaling an important unresolved issue in corporate finance. There are firms in which dividend signaling is inarguably at work, and they are the ones studied by Brickley (1982, 1983), whose managers pay both regular dividends and occasional special dividends (extras, specials, year-ends, etc., hereafter “specials”). As Brickley indicates, the differential labeling of special and regular dividends inherently conveys a warning to stockholders that the “special” payout is not as likely to be repeated as the “regular” payout. Brickley’s evidence indicates that investors treat special dividends as hedged managerial signals about future profitability, in that unanticipated specials are associated with weaker stock market reactions than are regular dividend increases of comparable size. One contribution of the current paper is to provide evidence that the historically prevalent practice of paying special dividends has largely failed the survival test, casting further doubt on the overall importance of signaling motivations in explaining dividend policy in general. We document that special dividends were once commonly paid by NYSE firms but have gradually disappeared over the last 40 to 45 years and are now a rare phenomenon. During the 1940s, 61.7% of dividend-paying NYSE firms paid at least one special, while only 4.9% did so during the first 2 half of the 1990s. In the single year 1950, 45.8% of dividend-paying NYSE firms paid specials, while just 1.4% of such firms paid specials in 1995. In years past, special dividends constituted a substantial fraction of total cash dividends. Among NYSE firms that paid specials, these bonus disbursements average 24.3% (median, 16.8%) of the dollar value of total dividends paid over all years between the firm’s first and last special. Firms that at one point frequently paid specials include such high visibility “blue chip” corporations as General Motors, Eastman K odak, Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Gillette, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, Sears Roebuck, J.C. Penney, Union Pacific, Corning, International Harvester, McGraw Hill, and Boeing. Today, only a handful of NYSE firms continues to pay frequent special dividends, and these firms are generally not well known companies. Why have firms largely abandoned the once pervasive practice of paying special dividends? Our evidence suggests that the evolution of special dividends reflects the principle that dividends are a useful signaling mechanism only when they send clear messages to stockholders. Surprisingly, most firms paid specials almost as predictably as they paid regulars, thereby treating the two dividend components as close substitutes and impeding their ability to convey different messages. Over 1926-1995, more than 10,000 specials were paid by NYSE firms and virtually all of these were declared by firms that announced specials in multiple years. Remarkably, a full 27.9% of the latter firms skipped paying specials in less than one year out of ten on average (i.e., they paid specials in over 90% of the years between their first and last special dividend). Well over half (56.8%) the firms that paid specials in multiple years did so more frequently than every other year on average. We find that the only specials that have survived to an appreciable degree -- and that, in fact, have grown in importance -- are large specials whose sheer size automatically differentiates them from regular dividends.1 When investors view specials and regulars as close substitutes, there is little advantage to differential labeling and so firms should eventually drop the practice of paying two types of dividends and simply embed specials into the regular dividend. Evidence supporting this prediction comes from our 1 Large specials, like large repurchases, are likely to get stockholders’ attention. These large payouts may or may not serve as signals in the conventional sense, however, depending on whether stockholders interpret them as information about the firm’s future profitability as opposed, e.g., to information about the success of its current restructuring efforts. 3 Lintner (1956) model analysis of the dividend decisions of firms that eliminated specials after paying them frequently for many years. This analysis shows that, controlling for earnings, the pattern of regular dividends after the cessation of specials does not differ systematically from the earlier pattern of total (special plus regular) dividends. Other data indicate that these sample firms preserved the relation between earnings and total dividends by substituting into greater reliance on regular dividend increases. We also find that firms generally tended to increase regulars when they reduced specials to a still-positive level (and this tendency becomes more pronounced in recent years), further supporting the view that firms treat specials and regulars as reasonably close substitutes. Finally, our data show that the disappearance of specials is part of a general trend toward simple, homogenous dividend policies in which firms converged on the now standard practice of paying exactly four regular dividends per year. Our event study analysis reveals that the stock market typically reacts favorably to the fact that a special dividend is declared (given a constant regular dividend), but the market response is not systematically related to the sign or magnitude of the change from one positive special dividend payment to another. We observe a significantly positive average stock market reaction of about 1%, both when firms increase specials and when they reduce them to a still-positive level (and leave the regular dividend unchanged). The stock market’s favorable reaction to special declarations is significantly greater than the essentially zero reaction when firms omit specials. These empirical tendencies provide some incentive for managers to pay special dividends more frequently than they otherwise would, even if specials must sometimes be reduced. These findings may therefore help explain why managers typically paid specials frequently, effectively converting them into payout streams that more closely resemble regular dividends than one would think based on the nominal special labeling. We also find some empirical support for the notion that the long term decline in special dividends is related to the clientele effect shift from the mid-century era in which stock ownership was dominated by individual investors to the current era in which institutions dominate. One might reasonably expect this clientele shift to reduce the importance of special dividends, since institutions are presumably more sophisticated than retail investors and are therefore better able to see that most firms treated specials as close substitutes for regulars. At the aggregate level, the secular decline in specials and the increase in 4 institutional ownership occurred roughly in parallel, with both trends proceeding gradually over many years. At the firm level, our logit regressions show a significant negative relation between the level of institutional ownership and the probability that a firm continues to pay special dividends. Finally, we find little support for the notion that special dividends were displaced by common stock repurchases. Theoretically, one mi ght expect a close connection between the disappearance of specials and the adoption of stock repurchases. Both payout methods allow managers to signal their beliefs about company prospects through temporary bonus distributions, with no necessary commitment to repeat today’s higher cash payout in future years. Moreover, repurchases are now widely prevalent (much as specials used to be) although historically they were rare events (as specials are now). However, at the aggregate level, the secular decline in specials began many years before the upsurge in repurchase activity, so that any theory which attributes the disappearance of specials to the advent of repurchases faces the difficult task of explaining the long time gap between the two phenomena. Moreover, at the firm level, the number of companies that repurchased stock after they stopped paying special dividends is significantly less than expected if firms simpl y substituted one for the other form of payout. Finally, repurchase tender offers and large specials both increase in recent years with the upsurge in corporate restructurings and takeovers. Perhaps the most important implication of the findings reported here is the challenge they pose for dividend signaling theories. Specifically, the fact that special dividends once flourished, but have largely failed to survive, is inconsistent with the view that these signals serve an economically important function. We discuss this and other implications of our findings for corporate finance research in section 7. We begin in section 2 by documenting the long-term evolution of special dividend payments. Section 3 analyzes the predictability of special dividends, the evolution of large specials, the behavior of total dividends around the time firms stopped paying specials, and firms’ general tendency to increase regulars when they reduce specials. Section 4 presents our event study analysis of the information content of special dividends. Section 5 examines the relation between institutional ownership and the payment of specials. Section 6 investigates the connection between repurchases and the decline in specials.

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Reebok and Adidas The athletic shoe industry in the United States was an $8.25 billion market in 2003. By 2010, industry revenue had hit $21.9 billion with sales of over 362 million shoes a year [Ibis World]. The four largest companies (Nike, New Balance, and AdidasReebok) controlled 70 percent of that market [Cassidy 2004]. The industry grew from almost nothing in the early 1980s to a global powerhouse. Reebok (ticker: RBK) can trace its history back to Joseph William Foster, who made some of the first spiked running shoes by hand in London—in 1895. In 1958, two grandsons started a companion company known as Reebok. But, the modern version was born in 1979 when Paul Fireman saw the shoes at an international trade show and negotiated for North American distribution rights. At $60 a pair, the shoes were the most expensive running shoes in America [www.reebok.com]. In 1982, Reebok helped launch the aerobic dance industry with a shoe specifically targeted to women. With explosive growth, the company went public in 1985. Growth con- tinued, supported by the Step Reebok program in 1989. By 1995, the company had grown from $50 million in sales to over $3 billion in a decade. Reebok’s 1993 sales of $2.9 billion placed it second behind $4.4-billion Nike, Inc. The nearly $1 billion increase in sales from 1989 to 1993 indicates Reebok’s success in gaining market share. Paul Fireman, president and CEO of Reebok Paul Fireman founded Reebok in 1979 and remains the largest shareholder. From 1986 to 1990, Fireman was one of the ten highest paid executives in the United States. Under his control, Reebok sales grew from $1.5 million in 1980 to $1.4 billion in 1987. In 1988, Fire- man relinquished the CEO role to spend time working on other projects, including develop- ing golf courses in Puerto Rico and Cape Cod. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Reebok suffered from two weak marketing campaigns (“Reeboks Let U.B.U.” and “Physics behind the Physique”). More importantly, the aerobics fitness craze began to subside. Women aero- bics shoes were a major component of Reebok sales, so the sales decline hit them especially hard. In 1992, Fireman returned as CEO. Tom Trainer, CIO Tom Trainer joined Reebok in 1991 as the chief information officer (CIO). He noted that his role “is to enable the kid in Reebok to stay fresh and creative while also allowing the grown- up corporation to compete in global markets” [Pulliam and Pereira 1995]. To accomplish these objectives, Trainer implemented videoconferencing, computer-aided design, the In- ternet, and laptops for the sales force. The goal was to improve communications among em- ployees, faster development of products, and more effective sales presentations. Before Trainer joined Reebok in 1991 as vice-president of information systems, the information systems area was less than up-to-date, with no global information system or way to look at data. Communications, primarily by telephone and fax, between the manu- facturing partners and worldwide distribution network were slow. Turnaround on new products was equally slow. This was a critical problem because Reebok is a fashion-oriented business with three product cycles a year in footwear and five in apparel. While sales repre- sentatives from Nike were walking in with laptops to display their lines, reps from Reebok were walking into offices with bags of shoes. Trainer’s early days were spent accomplishing short-term projects that got him points with the board of directors. He fired six of eight senior staff. He kept 85 percent of the old programming staff, retraining many of them. In addition to his IS responsibilities, Trainer drove the re-engineering process in the company. To do so, he spent a great deal of time on the road, building relationships with Reebok executives around the world. He also studied Sony Corporation to learn ways that it meets customer needs. To accomplish his re-engineering, Trainer formed five megaprocesses that streamlined procedures for production, sales and marketing, research and development, adminis- tration, finance, and distribution. In 1992, he presented a four-year, $75- million strategic information systems plan to Reebok’s executive committee. The board approved it on the condition that it give Reebok strategic advantage. To improve its communications, Reebok installed a privately designed architecture for voice, video, and data. Reebok communicates not only with its worldwide distribution base but also with its ad agency and other suppliers. IT currently developed an electronic image library to enable product shots to be distributed to every country where Reebok does business. The system dropped the new product lead time from six months to three, and, in some cases, 30 days. Before the new ordering system was installed, orders were first printed out locally and faxed to the international headquarters in London. London would take all of the faxes and send them to the United States to be entered in the mainframe. Different standards for shoe sizes from different countries added to the delay. Once the information was entered in the mainframe, production and manufacturing would evaluate the orders. To improve this process, Trainer developed a software package called Passport. Passport rationalizes product codes and shoe sizes. It also gives small distributors and sub- sidiaries access to the system through personal computers. It can also function as a module by plugging into larger systems. Laptops were also given to the entire Reebok sales force. When orders were paper based, replacing material in a shoe to change its price from $95 to $65 might take 30 days and mean a lost sale. With the new system, these changes could be made almost automati- cally. Salespeople are able to check inventory and look into special orders. They can also access two years’ catalogs with full motion video and sound clips of Reebok’s advertise- ments. Lotus Notes is used to store the catalogs with mail links through cc:Mail. Another Reebok initiative is to use electronic data interchange with 10-15 percent of its retailers. This commitment enables goods to be tracked through shipping companies, customs, and warehouses. Hoover, a data capture system to “suck in” information from da- tabases around the world, is linked to customer databases that track what customers have ordered and what they want. Reebok experienced some problems implementing the new systems. Particularly difficult was the effort to integrate the Canadian operations into the U.S. business operation. Concentrating development and support in the United States did not take into account the specifics of invoicing under the Canadian law. This mistake added time and resources that had not been budgeted to the project. Reebok early 1990s In the early 1990s, facing continuing declines in the aerobics’ market, Fireman changed the focus and tried to expand into other areas. To a large extent, Nike was killing the competi- tion—largely by focusing on star athletes and spending more than 10 percent of its revenue on marketing. In the early 1990s, Fireman knew that he would have to compete directly in the sporting world [www.reebok.com]. His basketball market strategy copied a page from Nike, and relied on the new “Shaq Attaq” line supported by Shaquille O’Neal from the Or- lando Magic. While sales did increase, they did not reach the 25 percent levels predicted by Mr. Fireman—reaching only 20 percent market share. Additionally, Fireman estimated in 1993 that the outdoor-wear division would sell $350 million worth of shoes in 1995. Outdoor sales fell far short of the goal, reaching about $110 million. More importantly, expenses skyrocketed, increasing from 23.6 percent of sales in 1991 to 32.7 percent in June 1995. Experts say shoe company expenses typically average about 27 percent of sales. Investors blamed most of the increase on the cost of endorse- ments. Nike Late 1990s At the same time that Reebok was suffering, Nike reported a 55 percent jump in firstquarter 1995 earnings, with revenue increasing by 38 percent. Part of the increase was from expanded international sales, with a 34 percent increase in orders from France and Germany. Sales in Japan increased by 65 percent. Nike also expanded sales of tennis shoes, partly through endorsements from tennis stars Andre Agassi and Pete Sampras. In the first quarter of 1995, revenue from tennis shoes increased by 92 percent with a 42 percent in- crease in orders. At the same time sales were increasing, Nike managed to decrease its expense ratio. Selling and administrative costs dropped to 22.3 percent of revenue from 25 percent in the prior year. Much of the improvement came from an improved distribution system, including a new warehouse in Belgium that consolidated operations from 30 different facilities in Eu- rope. Beginning in the late 1990s, the footwear industry lost its luster. However, Nike revenue increased from $3.4 billion in 1998 to $9.0 billion in 2000 to $9.5 billion in 2001, to over $10 billion in 2003 [annual report]. In 2001, Nike installed a customized retail supply chain system from i2 Technologies, Inc. The implementation, including ties to other ERP systems, did not go well, and Nike faced a serious inventory reduction and misplacement. Nike management was disappointed in the problems, and Nike chairman questioned: “This is what we get for $400 million?” Reebok Late 1990s In 1990, Nike surpassed Reebok in footwear sales. In the year ending in August 1995, Nike had $4.7 billion in sales compared to Reebok’s $3.37 billion. One of the largest battle- grounds was the retail Foot Locker stores owned by Woolworth Corp. The 2,800 retail stores sell 23 percent of U.S. sport shoes, representing $1.5 billion of the $6.5 billion U.S. market for athletic shoes. Sales at Foot Locker stores account for almost 60 percent of the 1$ billion U.S. sales gap between Reebok and Nike. Insiders note that the problems between Reebok and Foot Locker go back to the days when Reebok shoes were selling rapidly. Foot Locker wanted concessions on price and wanted Reebok to make some styles exclusively for them. Reebok was busy selling to other outlets and was unwilling or unable to alter its production and distribution systems. Nike was eager to build custom products for Foot Locker and offered a dozen products exclusively at the chain. Ex-employees at Reebok note that the company had additional problems providing samples and design plans to Foot Locker, claiming that “Sometimes the samples would come in late and sometimes not at all—which got Foot Locker mad. . . . Sometimes, fashions last less than six weeks; if you don’t get it in right then, there goes a major sale.” Mr. Fireman responded by trying to improve relations with Foot Locker. He also offered to begin building exclusive styles for Foot Locker, but the introduction of the products was uncertain. He also noted that Reebok was working hard to cut costs and improve its order and information tracking system. One problem that remained was that the clerks at Foot Locker stores tended to push the Nike brands harder. By September of 1995, major shareholders were getting upset with Reebok management. One of the leading outsider shareholders, Glenn Greenberg of Chieftain Capital Management, noted that “The major shareholders have no confidence in the management of this company. If it was up to us, they would have changed horses or sold the company a long time ago.” Reebok and The Internet Like other shoe manufacturers, Reebok relies heavily on celebrity endorsements. Signing Alan Iverson (NBA rookie of the year in 1996) and Venus Williams (tennis sensation) gave Reebok greater visibility in 2000. In 2000, Reebok also increased its visibility by sponsoring the Survivor television show with humorous ads. Their Web site followed these themes. In 1997, Reebok installed Radnet Inc.’s WebShare groupware system to maintain its Web site. The system has tools for e-mail, discussion groups, and bulletin boards. The goal was to add interactivity to the site and build a community of users. Marvin Chow, Reebok’s director of interactive marketing noted that “If you just try and use the Web to sell them products, something is missing” [Cole-Gomolski 1998]. More importantly, the system makes it easy for Reebok’s managers to add content. They can add data and pass it to salespeople and re- tailers automatically using a workflow engine. The company used QuickTime from Apple to create CDs for its salespeople. Using Macromedia on its Internet site, the company was able to update pricing, styles, and even new photos and displays on the fly. The data was downloaded directly to the sales laptops [Dillon 1998]. Interestingly, the Web site is largely independent from the IT department. Roger Wood, vice president of electronic commerce at Reebok reports directly to the CEO and con- trols his own technology budget. He observes that “I am able to take down and build up fea- tures (of the Web site) without some IT overlord telling me what is good or bad” [Cole- Gomolski 1999]. In 2000, Reebok stopped selling shoes direct from its Web site. It was concerned about competing with the traditional retail outlets. So now the site focuses on image, tech- nical information about products, and then directs consumers to the retail partners. Enterprise Systems From SAP Facing weak sales, Reebok began focusing on reducing costs in the late 1990s. Net sales dropped from $3.6 billion in 1997 to $2.9 bil- lion in 1999 to about $2.8 billion in 2000. Worse yet, from 1999 to 2000, gross margin declined from 38.5 percent to 37.9 percent. Income (Million $) Year 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 Revenue 3,485 3,128 2,993 2,865 2,900 Net Income 157 126 102 81 11 In 1995, Trainer went to Eli Lilly [Information Week 1995]. The company ultimately replaced him with Peter Burrows as chief technology officer (CTO). Burrows knew that he needed to replace the aging, custom software that was being used to run the company. The problem was that nothing existed. In late 1995, he sent a dozen Reebok workers to an SAP R/3 course—the goal was to show SAP that its system could not handle the complex details of the apparel industry. Most products are created by hundreds of contract suppliers, gen- erally in Southeast Asia. Product designs change constantly, and the company has to coor- dinate shipments to thousands of customers. Ultimately, Burrows convinced SAP to develop a custom add-on system called the Apparel Footware Solution (AFS) module. To convince the company to spend the money, VF Corp., the company that makes Lee and Wrangler jeans, also signed on to the project. The two companies helped design the specifications for the new software. The project was far more complex than SAP anticipated, and the initial version was three months late. Leroy Allen, the CIO at VF commented that “I think SAP underestimated the amount of change that had to be made to standard R/3” [Steadman January 1999]. Burrows was counting on the system to handle the major transactions at Reebok, so he could avoid the necessity of rewriting the old applications to become Y2K compliant. By May, 1999, the system was still not fully operational. Among other problems and bugs, the system was too slow to check product inventories and raw material stocks when retailers and distributors placed orders. Burrows noted that “We’re not out of the woods, but SAP is responding. It’s not something we’re taking lightly, and neither are they” [Steadman May 1999]. In the meantime, another 60 apparel and footwear makers had purchased the sys- tem by early 1999. By 2000, Reebok was running the system in only a couple of divisions, such as golf shoes. The company deferred implementation of the full system until at least mid- 2001. Burrows noted that he was waiting for additional functionality scheduled for Release 2.5 [Steadman 2000]. Despite the problems in getting the software developed, apparel manu- facturers had few other choices. By 2001, Reebok had 115 retail stores running the AFS system. Burrows was pleased with the ability of the system to maintain accurate inventory records for the stores [Mearian and Songini 2001]. In January 2002, SAP shipped Release 3.0 of AFS. With the bug fixes and new features, Reebok continued to rollout the system in its divisions. Burrows planned to gradually implement Release 3.0 over a few years. Burrows continues to push for new features such as a Web-based system to handle business-to-business transactions with suppliers. In 2002, competitor Nike completed rolling out AFS 2.5 to its 5,000 end users [Songini 2002]. Competition and the Future There is no question that the shoe industry is competitive. There is also no question that it is still dominated by Nike. Yet, Reebok has made gains in the mid-2000s. The retro-trend bolstered sales for Reebok when it re-released older models. (It also convinced Nike to buy Converse.) Competition to sign new stars is also intense. Most observers believe Alan Iver- son has significantly boosted Reebok sales. In 2004, Reebok struck a huge note in the inter- national market by signing Yao Ming to market a line of shoes in China. Reebok will also market a line of Yao Ming shoes in the United States [Marcial 2004]. Somewhat surprisingly, Reebok did well in 2003 selling a line of shoes endorsed by Rap stars (Jay-Z and 50 Cent). The shoes were also popular in England [Thomaselli 2004]. On the other hand, Reebok’s 2003 sales gain was also attributed to the feud between Nike and Foot Locker. In 2002, Nike pulled its top products from Foot Locker—trying to negotiate better prices. In November 2003, the companies resolved their problems and Foot Locker again began carrying more Nike shoes. Foot Locker’s clout grew even more in 2004 when it purchased 353 Footaction stores from bankruptcy [Cassidy 2004]. Although Nike is still the strongest seller in the U.S. market, it has struggled to find a management team. In 2006, William D. Perez stepped down after only 13 months as CEO. Reportedly, Perez often clashed with Nike co-founder Philip Knight. Knight promoted Mark G. Parker to the CEO position. The change reminded observers of the situation in 2000 when Mr. Knight returned to the CEO position to replace Tom Clarke as sales fell from 1994 to 2000 [Lublin and Kang 2006]. Adidas In 2005, Adidas-Salomon AG in Germany agreed to purchase Reebok for $3.8 billion. The price represented a 34 percent premium over the existing stock valuation. The sale was closed in 2006. Adidas, a pioneer in the shoe and sporting-goods industries had been strug- gling in the U.S. trying to find a way to compete with Nike. Adidas was largely considered the engineering leader and produced some of the technically best shoes on the market—but it lacked the marketing flash appeal of Nike. For example, the company introduced a $250 running shoe containing a sensor and small motor that enabled it to adjust the tension and support based on the terrain. Shortly after the acquisition was closed in 2006, Paul Fire- man left Reebok [Reebok Web site]. A key element in the decision was Reebok’s appeal in the urban market—due to its embrace of 50 Cent and Jay-Z rappers. Herbert Hainer, CEO of Adidas noted that “we will expand our geographic reach, particularly in North America, and create a footwear, apparel and hardware offering that addresses a broader spectrum of consumers and demographics.” The global market for athletic shoes is about $33 billion and about half of that total comes from America. In 2004 combined, Reebok and Adidas had about 20 percent of the U.S. mar- ket compared to Nike’s 35 percent [Karnitschnig and Kang 2005]. Adidas was formed by Adi Dassler after World War II. It gained attention by creating soccer cleats that helped Germany win the 1954 World Cup

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tejem ⌂ Home Aptanta Avatar Aptanta ⚙ Help Press ? for keyboard shortcuts. Fill The Application Madam Sindi To me My Greetings to you And your Family. Please The Next Step Now I have Draft The Application Of Claim Which You have To Apply To the Security Finance Company. The Application Form Please if you have any Questions you can also call me on my mobile line + 226 74 11 34 06. Below is the Application Form Fill it and Apply to the company Mail ID( usfc_ouaga@financier.com ) Attention, Dr John Williams The Director. Universia Security and Finance Company Ouagadougou Burkina Faso Tel: 00226 64 19 48 94 Email: usfc_ouaga@financier.com Sir/Madam, I'm Mr… ……….of the above mentioned firm introduces myself as a business partner to late Mr.Karim Kuku . who was one of your customers and my business associate who died in his home town after an attack by the rebels in his home town living behind the sum of $6.500.000( Six Million Five Hundred Thousand dollars Only) in your custody. Having introduce my person to this firm, I therefore advice and instruct Universia Security and Finance Company Ouagadougou Burkina Faso to effect the release of Mr.Karim Kuku's fund, valued at $6.500.000M usd into the below stated bank details as it is long due for payment. Meanwhile, my late partners wife Madam Sindi Kuku and Daughter Miss. Linda Kuku will confirm this application before your management as been true. Beneficiary................... ........................... Occupation.................... .......................... Country of Origin........................ ............. Sex........................... .............................. . Age........................... .............................. Private Email Address....................... ....... Private Telephone..................... ................. Private Fax........................... ....................... Bank name.......................... ...................... Bank Address....................... ...................... Account No............................ ................... Tele No............................ ...................... Fax No............................ ....................... Telex No............................ ..................... Sir I will appreciate if you will act accordingly to the release of the fund and wish to respond to all your demands . Thanking you in anticipation.ahan indonesia-inggris

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Referenz: Anonym

Englisch

google translete Fashion Blues Jill Carmer was the first student to walk through the classroom door. “Good morning, my flower,” Mr. El said as he finished writing the morning assignments on the board for his fourth graders. He was especially fond of Jill. She had a lot of qualities, Mr. El’s favorite being that she always laughed at all his jokes. “Mr. El, I like your blue jeans. You look cool!” Jill said as she took her seat. Before Mr. El could acknowledge the compliment, Tommy and Alex Howard, the twins, walked in. “Cool jeans, Mr. El,” Alex announced. Soon the rest of the class was streaming in, and a chorus of similar comments could be heard. “Thank you, thank you,” Mr. El said to the class. “I'm glad you guys like my new jeans. I wear Levi’s jeans almost every day and this is the first time anybody has even noticed.” Angela Williams, the self-appointed fashion expert of the class, raised her hand and spoke without waiting to be called on. “That’s because all the other jeans you wear are brown, black, green, tan, or gray.” David Tyler waved both hands furiously until the teacher pointed at him. “You see, Mr. El, you’re wearing blue jeans, just like a real person.” “Thank you, David” Mr. El responded and then addressed the entire class. “Does it really matter what color denim jeans are? Think about it and we’ll discuss the matter later.” Mr. El took the roll call quickly and was pleased to find that no one was absent. This was that annoying day of the week when he had to get his kids to their gym class first thing in the morning. The class walked down the long hallway to the gym with Mr. El at the end of the line. He opened the door to the faculty room as he watched the last child in line disappear into the gym. Miss Joan was the only person in the room. “Mr. El, what kind of field trip are you taking?” she asked. “What field trip?” “You’re wearing jeans. Isn’t that a little unusual?” “I wear jeans all the time. These just happen to be blue.” At that moment, Mr Kay, the principal, walked into the room. He glanced at Mr. El who was still standing by the door. “Hmmm,” he said as he walked over to the refrigerator that stood in the far corner of the room. He placed his brown paper lunch bag into it and walked back toward the door. “How are you people this morning?” he asked, and walked out before anyone could reply. “Those are very nice jeans,” Miss Joan continued, “but aren’t they a little, shall we say, undignified for a professional position?” Before Mr. El could respond, she added, “Not that I mean to suggest that you ever are dignified.” Mr. El smiled. He would have been disappointed if Miss Joan had not made the latter remark. “How come you haven’t made any comments all the other times I wore different color jeans?” “I hadn’t noticed. Besides, they weren’t blue jeans.” “They were the same brand, the same style, the same material. No one noticed, no one cared.” Miss Joan sighed, “I get the feeling you’re trying to make some profound point.” Mr. El sat down at the long table that practically went from one end of the room to the other. “My point,” he said, “ is that humans are a strange species. They tend to put a lot of importance on unimportant differences.” Miss Joan smiled. “That’s true,” she replied. “But there are times when you have to pretend to be a human if you want to live successfully among them.”

Indonesisch

hidup selalu punya tujuan

Letzte Aktualisierung: 2014-10-30
Nutzungshäufigkeit: 1
Qualität:

Referenz: Anonym

Englisch

Fashion Blues Jill Carmer was the first student to walk through the classroom door. “Good morning, my flower,” Mr. El said as he finished writing the morning assignments on the board for his fourth graders. He was especially fond of Jill. She had a lot of qualities, Mr. El’s favorite being that she always laughed at all his jokes. “Mr. El, I like your blue jeans. You look cool!” Jill said as she took her seat. Before Mr. El could acknowledge the compliment, Tommy and Alex Howard, the twins, walked in. “Cool jeans, Mr. El,” Alex announced. Soon the rest of the class was streaming in, and a chorus of similar comments could be heard. “Thank you, thank you,” Mr. El said to the class. “I'm glad you guys like my new jeans. I wear Levi’s jeans almost every day and this is the first time anybody has even noticed.” Angela Williams, the self-appointed fashion expert of the class, raised her hand and spoke without waiting to be called on. “That’s because all the other jeans you wear are brown, black, green, tan, or gray.” David Tyler waved both hands furiously until the teacher pointed at him. “You see, Mr. El, you’re wearing blue jeans, just like a real person.” “Thank you, David” Mr. El responded and then addressed the entire class. “Does it really matter what color denim jeans are? Think about it and we’ll discuss the matter later.” Mr. El took the roll call quickly and was pleased to find that no one was absent. This was that annoying day of the week when he had to get his kids to their gym class first thing in the morning. The class walked down the long hallway to the gym with Mr. El at the end of the line. He opened the door to the faculty room as he watched the last child in line disappear into the gym. Miss Joan was the only person in the room. “Mr. El, what kind of field trip are you taking?” she asked. “What field trip?” “You’re wearing jeans. Isn’t that a little unusual?” “I wear jeans all the time. These just happen to be blue.” At that moment, Mr Kay, the principal, walked into the room. He glanced at Mr. El who was still standing by the door. “Hmmm,” he said as he walked over to the refrigerator that stood in the far corner of the room. He placed his brown paper lunch bag into it and walked back toward the door. “How are you people this morning?” he asked, and walked out before anyone could reply. “Those are very nice jeans,” Miss Joan continued, “but aren’t they a little, shall we say, undignified for a professional position?” Before Mr. El could respond, she added, “Not that I mean to suggest that you ever are dignified.” Mr. El smiled. He would have been disappointed if Miss Joan had not made the latter remark. “How come you haven’t made any comments all the other times I wore different color jeans?” “I hadn’t noticed. Besides, they weren’t blue jeans.” “They were the same brand, the same style, the same material. No one noticed, no one cared.” Miss Joan sighed, “I get the feeling you’re trying to make some profound point.” Mr. El sat down at the long table that practically went from one end of the room to the other. “My point,” he said, “ is that humans are a strange species. They tend to put a lot of importance on unimportant differences.” Miss Joan smiled. “That’s true,” she replied. “But there are times when you have to pretend to be a human if you want to live successfully among them.”google translete

Indonesisch

ok terimakasih sayang , aku mau mandi dulu nanti lagi ya

Letzte Aktualisierung: 2014-10-29
Nutzungshäufigkeit: 1
Qualität:

Referenz: Anonym

Englisch

Williams Lake

Indonesisch

Danau Williams

Letzte Aktualisierung: 2014-08-15
Nutzungshäufigkeit: 1
Qualität:

Referenz: Anonym

Englisch

(openPR) - Christopher Williams’ first trip to our nation’s capital was one of great importance. He wasn’t there just as a tourist; he was there to represent Reinhardt College at the 2010 American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) policy conference on the U.S.-Israel relationship—the first nationally recognized policy conference that Reinhardt has been represented. “It was exciting that I got to represent Reinhardt because I was among nearly 250 other Student Government Association presidents, all from schools like UCLA, Morehouse and Harvard,” said Williams, a senior from Loganville, Ga. and Reinhardt’s SGA president. “We as a smaller, private college were represented and acknowledged in our nation’s capital; it was a great moment for Reinhardt!” From learning about political relationships to how to catch a cab, Williams took away many valuable experiences from his trip. “I learned so much during my time in Washington, D.C. I learned a lot about Israel and the importance of their relationship with the United States, and also of the impact that Iran's fight to acquire nuclear weapons has on Israel, the U.S. and the rest of the world. I learned how to lobby my congressmen and even how to catch a cab!” The conference also gave Williams the opportunity to see politics up close and personal. “During the conference there was a large protest outside of the convention center where we were. It was intense! I've never experienced anything like it. “The conference also gave me a chance to see some prominent politicians at their finest. I got to hear Hilary Clinton, as well as Tony Blair and Benjamin Netanyahu, speak right in front of me!” What will Williams, who will graduate this May, remember most about his experience at the conference? “I will always remember that I was the first student ever to represent Reinhardt at a nationally recognized policy conference! The experience and insight that I gained at the conference will last me a lifetime!” AIPAC Background AIPAC believes the key to securing the U.S.-Israel alliance in the future is to educate student leaders today. AIPAC's Leadership Development Department empowers students to be confident advocates for Israel-both on campus and beyond. Working with high school, undergraduate, and graduate students, as well as young professionals, AIPAC's training programs teach students how to strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship through political involvement. On campuses across America-from Ivy League universities, to small liberal arts colleges, to Historically Black and Christian schools-AIPAC gives students the tools to find their voices in support of a strong U.S.-Israel relationship. As of June 1, 2010, Reinhardt College will take on a new name – Reinhardt University. Since 1883, Reinhardt has focused on being “the way college should be,” and although the name will change, Reinhardt will remain true to its values as a private liberal arts institution affiliated with The United Methodist Church which offers a caring learning environment dedicated to meeting each student’s needs. More than 1,100 students are enrolled in Reinhardt’s three graduate programs in business administration, music and education, and 40 undergraduate degree programs, which range from business, communications and education to psychology, music and math. Reinhardt has two locations- a residential campus in Cherokee County in Waleska, Ga., just 45 minutes northwest of Atlanta, and center focused on adults in Alpharetta, Ga. It also is offers selected programs in Epworth, Cartersville and Marietta, Ga. Sengkang, Indonesia

Indonesisch

Sengkang

Letzte Aktualisierung: 2014-02-21
Nutzungshäufigkeit: 1
Qualität:

Referenz: Wikipedia

Englisch

Hayley Williams

Indonesisch

Hayley Williams

Letzte Aktualisierung: 2012-09-19
Nutzungshäufigkeit: 1
Qualität:

Referenz: Wikipedia

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