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in terms of public goods, abbott's smoke and abbott's wall are the same. once produced, the smoke that chokes some people will not diminish appreciably the amount of smoke available to choke others. even if abbott wants to be a good citizen and not produce smoke for the sake of allocative efficiency, the victims of his smoke cannot be forced to pay him to stop producing smoke. abbott will continue producing smoke even though he knows that stopping production would be more allocatively efficient. when should a public good be produced because its benefits to some members of the public outweigh its externalities to other members of the public? sometimes intuition leads to the correct result. consider the case of protecting orphanages from the hazard of firebugs. this protection is a public good that seems beneficial to orphans and to all those who care about orphans. this protection is not a public good for firebugs, for whom fire protection is a negative externality. under these circumstances, subsidizing, or at least not taxing, the provisions for fire protection of orphanages is a good idea. one's intuition that orphans' interests should be preferred to firebugs' interests is fortified by observing that orphans (to say nothing of those who care about orphans) outnumber firebugs by hundreds to one. even though protecting orphanages from firebugs is expensive, the class of orphans and orphanophiles is large enough to assume that each member of the class would willingly pay his relatively small aliquot share of fire protection costs. on the other hand, the relatively few firebugs could not buy out the orphans for an amount remotely near the costs of their arsonous conduct. this is an obvious case in which fire protection is a beneficial "good" that may be underproduced unless it is collectivized and subsidized. other cases of public goods are notoriously more difficult than the firebugs and orphans example. ronald coase's classic discussion of the generally reciprocal properties of "goods" and "bads" shows that whether a given public good should be produced is often unclear.15 5 coase, the problem of social cost, 3 j.l. & econ. 1 (1960). 1112 [vol. 38 electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927730 just cause for termination establishing that, other than in obvious cases, a public good is socially desirable presents a daunting task. when a situation contains both jointness of consumption and non-excludability, and the claim is made that the situation is a good public good, a series of essentially empirical assertions is involved which assume fairly accurate knowledge of other individuals' cardinal utilities. disregarding the specific transactions costs associated with the public goods situation (pgc), the aggregate utility of the good (au) must exceed the price (p) that a seller of the public good would demand for the good in a market.'" in other words, au must be greater than p (au > p) but au minus pgc must be less than p ((au - pg) <p). in order to establish these relationships, one must show why the aggregate positive utility of the people for whom the public good will be a "good" good (aug) exceeds the aggregate negative utility of the people for whom the public good will be a "bad" good (aub). one must have information about the relative size of the two publics and the intensity of their respective preferences. interpersonal comparisons of utility are notoriously tricky; one must know what someone else thinks. whether introspective evaluation of one's own utility can lead to meaningful knowledge about many others' utilities is questionable. suppose, for the sake of argument, that someone can successfully determine others' utilities. however, all that will have been established is whether au is a positive number or not. in order for this case to justify a subsidy, one must believe that au, expressed in dollars, costs more than the market price of the sought good. the argument that universal just cause guarantees are undiscovered public goods is a dubious proposition. first, tenure guarantees have not been proved to contain the properties of jointness of consumption or nonexcludability. second, even if this first hurdle is cleared, ample reason exists to doubt the argument that tenure's aggregate utility to workers exceeds its costs of production.
فيما يتعلق بالمنافع العامة ، فإن دخان أبوت وجدار أبوت متماثلان. بمجرد إنتاجه ، لن يقلل الدخان الذي يخنق بعض الأشخاص بشكل كبير من كمية الدخان المتاحة لخنق الآخرين. وحتى لو كان أبوت راغباً في أن يكون مواطناً صالحاً وألا ينتج الدخان من أجل كفاءة التخصيص ، فإن ضحايا دخانه لا يمكن إرغامهم على الدفع له لكي يتوقف عن إنتاج الدخان. سيستمر أبوت في إنتاج الدخان على الرغم من أنه يعرف أن إيقاف الإنتاج سيكون أكثر كفاءة من حيث التخصيص
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