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Şunu aradınız:: generic structure of recount (İngilizce - Endonezce)

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Profesyonel çevirmenler, işletmeler, web sayfaları ve erişimin serbest olduğu çeviri havuzlarından.

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Bilgi

İngilizce

Structure of %s

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Struktur dari %s

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İngilizce

example of recount text

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Dulu,ketika smp saya ikutan eskul pmr.dan saya masuk ke bagian tandu.

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İngilizce

example of recount text to jakarta

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contoh recount text to jakarta

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İngilizce

example of recount text to surabaya

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contoh recount text to surabaya

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İngilizce

example of recount text holiday of Eid

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contoh recount text liburan di rumah

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İngilizce

example of recount text holiday of Eid

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contoh recount text liburan lebaran

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example of recount text holiday at home

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liburan awal liburan

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İngilizce

example of recount text holiday in Yogyakarta

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contoh text recount liburan di yogyakarta

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İngilizce

example of recount text holiday in Yogyakarta

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contoh recount text liburan di yogyakarta

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İngilizce

invalid structure of OpenPGP card (DO 0x93)

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struktur kartu OpenPGP tidak valid (DO 0x93)

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İngilizce

Sukkot structures of all kinds have sprung up on balconies, street corners and in front of cafes.

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Segala macam struktur Sukkot terlihat dari balkon, sudut jalan dan di depan kafe.

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Table 2 reports ownership structure of the sample firms over the period 2002-2010. Overall, the ownership structure of Thai firms had been stable over the sample period, despite a slight increase in individual ownership due to domestic individual ownership and a small decline in institutional ownership due to foreign institutional ownership.

Endonezce

Tabel 2 laporan struktur kepemilikan perusahaan sampel selama periode 2002-2010. Secara keseluruhan, struktur kepemilikan perusahaan Thailand telah stabil selama periode sampel, meskipun sedikit peningkatan dalam kepemilikan individu karena kepemilikan individu domestik dan penurunan kecil dalam kelembagaan kepemilikan karena kelembagaan kepemilikan asing.

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The main independent variables are ownership structure of Thai firms. TOP is the percent of shares held by the largest shareholder. Following Harada and Nguyen (2011) and Khan (2006), ownership concentration is measured by the percent of shares owned by the five largest shareholders (TOP5).

Endonezce

Variabel independen utama adalah struktur kepemilikan perusahaan Thailand. ATAS adalah persen dari saham dipegang oleh pemegang saham terbesar. Mengikuti Harada dan Nguyen (2011) dan Khan (2006), kepemilikan konsentrasi diukur persen saham dimiliki oleh pemegang saham terbesar lima (TOP5).

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First, according to La Porta et al. (2000), Thailand is characterized as a country with low shareholder protection and the ownership structure of Thai firms is highly concentrated. Second, it is documented that Thai firms are mostly owned and controlled by individuals, families, and related partners (see, e.g., Aivazian et al., 2003; Claessens et al., 2000; Wiwattanakantang, 2001).

Endonezce

Pertama, menurut La Porta et al. (2000), Thailand ditandai sebagai negara dengan pemegang saham rendah perlindungan dan struktur kepemilikan perusahaan Thailand sangat terkonsentrasi. Kedua, didokumentasikan bahwa perusahaan Thailand kebanyakan dimiliki dan dikendalikan oleh individu, Keluarga, dan terkait mitra (Lihat, misalnya, Aivazian et al., 2003; Claessens et al., 2000; Wiwattanakantang, 2001).

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İngilizce

PART 3 CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR IN OLIGOPOLY Up to this point we have restricted our attention to non-co-operative behaviour. That is we have treated firms as acting independently from one another and have thus ignored the possibility of co-operation. We have seen that the outcome of oligopolistic interdependence can lead to a variety of outcomes many of which are likely to be unsatisfactory from the point of view of the firm. If nothing else it is clear that non-co-operative oligopoly behaviour creates uncertainty because so many outcomes are conceivable. This uncertainty in itself will harm the firm’s search for value but in addition to this our analysis suggests that the independent search for profits will often lead to an outcome in which industry profits are below the maximum possible. It is now time to consider if co-operative behaviour is the answer to this problem. Intuitively it seems obvious that co-operation will lead to a better outcome for the firms involved in oligopolistic rivalry. By co-operating, or colluding, in the creation of a cartel firms can in principle act as if the industry was a monopoly and so ensure industry profits are at the maximum possible level. But if co-operation is valuable why doesn’t every oligopolistic industry operate on co-operative principles? We will see that whilst co-operation is valuable for oligopolistic firms it is not necessarily easy to organise and maintain. Like everything else there are costs involved in producing the desired benefits. This will lead us to a discussion of the chances of success for organising a collusive industry. 3.1 CO-OPERATION AND THE PROFIT MAXIMISING CARTEL A likely form of collusion amongst independent firms is the explicit profit maximising cartel. We have mentioned earlier some well known examples of this such as OPEC and the world diamond market dominated allegedly by the De Beers Central Selling Organisation. There are however many more less prominent cases. For example hundreds of cartel like arrangements have been registered with the British Restrictive Practices Court whose job is to examine the practices and judge their impact on the public interest. From time to time unregistered agreements also come to light in industries as far apart as cement and bread. The incentives for co-operation amongst oligopolistic firms are not hard understand. Fi rst, it enables firms to set prices at a high, possibly even the monopolistic, level and a void poorer outcomes such as those predicted by the Cournot and Bertrand models we outlined earlier. Second, it can help to avoid price wars breaking out. Price wars are of course bad news for most firms. Just look at what happened to profits in the grocery supermarket sector when a price war (or more precisely a loyalty card war) broke out in 1995. Sainsbury suffered its first profit decline in over twenty years. Or what happened to profits in the newspaper industry when a price war was started by News International in 1993 after a long period of stability. Market share was shuffled slightly, total sales stagnated, and everyone lost money (except the consumer of course). Third, co-operation promises a period of stability and allows for better planning of investment and employment, not to mention an easier life for management. Co-operation takes some of the guesswork out of oligopoly. How exactly does it work? Look back to Figure 8.1. Imagine an oligopolistic industry with several firms and no co-operation. The industry price has settled at a low level such as that shown at point c because firms have been using the type of conjectures we described under Cournot quantity competition. Industry output is at Qnc, and the industry price is Pnc. Industry profits are not being maximised at this level of prices although each firm is doing the best it can to maximise its own profits given what the others are doing. (maybe repeat fig 8.1 here if necessary) How will co-operation help in this situation? Assuming the firms can negotiate an acceptable cartel agreement amongst themselves which allows for the cartel executive committee to order each firm to produce less output than before then industry supply can be reduced and prices pushed up. Ultimately if the cartel committee had good information about industry demand conditions and industry marginal costs it could determine the precise industry profit maximising level of output, divide this up amongst the firms involved according to some negotiated formula, and achieve the industry maximum profits. Each firm would share in these profits according to its allocated output quota. The profit maximising level of output for the industry is of course the monopoly level as shown in Figure 8.1 as QM The industry price is then the monopoly price PM Of course the precise gap between non co-operative profits and co-operative profits will depend on many things such as the number of firms in the industry, the nature of the competition involved, and the quality of information available to the cartel executive. But the basic principle is this: successful co-operation amongst rivals will generally produce a more profitable industry than will non-co-operation. All the cartel has to do, which we will soon see is not as easy as it sounds, is to determine the output quotas for each firm and to encourage each firm to stick to this quota. A license to print money or so it would seem! A cartel arrangement is even consistent with the appearance of considerable rivalry. Until recently the world air transport system was regulated by the International Air Transport Association. Despite this there was evidence of rivalry amongst the firms involved in the form of advertising and other efforts to differentiate products, or more corr ectly services. It might even be argued that the unpredictable nature of price competition causes firms to seek to avoid it by price collusion and to channel their efforts to build market share into other area such as product differentiation and product development. 3.2 IF CO-OPERATION IS SO GOOD WHY DOESN’T EVERYONE DO IT? The question now arises, if co-operation is so good why doesn’t everyone do it and take the guesswork and uncertainty out of oligopoly? The fact is that not every oligopolistic industry is effectively cartelised. Why not? Let us consider why despite its apparent attractions co-operation is not always attempted, and if attempted why it is not always successful. First, it may be that some or all of the owners or managers in a particular industry believe they are good enough to win the competitive battle and create a profitable dominant firm on their own. A cartel might be seen by aggressive firms therefore as an attempt to stop the best firms from pushing out the weaker firms. Few managers believe they are below average and many may think they are good enough to sustain high profits without the help of a cartel. Hubris may even be a qualification for the job. Of course in some cases and in certain circumstances such a belief might be well justified by the results. Intel for example presumably felt little need for price co-operation in the computer chip industry, nor did Microsoft in software. In others however it might simply lead to temporary shuffling of market shares and permanently low profits. The newspaper price wars in the UK for example mentioned above. Second, it may be against the law. To the extent that co-operative behaviour is successful it is so at the expense of the consumer. If cartels keep up the price of diamonds or air fares then consumers pay higher prices than otherwise and fewer consumers enjoy the product or service. Governments in many countries, such as the US and the UK, have therefore seen it as necessary to regulate co-operative efforts amongst firms in the interests of consumers. The precise theoretical rationale for these actions is discussed in a later chapter. In Britain for example cartels are not themselves illegal, although the new labour government is considering making them illegal. At present cartel arrangements must be registered with the Registrar of Restrictive Practices and if they wish to continue to operate within the law they must be able to demonstrate that they work in the public interest. This is not an impossible thing to do but, on the basis of experience, it is extremely difficult so effectively cartels are forbidden in the UK. This it must be said does not necessarily mean that they no longer exist in Britain because they do and from time to time these unregistered agreements come to light. It is strongly suspected by some for example that retailers of electrical goods in the UK operate in a way consistent with a cartel. See Box 8.4 for some information on this. box 8.4 around here BOX 8.4 HOW SHOPPERS PAY HIGH PRICES In an article in the Sunday Times newspaper recently the prices of widely available electrical goods were compared across different retail store groups in the UK. The article argues that British shoppers were paying inflated prices for electrical goods such as TV’s and videos. The evidence given for this was the very close similarity of the prices quoted by different stores, some of which is shown below, and the fact that prices in America for exactly the same products were significantly lower (not shown here). Now Table 8.3 Price spreads for a variety of products Product / store Dixons Argos John Lewis Comet Currys Sony Play Station 197 196.5 197 197 197 Sega Saturn 197 197 196 197 196 Sony TV 699.99 na 699 699.99 699.99 Psion Organiser 329.99 329.99 329 na 329.99 Aiwa CD/tape 130 129.99 na 129.99 129.99 Of course it might well be the case that there is a perfectly innocent explanation for such price similarities and we have already suggested earlier what they might be. For example it is possible, although perhaps unlikely, that retailers are making Bertrand style conjectures (see section 2.3 above) and ending up at the competitive price level which is the same for everyone. It is certainly difficult to differentiate one store from another because most of these stores are located close to one another, so you have a homogeneous product situation here where it is hard to see how a price spread could develop. The Office of Fair Trading however takes the view that what is happening is that manufacturers are trying to prevent price competition between the stores and thus are enforcing their prices on the hapless retailers. Retailers which step out of line may be refused supplies and this keeps prices at the levels desired by the producers. Source: Sunday Times, Stephen McGinty, 17 November, 1996 End of Box 8.4   Third, a cartel has to meet a basic economic condition: the benefits involved have to exceed the costs. We analysed the benefits of co-operation above and they are clearly positive but we did not consider the costs involved in creating and maintaining a cartel. They include negotiating costs, contracting costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs. These can be considerable especially in the light of the fact that cartel arrangements are often strictly regulated by the state and so can’t be negotiated publicly and can’t be enforced by members through the courts. Consider OPEC for example. Member countries have to create an organisation which is regularly re-negotiating quotas, monitoring oil shipments and contract prices, and enforcing agreed quotas. None of this is easy or cheap. Think of what you would need to do to monitor all oil shipments? How exactly would OPEC force Nigeria or Saudi Arabia to stick to its quota? Two factors in particular influence the cost-benefit calculation: the threat of new entry and cheating. Fourth, the cartel has to be able to discourage new entrants if it is to remain successful. If a cartel successfully achieves a position where firms are earning economic profits these will act to encourage new entry into the industry. If the cartel cannot discourage new entry market supply will increase and squeeze prices down. For example the rise in oil prices engineered by OPEC in the 1970’s lead to a surge in investment in oil exploration outside (and indeed inside) OPEC which eventually increased supply and caused prices to fall back again. OPEC had no control over the actions of non-OPEC countries, nor as it turned out enough control over its members, and so could not prevent new entry attracted by the prospective profits available at the price set by the cartel. Of course the new entrants might enter and join the cartel but this would make it somewhat more expensive to operate and somewhat less profitable because more firms then share the available industry profits. The cartel would eventually become pointless if any positive economic profits resulted in more entry. Professional organisations for doctors and lawyers provide an example of how entry might be controlled by controlling the supply of licenses to new entrants. Finally, all cartels faces a serious internal problem as a result of cheating. The problem is that whilst co-operation is good for the individual firms in the industry, pretending to co-operate and then reneging can be even better. In a successful cartel as we saw above the industry price is kept well above the level of costs. This means that for any individual firm the marginal revenue from selling units of output above its quota exceeds the marginal cost of production because at the industry price each individual firm faces an elastic demand function. This means the cartel quota allocated to the firm is not its Nash equilibrium output. At the cartel price the firm is doing nicely but it is not doing as well as it could do given what the others are doing. This is why the cartel organisers must set each firm a quota and try to ensure that it sticks. Each profit seeking firm would like to sell a lot more than its quota at the industry price because selling at the cartel price is so profitable for a firm. But it is only profitable for a particular firm if all the other firms stick to their quotas and support the industry price. And this is the fundamental problem the cartel faces. Why should any firm stick to the industry price when it is so profitable to renege and when there is a good chance that if you don’t renege the others will and your good behaviour will simply be making it easy for them? The threat and reality of cheating is a major problem for those seeking to create or maintain a successful cartel. This is because it raises the costs of cartel organisation. The cartel members have to meet the costs of an executive body charged with monitoring the cartel agreement to make sure individual members stick to their quotas and with enforcing these quotas when some members cheat. In some cases these costs may be manageable but in others they may be prohibitive and make the cartel non-viable. Thus if monitoring individual member output is simple and if enforcing agreements is relatively easy then a cartel can work to produce a net benefit for the firms involved. But if monitoring is difficult and enforcement is hard then the costs involved in maintaining the cartel rise rapidly and overtake the benefits. We will consider in more detail what determines the chances of success for collusive oligopolists below. However, before we do so, we can examine the problem of cheating more rigorously by considering a famous game called the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. This game and its significance is described in Box 8.5 Box 8.5 THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA An often discussed game - the so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma -illustrates the potential advantages and disadvantages of co-operative behaviour. More generally it shows the limitations of what we might call “rational self-interested behaviour”. An example of this game is shown in Figure 8.2. Figure 8.2: THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA PRISONER TWO CONFESS DON’T CONFESS CONFESS -7 -10 PRISONER -7 -1 ONE DON’T CONFESS -1 -2 -10 -2 Two suspects are arrested for a serious crime and kept in separate cells unable to communicate with one another. The evidence available to the prosecution is not sufficient to ensure conviction on the serious crime in the absence of a confession. If there are no confessions the charge will be reduced to a lesser crime with a much lower sentence. The prosecutor therefore tells each prisoner that if neither confesses they will be prosecuted on the minor charge carrying a two year sentence. However if one confesses and incriminates the other (who does not confess) he will get only one year whilst his partner will be given a hefty ten year sentence for his stubbornness. Finally, if both confess then each will get a seven year sentence. The payoffs to the two prisoners are shown in the table, with negative signs indicating the payoffs are bads rather than goods. As the prisoners are unable to communicate they have no choice but to behave non-co-operatively. What should these prisoners do? The choice of confess is the best strategy for both players and so we expect both prisoners to confess. This is also a Nash equilibrium for this game. Given that the other person is likely to confess, confessing is the best thing you can do. You can work this out like this if you are ever a prisoner: If I confess what is the worst that can happen (7 years) and what is the best (1 year). If I keep quiet what is the worst that can happen (10 years) and what is the best (2 years). Therefore no matter what my partner does it is always better for me to confess. Seven years is better than ten, and one year is better than two. QED. It is clear however that even though both players think like this, and that the subsequent outcome is an equilibrium one, it is sub-optimal for both players. If neither had confessed each would have received a jail sentence of only two years as opposed to seven years. One might think that as each would realise this neither would choose to confess. But not confessing is very risky for the players in this game. If one does not confess but the other does the non confessor will receive the maximum sentence of 10 years. How could the best outcome for both be achieved? Suppose the two prisoners are allowed to communicate and so to seek a co-operative outcome. They could then agree not to confess and minimise the likely sentences. Co-operation seems to be preferable for both compared with behaving non-co-operatively. Or so it might seem. Unfortunately for prisoners everywhere the structure of payoffs in our game suggests that co-operation is not necessarily a rational strategy even in these circumstances. It may be better to offer to co-operate and to then renege in the hope of getting the minimum sentence of one year. If prisoner one agrees with his partner to refuse to confess, but then breaks the agreement and confesses, he receives the minimum punishment and his partner get the maximum. Of course, given the symmetry of the game, the other player is likely to reason in the same way too. So even when co-operation is possible not confessing is a dangerous choice and a risk-averse person is likely to avoid it because of the probability of being ‘cheated against’. Why is this game called the prisoners’

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google translete

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İngilizce

Pirate ringleader admits to murder JAMBI:a pirate leader admitted ‘Wednesday, that his gang had been involved in six robberies and killed to police officers. Itham Guntur,27 told police investigators that the gang consisted of six people, all former members of ship crews “because we are all ex-crew, we know the the major shipping lanes, such us sunda strait and the east Jambi coast verywell,”he said Itham identified the murdered officrs as brigadier genral mulyadi from the south Sumatra police and brigadier genral kennedy from the Jakarta police. The pirates tragated cargo ship, fishing boat and oil tankers.-antara 16.accoarding to text 1, wich statement is true A.the pirate ringleader had been accused of murders B.the members of the pirate were murderes C.the murders happened in jambi last Wednesday D.twopolice officers had been involved in six robberies E.itam Guntur was one of two police officers who was involved in the robbery. 17.the pronoun “he” in the second paragraph refers to……… A.police officer . B. itham Guntur C.one of the ship crews D.ex-crew member E.brigadier genral mulyadi 18.the communicative purpose of text one is…… A.to tell the reader what really happened B.to explain sequence of event C.to amuse the reader problematic event D.to inform the reader about newsworthy events E.to describe the murderers in south Sumatra 19.A person who rob the cargo ship, fishing boat or oil tankers is call a…. A.robber B. police offers C.ship crew D.pirate E.ringleader 20. The text typ of text 1is called a/an….. A.recount B.narrative C. anecdote D.news item E.spoof TEXT 2 CHEVY RADIO FM 103.7 59 PASIR KALIKI RD.Bandung 40172 Phone: 613902-613304 Want to feel relaxed while improving your English? Listen regilary to our most progressive and wonderful English program: “CHEVY RENDEZVOUS” Broad casted every Tuesday, 10.15 P.M. to 12.00 P.M Our program includes: • Songs • Word news • News from the entertainment world(music,film,and sport) • Celebrities interview • quiz with the hots of the program : lexy and febri (taken from: hallo English magazine) 21. the text above is akind of ……… A.announcement B.advertisment C.news item D.instruction E.tips 22. what is the topic of the topic of the text above? A.chevy rendezvous B.chevy radio C. lexy and febri E.FM.103.7 23.What is the communicative porpoise of text 2? A.to share an amusingstory with others B.to tell the readers the location of chevy radio C.To persuade the readers to tune in to chevy rendezvous program D.to ensure the readers that chavy radio is in FM radio stasion E.to describe how to entrol in chevy rendezvous program 24. chevy radio stasion is ………. From 59 pasir kaliki rd bandung 40172 A.founded B.located C.broadcasted D.released E.prodused TEXT 3 the exit tax policy EXIT TAX SPOIL VISA-FREE POLICY An article titled,”the ASEAN visa-free hailed as boon for tourism on page 10 of the Jakarta post, july 31, assumed the free visas and low cost airline tickets would not only encourage people to travel but also stimulate social and commercial interaction within ASEAN countries. However, the hopes expressed in the article will misled reader becouse the exit tax policy imposed by the Indonesian government is higer than the price of a budget airline ticket. Ionce saw an airline company charge a passanger about Rp.800.000,00 for areturn ticket to Jakarta-kualalumpur ,which certainly attracted people to Malaysia . unfortunately, those people had to think twice before buying the ticket , because they had to pay an exi tax ofRp.1 million. Finalad,however a country where I use to live for a several years, does not charge,is citizen with the exit tax.it was easy and cheap for me to travel around eropean countries. Thus,in order to promote people-to-people contect in southeast asia, the Indonesian government sould revoke the exit tsxfor visit within ASEAN countries immediately. 25. Adrian dutika ikawati a citizen from Jakarta, wrote a latter to the Jakarta post in order to….. A.persuade the government to put an end balance to the exit tax policy B.spoil the visa-free policy released by the government C balance the price of the airline ticket and the exit text D.promote people-to-people contect in southeast asia E.impose the exit tax policy ab=nd new airline ticket 26.the exit tax spoil visa-free policy because…….. a.the opration of budget airline are getting more expensive b.the exit tax is higer than the price of an airline ticket c.the policy facility many tourists to visit southeast asia countries d.the exit tax is cheaper than the price of airline ticket e.the policy won’t charge every passengers who travels abroad 27.the writer wrote the recommendation in paragraph…….. A.1 B.2 c.3 d.4 e.5 28.the generic structure of text 3 is…… a.orientation-event –reorientation b.orientation-complication-resolution c.thesis-elaboration d.thesis-argument-reiteration e.thesis-arguments-recommendation 29.the text belong to a/an? a.explanation b.review d.hortatory exposition e.analytical exposition TEXT 6 Once upon a time there live as neighbors, a bear and a rabbit. The rabbit was a good shot and the bear,being very clumsy,could not use the arrow togood adventage. The bear was very ukiind to the rabbit. Every morning the bear would call the rabbit and asked the rabbit to take hos bow and arrow and come with the bear to the other sode of the hill.the rabbit felling to arouse the bear’s anger by refusing,consented to go with the bear and shot enough buffalo to satisfy the hungry family. Indeed,he shotand killed,so many that there was lots of meat left the bear and his fmily after loaded themselves and packed all they could carry home.howeverthe poor rabbit could not event teste the blood from the butchering, as the gluttonous bear would throw earth on the blood and dry it up.poor rabbit would have to go home hungry after his hard day’s work. The bear was the father f five children the youngest bear was very kind to the rabbit. The mother rabbit knowing that the youngest was a very hearty eater,always gave him an extra large pic of meat.the baby bear was not eat this meat extra large piece of meat. Instead,he would take the meat outside and would pretend to play ball with it,kicking it toward the rabbit’s house, and when he got close to the door he would give the meat such as a great kick that it would fly into the rabbit’s house.in this way,the poor rabbit would get his meat unknow to the papa bear. 38.how was the youngest accoarding to thewriter? a.greddy b.humble c.poor d.humorous e.generous 39.the complication started when …….. a.the bear was unkind with the rabbit as every morning the bear would call over the rabbit to take his how and arrow and come with the bear witj the others side of the hill. b.the rabbit fearing,to arouse the bear’s anger by refusing ,consented to go with the bear and enough buffalo to satisfy the hungry family. c.the rabbit shot and killed so many that there was lots of meat left after the bear and his family had loaded themselves packed all they could carry home. d.the bear would throw earth on the blood and dry it up e.the poor rsbbit could not event taste the blood from the butchering 40”the poor rabbit could not event taste the blood from the butchering as the gluttonous bear would throw out on the blood and dry it up” Gluttonous had almost same meaning as…… a.humble b.glad c.fat d.greddy e.generous 41.what did we learn from the story ? a.being honest is not always wise b.being a miser is some time important c.all that glitters is not gold d.to lovemean to share e.to be generous is not good 42the communicative purpouse of text 6 is……… a.to tell the raders what really happened in the past b.to amuse and entertain the readers with problematic event c.to inform the readers about how and why something works d.to present information a current issue e.to describe an event in the past VOCABBULARY: TEXT 1 Pirate: meranpok Ringleader: pemimpin Admits: mengakui Murder:pembunuh Involved: telah melibatkan Robbies:perampok Officers:pegawai Investigator:penyelidik Consisted:terduri Former:tadinya Ship chrew: awak kapal Lane:jalan Such:serupa Strait:selat coast:pesisir pantai identified:mengenali brigadier:jendral targeted :sasaran cargo:muatan major:utama amuse:menghibur sequence:berturut TAXT 3 Policy:politik Tax:pajak Spoil:rampasan Pact:persrtujuan Hassled:menyambut Boon;hadiah Assumed:telah menerima Low;rendah Coast:harga Airline:penerbangan Encourage:membesarkan Expressed :kilat Mislead:menyesatkan Impose:mentahunkan Budged:mengalhkan charge:ongkos attracted :menarik unfortunately:kurang beruntung several :beberapa cheap:murah revoke:menariknkembali thus:jadi immedietelly:dngn segera promot:kemajuan release:pembahasan balance:keseimbangan impose:menjatuhkan abroad:luar negri TAXT 6 Shot:tembakan Clumsy:janggal Arrow:ank panah Advantage;tdk enak Bow;haluan Fearing;ktakutan Arouse:membangunkan Consented: Statisfik: Indeed:memang Loaded:muatan Butchering:pembantaian Gluttonnus;lengket Pretend: Toward;terhadap Almost;hamper Miser: Glitters:kemegahan c Pirate ringleader admits to murder JAMBI:a pirate leader admitted ‘Wednesday, that his gang had been involved in six robberies and killed to police officers. Itham Guntur,27 told police investigators that the gang consisted of six people, all former members of ship crews “because we are all ex-crew, we know the the major shipping lanes, such us sunda strait and the east Jambi coast verywell,”he said Itham identified the murdered officrs as brigadier genral mulyadi from the south Sumatra police and brigadier genral kennedy from the Jakarta police. The pirates tragated cargo ship, fishing boat and oil tankers.-antara 16.accoarding to text 1, wich statement is true A.the pirate ringleader had been accused of murders B.the members of the pirate were murderes C.the murders happened in jambi last Wednesday D.twopolice officers had been involved in six robberies E.itam Guntur was one of two police officers who was involved in the robbery. 17.the pronoun “he” in the second paragraph refers to……… A.police officer . B. itham Guntur C.one of the ship crews D.ex-crew member E.brigadier genral mulyadi 18.the communicative purpose of text one is…… A.to tell the reader what really happened B.to explain sequence of event C.to amuse the reader problematic event D.to inform the reader about newsworthy events E.to describe the murderers in south Sumatra 19.A person who rob the cargo ship, fishing boat or oil tankers is call a…. A.robber B. police offers C.ship crew D.pirate E.ringleader 20. The text typ of text 1is called a/an….. A.recount B.narrative C. anecdote D.news item E.spoof TEXT 2 CHEVY RADIO FM 103.7 59 PASIR KALIKI RD.Bandung 40172 Phone: 613902-613304 Want to feel relaxed while improving your English? Listen regilary to our most progressive and wonderful English program: “CHEVY RENDEZVOUS” Broad casted every Tuesday, 10.15 P.M. to 12.00 P.M Our program includes: • Songs • Word news • News from the entertainment world(music,film,and sport) • Celebrities interview • quiz with the hots of the program : lexy and febri (taken from: hallo English magazine) 21. the text above is akind of ……… A.announcement B.advertisment C.news item D.instruction E.tips 22. what is the topic of the topic of the text above? A.chevy rendezvous B.chevy radio C. lexy and febri E.FM.103.7 23.What is the communicative porpoise of text 2? A.to share an amusingstory with others B.to tell the readers the location of chevy radio C.To persuade the readers to tune in to chevy rendezvous program D.to ensure the readers that chavy radio is in FM radio stasion E.to describe how to entrol in chevy rendezvous program 24. chevy radio stasion is ………. From 59 pasir kaliki rd bandung 40172 A.founded B.located C.broadcasted D.released E.prodused TEXT 3 the exit tax policy EXIT TAX SPOIL VISA-FREE POLICY An article titled,”the ASEAN visa-free hailed as boon for tourism on page 10 of the Jakarta post, july 31, assumed the free visas and low cost airline tickets would not only encourage people to travel but also stimulate social and commercial interaction within ASEAN countries. However, the hopes expressed in the article will misled reader becouse the exit tax policy imposed by the Indonesian government is higer than the price of a budget airline ticket. Ionce saw an airline company charge a passanger about Rp.800.000,00 for areturn ticket to Jakarta-kualalumpur ,which certainly attracted people to Malaysia . unfortunately, those people had to think twice before buying the ticket , because they had to pay an exi tax ofRp.1 million. Finalad,however a country where I use to live for a several years, does not charge,is citizen with the exit tax.it was easy and cheap for me to travel around eropean countries. Thus,in order to promote people-to-people contect in southeast asia, the Indonesian government sould revoke the exit tsxfor visit within ASEAN countries immediately. 25. Adrian dutika ikawati a citizen from Jakarta, wrote a latter to the Jakarta post in order to….. A.persuade the government to put an end balance to the exit tax policy B.spoil the visa-free policy released by the government C balance the price of the airline ticket and the exit text D.promote people-to-people contect in southeast asia E.impose the exit tax policy ab=nd new airline ticket 26.the exit tax spoil visa-free policy because…….. a.the opration of budget airline are getting more expensive b.the exit tax is higer than the price of an airline ticket c.the policy facility many tourists to visit southeast asia countries d.the exit tax is cheaper than the price of airline ticket e.the policy won’t charge every passengers who travels abroad 27.the writer wrote the recommendation in paragraph…….. A.1 B.2 c.3 d.4 e.5 28.the generic structure of text 3 is…… a.orientation-event –reorientation b.orientation-complication-resolution c.thesis-elaboration d.thesis-argument-reiteration e.thesis-arguments-recommendation 29.the text belong to a/an? a.explanation b.review d.hortatory exposition e.analytical exposition TEXT 6 Once upon a time there live as neighbors, a bear and a rabbit. The rabbit was a good shot and the bear,being very clumsy,could not use the arrow togood adventage. The bear was very ukiind to the rabbit. Every morning the bear would call the rabbit and asked the rabbit to take hos bow and arrow and come with the bear to the other sode of the hill.the rabbit felling to arouse the bear’s anger by refusing,consented to go with the bear and shot enough buffalo to satisfy the hungry family. Indeed,he shotand killed,so many that there was lots of meat left the bear and his fmily after loaded themselves and packed all they could carry home.howeverthe poor rabbit could not event teste the blood from the butchering, as the gluttonous bear would throw earth on the blood and dry it up.poor rabbit would have to go home hungry after his hard day’s work. The bear was the father f five children the youngest bear was very kind to the rabbit. The mother rabbit knowing that the youngest was a very hearty eater,always gave him an extra large pic of meat.the baby bear was not eat this meat extra large piece of meat. Instead,he would take the meat outside and would pretend to play ball with it,kicking it toward the rabbit’s house, and when he got close to the door he would give the meat such as a great kick that it would fly into the rabbit’s house.in this way,the poor rabbit would get his meat unknow to the papa bear. 38.how was the youngest accoarding to thewriter? a.greddy b.humble c.poor d.humorous e.generous 39.the complication started when …….. a.the bear was unkind with the rabbit as every morning the bear would call over the rabbit to take his how and arrow and come with the bear witj the others side of the hill. b.the rabbit fearing,to arouse the bear’s anger by refusing ,consented to go with the bear and enough buffalo to satisfy the hungry family. c.the rabbit shot and killed so many that there was lots of meat left after the bear and his family had loaded themselves packed all they could carry home. d.the bear would throw earth on the blood and dry it up e.the poor rsbbit could not event taste the blood from the butchering 40”the poor rabbit could not event taste the blood from the butchering as the gluttonous bear would throw out on the blood and dry it up” Gluttonous had almost same meaning as…… a.humble b.glad c.fat d.greddy e.generous 41.what did we learn from the story ? a.being honest is not always wise b.being a miser is some time important c.all that glitters is not gold d.to lovemean to share e.to be generous is not good 42the communicative purpouse of text 6 is……… a.to tell the raders what really happened in the past b.to amuse and entertain the readers with problematic event c.to inform the readers about how and why something works d.to present information a current issue e.to describe an event in the past VOCABBULARY: TEXT 1 Pirate: meranpok Ringleader: pemimpin Admits: mengakui Murder:pembunuh Involved: telah melibatkan Robbies:perampok Officers:pegawai Investigator:penyelidik Consisted:terduri Former:tadinya Ship chrew: awak kapal Lane:jalan Such:serupa Strait:selat coast:pesisir pantai identified:mengenali brigadier:jendral targeted :sasaran cargo:muatan major:utama amuse:menghibur sequence:berturut TAXT 3 Policy:politik Tax:pajak Spoil:rampasan Pact:persrtujuan Hassled:menyambut Boon;hadiah Assumed:telah menerima Low;rendah Coast:harga Airline:penerbangan Encourage:membesarkan Expressed :kilat Mislead:menyesatkan Impose:mentahunkan Budged:mengalhkan charge:ongkos attracted :menarik unfortunately:kurang beruntung several :beberapa cheap:murah revoke:menariknkembali thus:jadi immedietelly:dngn segera promot:kemajuan release:pembahasan balance:keseimbangan impose:menjatuhkan abroad:luar negri TAXT 6 Shot:tembakan Clumsy:janggal Arrow:ank panah Advantage;tdk enak Bow;haluan Fearing;ktakutan Arouse:membangunkan Consented: Statisfik: Indeed:memang Loaded:muatan Butchering:pembantaian Gluttonnus;lengket Pretend: Toward;terhadap Almost;hamper Miser: Glitters:kemegahan c

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translite

Son Güncelleme: 2015-12-22
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Referans: Anonim

İngilizce

The history of societies requires us to apply, if not a formalized and elaborate model of such structures, then at least an approximate order of research priorities and a working assumption about what constitutes the central nexus or complex of connections of our subject, though of course these things imply a model. Every social historian does in fact make such assumptions and hold such priorities. Thus I doubt whether any historian of eighteenth-century Brazil would give the Catholicism of that society analytical priority over its slavery, or any historian of nineteenth-century Britain would regard kinship as central a social nexus as he would in Anglo-Saxon England. A tacit consensus among historians seems to have established a fairly common working model of this kind, with variants. One starts with the material and historical environment, goes on to the forces and techniques of production (demography coming some where in between), the structure of the consequent economy? divisions of labor, exchange, accumulation, distribution of the sur plus, and so forth?and the social relations arising from these. These might be followed by the institutions and the image of so ciety and its functioning which underlie them. The shape of the social structure is thus established, the specific characteristics and details of which, insofar as they derive from other sources, can then be determined, most likely by comparative study. The practice is thus to work outwards and upwards from the process of social pro duction in its specific setting. Historians will be tempted?in my view rightly?to pick on one particular relation or relational com plex as central and specific to the society (or type of society) in question, and to group the rest of the treatment around it?for example, Bloch's "relations of interdependence" in his Feudal Society, or those arising out of industrial production, possibly in industrial society, certainly in its capitalist form. Once the structure has been established, it must be seen in its historical movement. In the French phrase "structure" must be seen in "conjuncture," though this term must not be taken to exclude other, and possibly more relevant, forms and patterns of historical change. Once again the tendency is to treat economic movements (in the broadest 31 DAEDALUS sense) as the backbone of such an analysis.

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grand theft auto sa

Son Güncelleme: 2014-11-15
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Referans: Anonim
Uyarı: Görünmez HTML biçimlendirmesi içeriyor

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Borobudur Temple Borobudur is a great Buddhist temple. The temple is located in Magelang on the island of Java in Indonesia. Built in the 9th century under the Saylendra dynasty of Java, it was abandoned in the 11th century and partially excavated by archeologists in the early 20th century. Influenced by the Gupta architecture of India, the temple is constructed on a hill 46 m (150 feet) high and consists of eight step like stone terraces, one on top of the other.The first five terraces are square and surround by walls adorned with Buddhist sculpture is bas-relief; the upper three are circular, each with a circle of bell-shaped stupas (Buddhist shrines). The entire edifice is crowned by a large stupa at the center of the top circle. The way to the summit extends through some 4,8 km (some 3 ml) of passage and staur ways. The design of Borobudur, a temple-mountain, symbolizing the structure of the universe, influenced temples built at Angkor Cambodia. Borobudur was rededicated as an Indonesian National Monument in 1983 following extensive reclamation aided by the united nations

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الجمل اندونيسيا ترجمت إلى اللغة الإنجليزية التعبيرات الاصطلاحية

Son Güncelleme: 2014-08-29
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Referans: Anonim

İngilizce

Surely many people before them had plotted in a similar manner to (vanquish the Truth), but Allah uprooted the whole structure of their plot from its foundations so that the roof fell in upon them, and the chastisement (of Allah) visited them from unknown directions.

Endonezce

(Sesungguhnya orang-orang yang sebelum mereka telah mengadakan makar) yaitu seperti apa yang telah dilakukan oleh raja Namrudz; ia membangun sebuah pencakar langit, lalu ia menaikinya dengan maksud untuk memerangi penduduk langit (maka Allah menghancurkan) bertujuan untuk menghancurkan (rumah-rumah mereka dari fondasinya) untuk itu maka Allah mengirimkan angin topan dan gempa bumi yang keras sehingga hancur leburlah apa yang telah mereka bangun itu (lalu atap rumah-rumah mereka jatuh menimpa mereka dari atas) artinya mereka ada di bawahnya lalu tertimpa hal tersebut (dan datanglah azab itu kepada mereka dari tempat yang tidak mereka sadari) artinya azab itu datang kepada mereka dari arah yang tidak mereka duga sebelumnya. Akan tetapi menurut pendapat yang lain dikatakan bahwa ini hanya tamtsil tentang dibinasakannya makar mereka yang telah direncanakan sebelumnya terhadap rasul.

Son Güncelleme: 2014-07-03
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Referans: Anonim

İngilizce

Surely many people before them had plotted in a similar manner to (vanquish the Truth), but Allah uprooted the whole structure of their plot from its foundations so that the roof fell in upon them, and the chastisement (of Allah) visited them from unknown directions.

Endonezce

Sesungguhnya orang-orang yang sebelum mereka telah mengadakan makar, maka Allah menghancurkan rumah-rumah mereka dari fondasinya, lalu atap (rumah itu) jatuh menimpa mereka dari atas, dan datanglah azab itu kepada mereka dari tempat yang tidak mereka sadari.

Son Güncelleme: 2014-07-03
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Referans: Anonim

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