您搜索了: simulation (英语 - 僧伽罗语)

print simulation
color-rendering-intent

initiating simulation.
සමාකරණය ආරම්භ කරන්න

captain, this is not a simulation.
කපිතන් මේක අභ්‍යාසණයක් නෙවෙයි.

and under whose jurisdiction is this simulation?
එතකොට කාගෙ අනුදැනුමක් ඇතුවද මේ අභ්‍යාසණය?

one more simulation, then i may have to go to war.
තව එක යුධ ක්‍රීඩාවයි, ඊට පස්සෙ මට යුද්ධයට යන්න වෙනවා.

mm-hmm. engaging neural synaptic simulation sequence.
ස්නායු සමායෝජන අනුපිළිවල සක්‍රිය කරනවා.

so tomorrow colonel rackham will run your final simulation.
හෙට කර්නල් රැකම් විසින් ඔයාලගෙ අවසාන යුධ තරඟය පවත්වාවි.

the strategos is here today to witness your final simulation.
අද දින අප සියල්ලන්ම මෙතනට පැමිණ සිටින්නේ ඔබලාගේ අවසාන යුධ ක්‍රීඩාවට සාක්ෂියක් වීමටයි.

this simulation is based around the enemy's home planet.
මේ යුධ ක්‍රීඩාවට පදනම් වන්නේ සතුරාගේ මව් ග්‍රහලොව අවටයි.

and of course you'll need transport to cross the sea of simulation.
ඔයාට ගමනාගමන පහසුකම් ඕනා කරනවා. මුහුද හරහා යන්න

to avoid some of these complications and to reduce the expense with market testing, some companies and marketers have begun to use virtual worlds to conduct market testing. simulation tools and virtual stores help to reduce development costs and the time required to bring a new product to market.
awasthawak thibeda

this step is sanctioned by a very weak indifference principle. let us distinguish two cases. the first case, which is the easiest, is where all the minds in question are like your own in the sense that they are exactly qualitatively identical to yours: they have exactly the same information and the same experiences that you have. the second case is where the minds are “like” each other only in the loose sense of being the sort of minds that are typical of human creatures, but they are qualitatively distinct from one another and each has a distinct set of experiences. i maintain that even in the latter case, where the minds are qualitatively different, the simulation argument still works, provided that you have no information that bears on the question of which of the various minds are simulated and which are implemented biologically. a detailed defense of a stronger principle, which implies the above stance for both cases as trivial special instances, has been given in the literature.11 space does not permit a recapitulation of that defense here, but we can bring out one of the underlying intuitions by bringing to our attention to an analogous situation of a more familiar kind. suppose that x% of the population has a certain genetic sequence s within the part of their dna commonly designated as “junk dna”. suppose, further, that there are no manifestations of s (short of what would turn up in a gene assay) and that there are no known correlations between having s and any observable characteristic. then, quite clearly, unless you have had your dna sequenced, it is rational to assign a credence of x% to the hypothesis that you have s. and this is so quite irrespective of the fact that the people who have s have qualitatively different minds and experiences from the people who don’t have s. (they are different simply because all humans have different experiences from one another, not because of any known link between s and what kind of experiences one has.) the same reasoning holds if s is not the property of having a certain genetic sequence but instead the property of being in a simulation, assuming only that we have no information that enables us to predict any differences between the experiences of simulated minds and those of the original biological minds. it should be stressed that the bland indifference principle expressed by (#) prescribes indifference only between hypotheses about which observer you are, when you have no information about which of these observers you are.
සිරස්තලයක් එක් කරන්න