Você procurou por: like picking at a scab so it could never heal ... (Inglês - Árabe)

so it could never be perfect.
لذا، لن يكون رائعاً ابداً

so it could never be tracked from inventory.
إذن لا يمكن أبدا تعقبها من المصدر

with the bubble. and so it could never turn the bubble off
و كذلك لا يمكنك ايقاف الفقاعة بمجرد انطلاقها

it could never be worth my while, so it's all yours.
لن يفيدني أبدًا ، لذلك فإنه ملكك

well, it looks like they were at a chili's and there's a platter of ribs, so it could be rib wednesday.
يبدو باأنهم كانوا في مطعم "تشيلي" ـ وهناك طبق ضلوع ,اذا من الممكن أن يكون الأربعاء

sixth committee summary record of the 14th meeting held at headquarters, new york, on thursday, 1 november 2001, at 10 a.m. chairman: mr. lelong (haiti) contents agenda item 162: report of the international law commission on the work of its fifty-third session (continued) agenda item 160: convention on jurisdictional immunities of states and their property (continued) the meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m. agenda item 162: report of the international law commission on the work of its fifty-third session (continued) (a/56/10 and corr.1) mr. kanu (sierra leone) said that the draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts adopted by the international law commission constituted a comprehensive and balanced text. the commission was to be commended for having addressed the most controversial issues. his delegation felt, however, that some of the provisions required further attention. in attempting to distinguish between ordinary breaches and breaches of norms of a fundamental character, the commission had originally posited the notions of international crimes and international delicts of a state, but had wisely decided instead to refer to serious breaches of obligations to the international community as a whole. his delegation had welcomed that approach but had expressed doubts about the precision of the term. the compromise language of the current article 40, paragraph 1, addressed some of those concerns by referring to a serious breach by a state of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law, a wise choice since the concept of peremptory norms was sufficiently defined by the vienna convention on the law of treaties and the jurisprudence of the international court of justice. moreover, the definition of “serious” as contained in article 40, paragraph 2, was based on ideas in widespread use in international law. his delegation would nonetheless welcome language that would prevent the assessment of the seriousness of a breach from being an arbitrary determination. the wording “international community as a whole” had been retained in a number of other articles, and his delegation was not convinced that departing from the language of the vienna convention was appropriate. whatever language was adopted should, in any case, be without prejudice to the rights of persons or entities arising from the responsibility of a state, as set forth in article 33, paragraph 2. his delegation welcomed the emphasis given to the principle of the irrelevance of internal law, expressed in the final draft of articles 3 and 32. its inclusion reflected a well-established norm and gave an incentive to states to bring their domestic legislation into conformity with international standards. the main difficulty with respect to countermeasures was to strike a balance between the need for flexibility and effectiveness, on the one hand, and the desire to prevent the abuse of countermeasures, especially when directed against smaller or weaker states. the final draft articles represented a step forward compared with the previous version in that they specified the obligations not affected by countermeasures (art. 50), recognized the principle of proportionality (art. 51), stipulated that countermeasures should be terminated as soon as the responsible state had complied with its obligations (art. 53) and in general established some important safeguards against the misuse of countermeasures. his delegation was still concerned, however, about the unilateral assessment of the legitimacy of countermeasures. moreover, some of the safeguards in article 52 would weaken the flexibility and effectiveness of countermeasures. the requirements of prior notification and negotiation in article 52, paragraph 1 (b), for example, imposed an obligation not recognized under international law, and the prohibition in article 52, paragraph 3 (b), against taking countermeasures when the dispute was pending before a court seemed incompatible with the possibility of taking urgent countermeasures rightly provided for in article 52, paragraph 2. on the question of measures taken by states other than the injured state, his delegation welcomed the new wording of article 54 in the form of a saving clause much less open to abuse than the previous version but leaving open the possibility of a collective response by states within the context, for example, of the united nations. although several articles required improvement, his delegation thought that chapter ii was useful overall and should be retained. his delegation supported the recommendation of the commission to the general assembly that it should take note of the draft articles in a resolution and annex the articles thereto, and it would be willing to consider, at a later stage, negotiating a convention on state responsibility. mr. gómez robledo (mexico) said that the draft articles adopted by the commission were the most refined statement available of the rules governing the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts and constituted an invaluable work of codification and progressive development of international law. the articles attempted to strike a balance between heavily debated opposing viewpoints in an area of international law that was rapidly evolving and in which the need for rules and standards was increasingly felt. unfortunately, like all products of compromise, the articles left some room for doubt and reservations. the most serious shortcoming was the lack of dispute settlement provisions, which seemed at best contrary to good sense and at worst a fatalistic acceptance that the injured state would inevitably resort to its own measures. his delegation was not convinced by the argument that dispute settlement provisions were only appropriate if the articles were to take the form of a convention. with respect to article 25, his delegation agreed with the commission that necessity as a ground for precluding wrongfulness was an exceptional case that should be subject to strictly defined conditions to safeguard against possible abuse by states, especially in view of the subjectivity of the phrases “essential interest” and “grave and imminent peril”. in no case should the state invoking necessity be the sole judge of its existence, nor should the article be taken in any way as legitimizing certain concepts, such as anticipatory self-defence, that were not firmly grounded in the rules relating to the use of force and the definition of aggression. although the commission had improved the wording of part two, chapter iii, on serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law, there were still problems with articles 40 and 41. his delegation could not agree that it was currently accepted that all states were obliged to cooperate to bring to an end a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law. the broad language of the chapter invited abuse of countermeasures and ignored the system of collective security provided for in the charter of the united nations. although “peremptory norms of international law” was a more precise wording than “obligations to the international community as a whole”, it was open to subjective interpretation, because there was still no well-defined list of peremptory norms. moreover, the earlier phrase had been retained in many of the draft articles. his delegation was also concerned that by defining a “serious breach” as a threshold for the application of the articles, the commission was implying the existence of a category of “non-serious” breaches of peremptory norms not mentioned in the vienna convention. since the very concept of peremptory norms had been developed to safeguard the most precious legal values of the community of states, it was difficult to justify the distinction. his delegation felt that the best alternative was to eliminate chapter iii of part two, on the understanding that nothing in the draft articles affected the provisions of the charter of the united nations. in article 44, subparagraph (b), it was questionable whether the requirement that local remedies must be exhausted should be made dependent on those remedies being “available and effective”. the rule of exhaustion of local remedies was well established in international law. a determination of their effectiveness implied a value judgement passed on the internal legal system of a state and could lead to abuse by allowing the injured state to bypass the legal remedies of the responsible state. the american convention on human rights and the international covenant on civil and political rights made exceptions to the exhaustion of local remedies dependent not on an evaluation of their effectiveness but on whether their application was unreasonably prolonged, and the decisions of the inter-american court of human rights had been consistent in that regard. as if article 42 were not broad enough, article 48 further expanded the opportunities for states other than the injured state to invoke the responsibility of a state and take measures against it, if the obligation breached was owed to the international community as a whole. it was unclear precisely which obligations were meant. his delegation would prefer the language of the vienna convention, which referred to “the international community of states as a whole”. moreover, the prerogatives of a state entitled to invoke responsibility should have been expressly limited to those mentioned in paragraph 2, in order to rule out any application of countermeasures by states other than the injured state. despite some doubts about the inclusion of part three, chapter ii, on countermeasures, his delegation felt that the final result was balanced and reinforced the principles that countermeasures were limited in scope, were restricted to the purpose of securing compliance with the obligation breached and must be proportionate to the injury suffered. although those elements were insufficient to prevent abuses, they would help to guide the conduct of states. on a drafting point, he wondered why the drafters had chosen to use the words “commensurate with” in the english version instead of “proportionate to” in draft article 51, since “proportionality” was used in the title and was a concept well established in international law. his delegation had concerns about the provision in article 52, paragraph 2, whereby an injured state might take urgent countermeasures if necessary without notifying the responsible state or offering to negotiate with it. as in many other places in the draft articles, the decision was left entirely to the injured state, and the provision could have the effect of legitimizing abuses. here, again, the lack of a dispute settlement mechanism was sorely felt. his delegation had reservations about the inclusion of draft article 54, since it seemed to invite states other than the injured state to take countermeasures against a responsible state and was silent on other mechanisms that existed in the organized international community for dealing with breaches of international law. although his delegation had always been in favour of a convention as the only appropriate outcome for the important work done by the commission over nearly half a century, the idea of a convention did not appear to enjoy a consensus at present. his delegation could therefore support a step-by-step approach towards the ultimate goal, as recommended by the commission; that the general assembly should simply take note of the draft articles, however, seemed inadequate as the first step. it would be better to allow states a year or two to weigh the text and commentaries carefully before deciding what to do with them. his delegation therefore proposed that the general assembly should express its appreciation for the work of the commission, call the attention of states to the draft articles and include an item on the agenda of the fifty-seventh session of the general assembly entitled, “responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts”. under that agenda item, the assembly could consider annexing the draft articles to a resolution and possibly taking future action on them, including the adoption of a legally binding instrument. mr. economides (greece) said that, with the submission of the draft articles, the commission had filled an immense gap by codifying an area of international law — its most important area — that had been highly decentralized and poorly developed but was presently in transition from the status of exclusively customary law to that of written law. being a consensus document, the articles, of course, represented extensive compromises. he wished to draw attention to both the strong and the weak points in the articles, difficult though that would be, given the inevitable high degree of subjectivity involved. the first was the emphasis placed on the concept of the international community as a whole, to which states owed obligations. the concept was expressed explicitly in draft article 33, paragraph 1, implicitly in draft article 40 and again explicitly in draft articles 42 and 48, paragraph 1 (b). thus in cases of breaches of international obligations to the international community and, a fortiori, in those involving jus cogens, not only a specially affected state but also other states were entitled to invoke the responsibility of the state which had committed the internationally wrongful act; the difference between the two situations was that the injured state acted in its own interest, whereas other states acted in a common interest, which amounted to nothing more nor less than that of the international community as a whole. that it should be seen as a distinct entity, with legally protected rights, boded well for the future both of the international community and of international law. another extremely positive aspect of the articles was the considerable impetus they gave to the peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens), which had first been adopted by the 1969 vienna convention on the law of treaties and had since become part of international public policy. obligations arising under them outweighed any other international obligation, whether agreement-based, customary or of any other nature. the draft articles devoted several significant provisions to such norms, including article 26, the wording of which was greatly preferable to that of draft article 21 as provisionally adopted by the commission's editorial committee the previous year. chapter iii of part two — articles 40 and 41 — provided specifically for the international responsibility entailed by a serious breach by a state of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law, an approach that had ultimately replaced the provisions on state crimes contained in the famous draft article 19 adopted on first reading. the term “crimes” had indeed been deleted, but the substance of the rules had been retained. there were also other articles, such as article 50, paragraph 1, which related, directly or indirectly, to obligations arising under such peremptory norms. the articles therefore substantially strengthened an institution of great significance in international law. the third positive aspect of the draft articles was the concept of consequences envisaged for serious breaches, a concept that had developed gradually since the end of the second world war. the process had begun with chapter vii of the charter of the united nations and continued with the introduction of the concept of peremptory norms, the case law of the international court of justice, particularly its 1970 judgment in the barcelona traction case, the important advances in international criminal law, article 19 of the draft articles on state responsibility as put forward by mr. ago and adopted by the commission on first reading in 1980 (the first reference to state crimes) and, lastly, the doctrine according to which, ever since bluntschli had propounded it in 1868, a serious breach affecting the essential interests of the international community itself could not be treated in the same way as a minor breach causing simple damage to a state. serious breaches of obligations owed under jus cogens norms entailed the same consequences as those produced by any other internationally wrongful act, as outlined in articles 30 (a) (cessation), 29 (continued duty of performance), 30 (b) (assurances of non-repetition) and, above all, 34 ff. (reparation, which could take various forms). of particular significance was the fact that restitution — re-establishing the situation that had existed before the wrongful act had been committed — was applied particularly strictly in cases of breaches that affected international public order: for example, cessation of illegal occupation and restitution of a territory to the state to which it belonged. the articles also contained more specific consequences, contained in article 41, which obliged states to cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach, not to recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. although only the first obligation was of a positive nature, while the other two entailed abstaining from a specific course of action, they amounted to international solidarity with the injured state and, ultimately, with the whole international community. by the same token, serious breaches of such recognized peremptory norms as the prohibition of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture and the right to self-determination should be tackled collectively at the global level. in that context, it was regrettable that the commission had ultimately deleted draft article 42, paragraph 1, as provisionally adopted by its editorial committee the previous year, since it had provided for an additional consequence, namely, obliging the responsible state to pay damages commensurate with the seriousness of the breach, or punitive damages. overall the regime of state responsibility had been brought up to date: any serious breach of an obligation under peremptory norms of general international law entailed far more serious consequences, although it should be said that the word “serious” was superfluous, since any breach of a peremptory norm was, by definition, serious. meanwhile, the traditional bilateral relationship between the injured and the responsible state had been abandoned, not only for breaches under draft articles 40 and 41 but for all collective obligations. in that context, draft article 48, which entitled states to act collectively, in effect exercising the rights of an injured state, including that of requiring performance of the obligation of reparation, was particularly significant. a state infringing collective obligations would therefore have to confront not just the injured state but also some or all of the other states that made up the international community. state responsibility would come to play an increasingly important role in the settlement of collective problems. another positive aspect of the articles was that there was less emphasis on the concept of injury as a prerequisite for acknowledgement of responsibility. article 1, which stated that “every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of that state”, although astonishingly clear and simple, covered every eventuality. in that context, he recalled that many international obligations, particularly those of a negative nature, could be breached without injury necessarily being caused. the draft articles had their weak points, but he would draw attention to only two. the first related to article 52, on countermeasures. such measures, e
اللجنة السادسة محضر موجز للجلسة الرابعة عشرة المعقودة في المقر، نيويورك، يوم لخميس، 1 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2001، الساعة 00/10. الرئيس: السيد للونغ (هايتي) المحتويات البند 162 من جدول الأعمال: تقرير لجنة القانون الدولي عن أعمال دورتها الثالثة والخمسينن (تابع)