Você procurou por: collusion (Inglês - Maltês)

collusion
kollużjoni

these antitrust investigations focus on exclusionary conduct, exploitative abuses and collusion.
dawn l-investigazzjonijiet antitrust jiffukaw fuq imġiba li teskludi, fuq abbużi li jisfruttaw u fuq kollużjoni.

in such an oligopolistic market, there is a risk of collusion between the four market leaders.
f'suq oligopolistiku bħal dan, hemm riskju ta' kollużjoni bejn l-erba' mexxejja tas‑suq.

apart from facilitating collusion, an exchange of information can also lead to anti-competitive foreclosure53.
minbarra li jiffaċilita l-kollużjoni, skambju ta’ informazzjoni jista’ jwassal ukoll għal esklużjoni antikompetittiva53.

this is also a situation where non-compete agreements may facilitate collusion between competing suppliers.
din hija wkoll sitwazzjoni fejn ftehim mhux kompetittiv jista' jiffaċilita konfoffa bejn fornituri li jikkompetu.

in addition to possible foreclosure effects, upfront access payments may soften competition and facilitate collusion between distributors.
flimkien mal-effetti possibbli ta’ esklużjoni, il-ħlasijiet bil-quddiem għall-aċċess jistgħu jnaqqsu l-kompetizzjoni u jiffaċilitaw il-kollużjoni bejn distributuri.

such a condition aims specifically at avoiding horizontal collusion to exclude particular brands through the creation of a selective club of brands by the leading suppliers.
tali kundizzjoni għandha l-għan speċifiku li tevita kollużjoni orizzontali sabiex teskludi marki partikolari permezz tal-ħolqien ta' klabb selettiv ta' marki mill‑fornituri mexxejja.

in order to ensure access to or to prevent collusion on the relevant market, certain conditions are to be attached to the block exemption;
sabiex ikun assigurat l-aċċess għal jew biex ma titħalliex kompliċità fis-suq relevanti, għandhom ikunu mehmuża ċerti kondizzjonijiet ma’ l-eżenzjoni ġenerali;

buying power may increase the risk of collusion between dealers and thus appreciably change the analysis of possible anti-competitive effects of selective distribution.
il-poter ta’ xiri jista' jżid ir-riskju ta' kollużjoni bejn negozjanti u b'hekk ibiddel sinifikattivament l-analiżi ta' effetti antikompetittivi possibbli ta' distribuzzjoni selettiva.

3.1.3 a complete separation of ownership between crs and airline or other transportation provider will ultimately eliminate the possibility of collusion or unfair competition by parent carriers.
3.1.3 is-separazzjoni totali tal-proprjetà bejn is-crs u l-linji ta’ l-ajru jew il-fornituri l-oħra tas-servizz tat-trasport ser telimina l-possibbiltà ta’ kollużjoni jew ta’ kompetizzjoni inġusta bejn it-trasportaturi prinċipali.

hence, information exchange can constitute a concerted practice if it reduces strategic uncertainty45 in the market thereby facilitating collusion, that is to say, if the data exchanged is strategic.
għaldaqstant, l-iskambju ta’ informazzjoni jista’ jikkostitwixxi prattika miftiehma jekk inaqqas inċertezza strateġika45 fis-suq u b’hekk jiffaċilita kollużjoni, jiġifieri jekk id-dejta skambjata tkun strateġika.

category management may also facilitate collusion between suppliers through increased opportunities to exchange via retailers sensitive market information, such as for instance information related to future pricing, promotional plans or advertising campaigns57.
il-ġestjoni ta’ kategorija tista’ wkoll tiffaċilita l-kollużjoni bejn fornituri permezz ta’ żieda fl-opportunitajiet għal skambju permezz ta’ bejjiegħa bl-imnut ta’ informazzjoni sensittiva dwar is-suq, pereżempju informazzjoni relatata ma’ pprezzar fil-futur, pjanijiet promozzjonali jew kampanji ta’ reklamar.57

buying power may also increase the risk of collusion on the buyers' side when the exclusive distribution arrangements are imposed by important buyers, possibly located in different territories, on one or several suppliers.
il-poter ta’ xiri jista' jżid ukoll ir-riskju ta' kollużjoni min-naħa tax-xerrejja meta l‑arranġamenti ta' distribuzzjoni esklużiva jkunu imposti minn xerrejja importanti, possibbilment allokati f'territorji differenti, fuq fornitur wieħed jew bosta fornituri.

an agency agreement may also fall within the scope of article 101(1), even if the principal bears all the relevant financial and commercial risks, where it facilitates collusion.
akkordju ta' aġenzija jista' wkoll jidħol fl-ambitu tal-artikolu 101(1), anke jekk il‑prinċipal jerfa' r-riskji kummerċjali u finanzjarji rilevanti kollha, fejn dan jiffaċilita l-kollużjoni.

however, if the number of competitors becomes rather small and their market position is rather similar in terms of market share, capacity and distribution network, there is a risk of collusion and/or softening of competition.
madankollu, jekk in-numru ta' kompetituri jsir pjuttost żgħir u l-pożizzjoni tas-suq tagħhom tkun pjuttost simili f'termini ta' sehem mis-suq, kapaċità u netwerk ta' distribuzzjoni, hemm riskju ta' kollużjoni u/jew tnaqqis ta’ kompetizzjoni.

foreclosure, softening of competition and collusion at the manufacturers' level may harm consumers in particular by increasing the wholesale prices of the products, limiting the choice of products, lowering their quality or reducing the level of product innovation.
esklużjoni, tnaqqis ta’ kompetizzjoni u kollużjoni fil-livell tal-manifattur jistgħu jkunu ta’ ħsara għall-konsumatur b’mod partikolari billi jżidu l-prezzijiet bl-ingrossa tal-prodotti, jillimitaw l-għażla tal-prodotti, inaqqsu l-kwalità tagħhom jew inaqqsu l‑livell ta’ innovazzjoni tal-prodott.