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Dear Sir . I am writing thisn letter in order to apply as a contract manager .I am interested in it and I would like to apply for that position. I am Imam rifqi abdillah . I graduated from stimart”amni” semarang with GPA 3,33.i am certain that I would be able to work in your instution due to the fact that I am dynamic and willing to work hard . I will welcome any critics for being better. And since I do not like to take risks. I Will Try to anything on time. Herewith I enclouse curriculum vitae .copy of transeript,bachelor certificate, identity card and my recent photo fulfil your requirements for your furher consideration . I will be happy to meet you at your convenience and provide my additional information. I look forward to hearing you soon .

Englisch

gremDear Sir . I am writing thisn letter in order to apply as a contract manager .I am interested in it and I would like to apply for that position. I am Imam rifqi abdillah . I graduated from stimart”amni” semarang with GPA 3,33.i am certain that I would be able to work in your instution due to the fact that I am dynamic and willing to work hard . I will welcome any critics for being better. And since I do not like to take risks. I Will Try to anything on time. Herewith I enclouse curriculum vitae .copy of transeript,bachelor certificate, identity card and my recent photo fulfil your requirements for your furher consideration . I will be happy to meet you at your convenience and provide my additional information. I look forward to hearing you soon .

Letzte Aktualisierung: 2017-09-09
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Indonesisch

Special Dividends and the Evolution of Dividend Signaling 1. Introduction Dividend signaling plays a prominent role in corporate finance theory, with numerous studies outlining scenarios in which managers use cash dividends to convey information about firm profitability (see, e.g., Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), and more recent papers cited in Allen and Michaely’s (1995) survey of the dividend literature). However, few empirical studies indicate that signaling is pervasively important, although some research suggests it might be important in limited circumstances (see, e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), and many earlier studies cataloged by Allen and Michaely). In their comprehensive survey, Allen and Michaely (1995, p. 825) state that “…the empirical evidence (on dividend signaling) is far from conclusive …. more research on this topic is needed.” The juxtaposition of continued strong theoretical interest in signaling models on the one hand, with limited empirical support on the other, has made the relevance of dividend signaling an important unresolved issue in corporate finance. There are firms in which dividend signaling is inarguably at work, and they are the ones studied by Brickley (1982, 1983), whose managers pay both regular dividends and occasional special dividends (extras, specials, year-ends, etc., hereafter “specials”). As Brickley indicates, the differential labeling of special and regular dividends inherently conveys a warning to stockholders that the “special” payout is not as likely to be repeated as the “regular” payout. Brickley’s evidence indicates that investors treat special dividends as hedged managerial signals about future profitability, in that unanticipated specials are associated with weaker stock market reactions than are regular dividend increases of comparable size. One contribution of the current paper is to provide evidence that the historically prevalent practice of paying special dividends has largely failed the survival test, casting further doubt on the overall importance of signaling motivations in explaining dividend policy in general. We document that special dividends were once commonly paid by NYSE firms but have gradually disappeared over the last 40 to 45 years and are now a rare phenomenon. During the 1940s, 61.7% of dividend-paying NYSE firms paid at least one special, while only 4.9% did so during the first 2 half of the 1990s. In the single year 1950, 45.8% of dividend-paying NYSE firms paid specials, while just 1.4% of such firms paid specials in 1995. In years past, special dividends constituted a substantial fraction of total cash dividends. Among NYSE firms that paid specials, these bonus disbursements average 24.3% (median, 16.8%) of the dollar value of total dividends paid over all years between the firm’s first and last special. Firms that at one point frequently paid specials include such high visibility “blue chip” corporations as General Motors, Eastman K odak, Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Gillette, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, Sears Roebuck, J.C. Penney, Union Pacific, Corning, International Harvester, McGraw Hill, and Boeing. Today, only a handful of NYSE firms continues to pay frequent special dividends, and these firms are generally not well known companies. Why have firms largely abandoned the once pervasive practice of paying special dividends? Our evidence suggests that the evolution of special dividends reflects the principle that dividends are a useful signaling mechanism only when they send clear messages to stockholders. Surprisingly, most firms paid specials almost as predictably as they paid regulars, thereby treating the two dividend components as close substitutes and impeding their ability to convey different messages. Over 1926-1995, more than 10,000 specials were paid by NYSE firms and virtually all of these were declared by firms that announced specials in multiple years. Remarkably, a full 27.9% of the latter firms skipped paying specials in less than one year out of ten on average (i.e., they paid specials in over 90% of the years between their first and last special dividend). Well over half (56.8%) the firms that paid specials in multiple years did so more frequently than every other year on average. We find that the only specials that have survived to an appreciable degree -- and that, in fact, have grown in importance -- are large specials whose sheer size automatically differentiates them from regular dividends.1 When investors view specials and regulars as close substitutes, there is little advantage to differential labeling and so firms should eventually drop the practice of paying two types of dividends and simply embed specials into the regular dividend. Evidence supporting this prediction comes from our 1 Large specials, like large repurchases, are likely to get stockholders’ attention. These large payouts may or may not serve as signals in the conventional sense, however, depending on whether stockholders interpret them as information about the firm’s future profitability as opposed, e.g., to information about the success of its current restructuring efforts. 3 Lintner (1956) model analysis of the dividend decisions of firms that eliminated specials after paying them frequently for many years. This analysis shows that, controlling for earnings, the pattern of regular dividends after the cessation of specials does not differ systematically from the earlier pattern of total (special plus regular) dividends. Other data indicate that these sample firms preserved the relation between earnings and total dividends by substituting into greater reliance on regular dividend increases. We also find that firms generally tended to increase regulars when they reduced specials to a still-positive level (and this tendency becomes more pronounced in recent years), further supporting the view that firms treat specials and regulars as reasonably close substitutes. Finally, our data show that the disappearance of specials is part of a general trend toward simple, homogenous dividend policies in which firms converged on the now standard practice of paying exactly four regular dividends per year. Our event study analysis reveals that the stock market typically reacts favorably to the fact that a special dividend is declared (given a constant regular dividend), but the market response is not systematically related to the sign or magnitude of the change from one positive special dividend payment to another. We observe a significantly positive average stock market reaction of about 1%, both when firms increase specials and when they reduce them to a still-positive level (and leave the regular dividend unchanged). The stock market’s favorable reaction to special declarations is significantly greater than the essentially zero reaction when firms omit specials. These empirical tendencies provide some incentive for managers to pay special dividends more frequently than they otherwise would, even if specials must sometimes be reduced. These findings may therefore help explain why managers typically paid specials frequently, effectively converting them into payout streams that more closely resemble regular dividends than one would think based on the nominal special labeling. We also find some empirical support for the notion that the long term decline in special dividends is related to the clientele effect shift from the mid-century era in which stock ownership was dominated by individual investors to the current era in which institutions dominate. One might reasonably expect this clientele shift to reduce the importance of special dividends, since institutions are presumably more sophisticated than retail investors and are therefore better able to see that most firms treated specials as close substitutes for regulars. At the aggregate level, the secular decline in specials and the increase in 4 institutional ownership occurred roughly in parallel, with both trends proceeding gradually over many years. At the firm level, our logit regressions show a significant negative relation between the level of institutional ownership and the probability that a firm continues to pay special dividends. Finally, we find little support for the notion that special dividends were displaced by common stock repurchases. Theoretically, one mi ght expect a close connection between the disappearance of specials and the adoption of stock repurchases. Both payout methods allow managers to signal their beliefs about company prospects through temporary bonus distributions, with no necessary commitment to repeat today’s higher cash payout in future years. Moreover, repurchases are now widely prevalent (much as specials used to be) although historically they were rare events (as specials are now). However, at the aggregate level, the secular decline in specials began many years before the upsurge in repurchase activity, so that any theory which attributes the disappearance of specials to the advent of repurchases faces the difficult task of explaining the long time gap between the two phenomena. Moreover, at the firm level, the number of companies that repurchased stock after they stopped paying special dividends is significantly less than expected if firms simpl y substituted one for the other form of payout. Finally, repurchase tender offers and large specials both increase in recent years with the upsurge in corporate restructurings and takeovers. Perhaps the most important implication of the findings reported here is the challenge they pose for dividend signaling theories. Specifically, the fact that special dividends once flourished, but have largely failed to survive, is inconsistent with the view that these signals serve an economically important function. We discuss this and other implications of our findings for corporate finance research in section 7. We begin in section 2 by documenting the long-term evolution of special dividend payments. Section 3 analyzes the predictability of special dividends, the evolution of large specials, the behavior of total dividends around the time firms stopped paying specials, and firms’ general tendency to increase regulars when they reduce specials. Section 4 presents our event study analysis of the information content of special dividends. Section 5 examines the relation between institutional ownership and the payment of specials. Section 6 investigates the connection between repurchases and the decline in specials.

Englisch

geogle terjemahan indonesia-englishSpecial Dividends and the Evolution of Dividend Signaling 1. Introduction Dividend signaling plays a prominent role in corporate finance theory, with numerous studies outlining scenarios in which managers use cash dividends to convey information about firm profitability (see, e.g., Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), and more recent papers cited in Allen and Michaely’s (1995) survey of the dividend literature). However, few empirical studies indicate that signaling is pervasively important, although some research suggests it might be important in limited circumstances (see, e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), and many earlier studies cataloged by Allen and Michaely). In their comprehensive survey, Allen and Michaely (1995, p. 825) state that “…the empirical evidence (on dividend signaling) is far from conclusive …. more research on this topic is needed.” The juxtaposition of continued strong theoretical interest in signaling models on the one hand, with limited empirical support on the other, has made the relevance of dividend signaling an important unresolved issue in corporate finance. There are firms in which dividend signaling is inarguably at work, and they are the ones studied by Brickley (1982, 1983), whose managers pay both regular dividends and occasional special dividends (extras, specials, year-ends, etc., hereafter “specials”). As Brickley indicates, the differential labeling of special and regular dividends inherently conveys a warning to stockholders that the “special” payout is not as likely to be repeated as the “regular” payout. Brickley’s evidence indicates that investors treat special dividends as hedged managerial signals about future profitability, in that unanticipated specials are associated with weaker stock market reactions than are regular dividend increases of comparable size. One contribution of the current paper is to provide evidence that the historically prevalent practice of paying special dividends has largely failed the survival test, casting further doubt on the overall importance of signaling motivations in explaining dividend policy in general. We document that special dividends were once commonly paid by NYSE firms but have gradually disappeared over the last 40 to 45 years and are now a rare phenomenon. During the 1940s, 61.7% of dividend-paying NYSE firms paid at least one special, while only 4.9% did so during the first 2 half of the 1990s. In the single year 1950, 45.8% of dividend-paying NYSE firms paid specials, while just 1.4% of such firms paid specials in 1995. In years past, special dividends constituted a substantial fraction of total cash dividends. Among NYSE firms that paid specials, these bonus disbursements average 24.3% (median, 16.8%) of the dollar value of total dividends paid over all years between the firm’s first and last special. Firms that at one point frequently paid specials include such high visibility “blue chip” corporations as General Motors, Eastman K odak, Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Gillette, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, Sears Roebuck, J.C. Penney, Union Pacific, Corning, International Harvester, McGraw Hill, and Boeing. Today, only a handful of NYSE firms continues to pay frequent special dividends, and these firms are generally not well known companies. Why have firms largely abandoned the once pervasive practice of paying special dividends? Our evidence suggests that the evolution of special dividends reflects the principle that dividends are a useful signaling mechanism only when they send clear messages to stockholders. Surprisingly, most firms paid specials almost as predictably as they paid regulars, thereby treating the two dividend components as close substitutes and impeding their ability to convey different messages. Over 1926-1995, more than 10,000 specials were paid by NYSE firms and virtually all of these were declared by firms that announced specials in multiple years. Remarkably, a full 27.9% of the latter firms skipped paying specials in less than one year out of ten on average (i.e., they paid specials in over 90% of the years between their first and last special dividend). Well over half (56.8%) the firms that paid specials in multiple years did so more frequently than every other year on average. We find that the only specials that have survived to an appreciable degree -- and that, in fact, have grown in importance -- are large specials whose sheer size automatically differentiates them from regular dividends.1 When investors view specials and regulars as close substitutes, there is little advantage to differential labeling and so firms should eventually drop the practice of paying two types of dividends and simply embed specials into the regular dividend. Evidence supporting this prediction comes from our 1 Large specials, like large repurchases, are likely to get stockholders’ attention. These large payouts may or may not serve as signals in the conventional sense, however, depending on whether stockholders interpret them as information about the firm’s future profitability as opposed, e.g., to information about the success of its current restructuring efforts. 3 Lintner (1956) model analysis of the dividend decisions of firms that eliminated specials after paying them frequently for many years. This analysis shows that, controlling for earnings, the pattern of regular dividends after the cessation of specials does not differ systematically from the earlier pattern of total (special plus regular) dividends. Other data indicate that these sample firms preserved the relation between earnings and total dividends by substituting into greater reliance on regular dividend increases. We also find that firms generally tended to increase regulars when they reduced specials to a still-positive level (and this tendency becomes more pronounced in recent years), further supporting the view that firms treat specials and regulars as reasonably close substitutes. Finally, our data show that the disappearance of specials is part of a general trend toward simple, homogenous dividend policies in which firms converged on the now standard practice of paying exactly four regular dividends per year. Our event study analysis reveals that the stock market typically reacts favorably to the fact that a special dividend is declared (given a constant regular dividend), but the market response is not systematically related to the sign or magnitude of the change from one positive special dividend payment to another. We observe a significantly positive average stock market reaction of about 1%, both when firms increase specials and when they reduce them to a still-positive level (and leave the regular dividend unchanged). The stock market’s favorable reaction to special declarations is significantly greater than the essentially zero reaction when firms omit specials. These empirical tendencies provide some incentive for managers to pay special dividends more frequently than they otherwise would, even if specials must sometimes be reduced. These findings may therefore help explain why managers typically paid specials frequently, effectively converting them into payout streams that more closely resemble regular dividends than one would think based on the nominal special labeling. We also find some empirical support for the notion that the long term decline in special dividends is related to the clientele effect shift from the mid-century era in which stock ownership was dominated by individual investors to the current era in which institutions dominate. One might reasonably expect this clientele shift to reduce the importance of special dividends, since institutions are presumably more sophisticated than retail investors and are therefore better able to see that most firms treated specials as close substitutes for regulars. At the aggregate level, the secular decline in specials and the increase in 4 institutional ownership occurred roughly in parallel, with both trends proceeding gradually over many years. At the firm level, our logit regressions show a significant negative relation between the level of institutional ownership and the probability that a firm continues to pay special dividends. Finally, we find little support for the notion that special dividends were displaced by common stock repurchases. Theoretically, one mi ght expect a close connection between the disappearance of specials and the adoption of stock repurchases. Both payout methods allow managers to signal their beliefs about company prospects through temporary bonus distributions, with no necessary commitment to repeat today’s higher cash payout in future years. Moreover, repurchases are now widely prevalent (much as specials used to be) although historically they were rare events (as specials are now). However, at the aggregate level, the secular decline in specials began many years before the upsurge in repurchase activity, so that any theory which attributes the disappearance of specials to the advent of repurchases faces the difficult task of explaining the long time gap between the two phenomena. Moreover, at the firm level, the number of companies that repurchased stock after they stopped paying special dividends is significantly less than expected if firms simpl y substituted one for the other form of payout. Finally, repurchase tender offers and large specials both increase in recent years with the upsurge in corporate restructurings and takeovers. Perhaps the most important implication of the findings reported here is the challenge they pose for dividend signaling theories. Specifically, the fact that special dividends once flourished, but have largely failed to survive, is inconsistent with the view that these signals serve an economically important function. We discuss this and other implications of our findings for corporate finance research in section 7. We begin in section 2 by documenting the long-term evolution of special dividend payments. Section 3 analyzes the predictability of special dividends, the evolution of large specials, the behavior of total dividends around the time firms stopped paying specials, and firms’ general tendency to increase regulars when they reduce specials. Section 4 presents our event study analysis of the information content of special dividends. Section 5 examines the relation between institutional ownership and the payment of specials. Section 6 investigates the connection between repurchases and the decline in specials.

Letzte Aktualisierung: 2015-10-10
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Indonesisch

scientevid learning Originally Posted by Ocelot Hi Radrook, Thanks once again for your response. Indeed I was just checking that I'd located the one article amongst many that you thought addressed my claim. As I detailed, it doesn't. Well actually some people do make that claim. I've seen much talk from various brands of creationist that claim that MacroEvolution (evolution of new taxa of the species level and above) is impossible. They use similar arguments as you do so please forgive me for my presumption. I do apologise. Of course the fact that new species have been observed to evolve both in the lab and in the wild, make this claim one of the more ridiculous creationist claims but it is nonetheless one that I have encountered. I asgee that speciation does and has occurred. It's interesting to me that you have raised the bar. You accept that not all individual species need to have been created. Presumably you accept that Lions, Tigers and the domestic Cat all have a common ancestor? Am I correct in my estimation of your beliefs. Yes. If so do you also accept the more controversial conclusion that Homo Sapiens has a common ancestor with Chimps, Bonobos, Gorillas and Orang Utans. It may be more controversial for it's broad implications to theology and philosophy but perhaps because of this added interest it is a conclusion backed by even greater quantities of genetic evidence. No, that's where we diverge. Of course the genetic evidence that all placental mammals share a common ancestor more recent than the one they share with marsupials is as compelling as the evidence for a common ancestor amongst other Genus, Family, Order or Classes. If your theory is true, it would be interesting to see if the genetic evidence could tell us what the original common ancestors were beyond which we can find no further link. For example lets take for want of a better choice a red kangaroo named Charles. You and I both agree that Charles shares a common ancestor with all other red kangaroos, the genetic evidence backs this up. I see no reason to object. According to the genetic evidence Charles also shares a more distant common ancestor with other species of kangaroo such as grey kangaroos, and antilopine kangaroos. Ok. The genetic evidence suggests that further back in time these kangaroos shared a common ancestor with a variety of other species of kangaroo, wallaby and walleroo of the macropus genus. Would you agree? Sure. If so then the genetic evidence further indicates that the macropus genus shares a common ancestor with all other members of the macropod family including various other Kangaroos and Wallabies, the quokka and pademelons. Would you agree that these are all of the same "kind" sharing a common ancestor. That might be acceptable. If so then the genetic evidence indicates that the macropod family share a more distant common ancestor with all members of the order diprodontia. This includes possums koalas and wombats. Is it conceivable to you that the genetic evidence is correct and that these creatures all share a common ancestor with one another? Could they all be of the same "kind"? If they are of the same kind. In fact could all the australidelphia super order of marsupials share a common ancestor as the genetic evidence would suggest, if so are they collectively a "kind" Or do they, as the empirical evidence would suggest, all share a common ancestor with all other marsupials. Are marsupials a kind? I presume that you do not accept that some time in the cretaceous there was an early mammal type reptile or therapsid from whom both you and Charles can claim lineage. However how do you explain why when the genetic evidence is so clear? Because I believe that the data is being interpreted to fit into a preconceived notion. It doesn’t matter where you place the bar, the genetic evidence is clear, there is only one "kind" currently on planet earth we are all descended from the same single common ancestor. I too have no problem when seriously considering a theory of intelligent design that the designer might choose to vary their techniques. What I have a problems with is why the techniques should so closely match a picture of common descent with particular variations being more closely clustered amongst species that appear to be more closely related. Creationists did not make this prediction. Evolutionary biologists did. The examination of the evidence continues to uphold the prediction of the evolutionary biologists. Unless Creationism can explain this remarkable coincidence it is deficient as a theory. I'm afraid your meaning here is not entirely clear to me. However the assumption that evolution is true is rather the point. If you make that assumption you make a prediction that turns out to be true. If you don't make that assumption you need an alternative explanation for the prediction. I offer the analogy once more. If you assume that I am related to my son you will expect a roughly 50% match between the various genes in highly variable alleles. If you do not make that assumption and otherwise find the 50% match you must find another explanation (perhaps we are brothers...) If you find more genetic matches amongst placental mammals than between placental mammals and marsupials this is explained by assuming that placental mammals sharing a more recent common ancestor amongst themselves than the one they might share with marsupials. If you reject that assumption then it would benefit your case to offer an alternative that fits the known facts at least as well. I agree that certain animals share more genetic material in common than other kinds. As I said previously, some of that sharing is due to a common ancestor called a kind in Genesis. What I don't agree with is the transformation of one kind into another or that all living things are ultimately related. Or that my ancestor was a one celled creature which slowly turned into a fish, and later into a reptile, and later into some type of piglike animal as the evolutionist interpretations of data say. Not simply because it is repulsive thought, but because it all depends on a mindless process which I and most human beings on this earth, including human beings who are scientists, find unbelievable due to its inherent improbability and based on the cause and effect phenomena we perceive which indicates that machinelike complex things do not make themselves but are the product of mind or else are programmed to replicate themselves by a mind. Hi again Radrook, It's good to hear back from you. This appears to be a derail from my original question of how do you account for the genetic evidence of common descent if not through common descent. Originally Posted by Radrook It's not the frequency it's the mutation process itself that is a dubious choice for the organization of complex organisms. Originally Posted by Radrook I never denied the occurrence of neutral or beneficial mutations. It is the unlikelyhood of a mindless process with its high probability of being harmful to an organism being said to ultimately lead to the intricate organization as is evident in the human eye with its iris, to adjust the entry of light, the lens to focus that light, on a screen called the retina which is connected to an optic nerve, which reacts to the radiation by coding it into neural impulses, which in turn arrives at a specialized part of the brain which can decode those impulses and turn them into the perception of images. Sorry but in the presence of such strong evidence to the contrary, I just can't buy into the mindless mutation explanation First let me congratulate you on your acceptance of the existence of small positive mutations. This is a major step towards your understanding of what evolution is truly about. It is a step that some creationists are not prepared to make even in the face of reproducible empirical evidence. It appears that you are not sufficiently aware of the intricate complexity that can be produced by undoubtedly mindless processes. Snowflakes, have complexity, a rock arch has irreducible complexity, the water cycle is a steam engine. There is nothing you have demonstrated to be beyond the reach of a mindless process. Are you familiar with John Conway's Game of Life. Draw a random pattern in this very simple purely mechanical 2D universe. The odds that within a few generations you'll see a small glider pattern. It looks designed but you know that you didn't design it. Genetic recipes for life allow new increases in complexity to build upon previous ones. This allows many small mutations to add up to a bigger one. As such it offers us the possibility for a pinnacle of "mindless design" It is in fact so good at design that genetic algorithms have been put to good use by human designers in computer simulations. For example a genetic algorithm produces a shape which is tested virtually for various structural properties. Those algorithms which produce the best designs are then used as the seeds for the next generation of designs. It is not uncommon for such a mindless process to produce "designs" superior in structural efficiency to any of intelligent origin. What evolutionary theory accepts can never evolve is a feature than cannot be broken down into many small neutral or positive stages. The discovery of such a feature would indeed be a problem for evolution. However it is difficult to demonstrate that a feature could not be the result of an appropriate evolutionary path. To do so would probably require examination of an infinite number of possible paths. Instead we get argument for incredulity: "I cannot see how this feature could have evolved, therefore it could not have evolved." I'm sure you don't need me to point out the flaw in this logic. In all cases that I'm aware of, biologists have made progress in discovering possible evolutionary paths for the formation of seemingly problematic features. You bring up the example of the eye as one candidate. This has of course been much discussed and I'm surprised that you do not acknowledge that the solution to this apparent conundrum has already been provided. In fact it was a topic discussed by Darwin himself, who also provided a solution. From here The gradual steps listed are briefly... • photosensitive cell • aggregates of pigment cells without a nerve • an optic nerve surrounded by pigment cells and covered by translucent skin • pigment cells forming a small depression • pigment cells forming a deeper depression • the skin over the depression taking a lens shape • muscles allowing the lens to adjust From the same page you can find links detailing how each stage has been observed in the natural world. Since you accept that small positive mutation can occur and be subject to natural selection it should now be clear to you that the evolution of the eye can be broken down into a series of such steps.

Englisch

english translation into Indonesian

Letzte Aktualisierung: 2014-10-27
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Indonesisch

INTRODUCTION Given the obsession we have with slimness in the United States and the fact that millions of Americans are overweight it is no wonder that a multibillion dollar weight control industry has developed. Weight loss centers and health and fitness spas cater to this obsession and promise us a new body just in time for the swimsuit season. Phamaceutical companies produce drugs, both prescription and over the counter types to help us lose fat the easy way. Food manufacturers market convenient, low calorie, prepackaged but expensive meals. Each year at least one diet book on the best seller list is advertised as the last diet we will ever need. A variety of techniques, some useful and some not are used in attempt to stimulate weight loss. Drugs are used to depress the appetite or increase metabolism. Creams are applied to specific body parts to srink local fat deposits. Surgical techniques include intestinal bypasses, removal or stapling part of the stomach, excising or suction removal of subcutaneous fat tissue, and wiring the jaw shut. Weight loss diets involve almost every possible manipulation, including the high fat diet, the high protein diet, the grapefruit diet, the starvation diet, and even the "no diet" diet. Exercising programs in specially designed clothing are advertised as helping you lose inches of fat in hours. Psychological techniques such as hypnosis or behavior modification are designed to change your eating habits. In severe cases of clinical obesity, treatment usually is administered under medical supervision and may involve a combination of many of these techniques including surgery, hormone therapy, drugs and starvation type diets. An individualized, medically supervised weight control program is very important for the clinically obese because so many health risks are related obesity is very resistant to treatment and over 95 percent of those individuals who lose weight regain it within one to five years and may di this repeatedly.As noted at chapter 10 these fluctuations in body weight, known as weight cycling may not exert deleterious effects on metabolism and health and should not deter obese individuals from attempts to lose weight. The National Institute of Health notes that other group may need medically supervised weight loss programs, including children, pregnant women, persons over the age of 65, and individuals with medical conditions that could be exacerbated by weight loos. Weight control programs have greater chances for success in individuals who have accumulated excess body fat throught environmental conditions, such as excessive eating and decreased physical activity, and who do not have a strong genetic predisposition to obesity. Such a treatmentprogram may be beneficial to the typical adult, for substantial amounts of body fat appear to accumulate between the age of 25 and 35. The prevalence of overweight individuals in the United States has increased in the past quarter century in both children and adults. It is interesting to note that the average American male age 25-50, increased his BMI from 22 to 25 between the 1980 and 1989 RDA, the average female went from about 21 to 24. Moreover prevention of excess weight gain should be a life long life style, beginning in childhood and continuing through adulthood, as suggested by the data presented above. Maintenance of a healthy body weight through prevention techniques may be especially helpfull during the first to years of college when young females typically gain 10-15 pounds. Additionally prevention may also curtail the weight gain in those genetically predisposed, as supported by the recent twin study of Newman and others.

Englisch

Indonesian translation google english

Letzte Aktualisierung: 2014-09-21
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