Sie suchten nach: directing synonym (Spanisch - Englisch)

a synonym for get.
a synonym for get.

obligate synonym(s):
obligate synonym(s):

synonym(s) or related concept(s)
synonym(s) or related concept(s)

this is a synonym for git-config(1).
this is a synonym for git-config(1).

"film directors on directing" (paperback ed.).
"film directors on directing" (paperback ed.).

we also use it as a synonym for 'to steal'.
we also use it as a synonym for 'to steal'.

current synonym(s) or related concept(s)
current synonym(s) or related concept(s)

steal"* outstanding directing: bob sweeney, "over fifty?
steal"* outstanding directing: bob sweeney, "over fifty?

also may be used as a synonym for the term istish'hād meaning martyrdom.
also may be used as a synonym for the term istish'hād meaning martyrdom.

"miersia scalae, a synonym of gilliesia monophylla (gilliesaceae).
"miersia scalae, a synonym of gilliesia monophylla (gilliesaceae).

1913 (now synonym of bulbophyllum erythrostictum ormerod 2005)* bulbophyllum popayanense kraenzl.
1913 (now synonym of "bulbophyllum erythrostictum" ormerod 2005)*"bulbophyllum popayanense" kraenzl.

individual chapters deal with aspects such as makeup, costume, acting, directing, etc.
individual chapters deal with aspects such as makeup, costume, acting, directing, etc.

"calayana" (synonym of the accepted name "vanda lamellata" var.
calayana" (synonym of the accepted name "vanda lamellata" var.

==directing career==alfredson's career started at svensk filmindustri, where he worked as an assistant.
==directing career==alfredson's career started at svensk filmindustri, where he worked as an assistant.

(synonym of "tripteris sinuata")* "osteospermum spinescens"* "osteospermum subulatum" dc.
(synonym of "tripteris sinuata")* "osteospermum spinescens"* "osteospermum subulatum" dc.

el premio primetime emmy a la mejor dirección en una serie dramática ("primetime emmy award for outstanding directing for a drama series") es uno de los galardones primetime emmy.
the primetime emmy award for outstanding directing for a drama series is an emmy presented to the best directing of a television drama series.

seves propone varias soluciones capaces de garantizar el nivel de privacidad requerido–entre las que se encuentran los bloques de vidrio light directing y light diffusing, caracterizados por diseños del vidrio especiales.
seves offers several solutions to provide the level of privacy required including the light directing and light diffusing glass blocks characterized by special glass designs.

the present taxonomic status is unknown, but is probably a junior subjective synonym of "lithocolletis viminetorum" or "lithocolletis salictella".
the present taxonomic status is unknown, but is probably a junior subjective synonym of "lithocolletis viminetorum" or "lithocolletis salictella".

common law legal systems have developed principles about modes of liability. however, at their inception, neither of these systems was intended to deal with the crimes under the jurisdiction of this court, i.e. the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. the statute sets out the modes of liability in articles 25 and 28 and, they should be interpreted in a way that allows properly expressing and addressing the responsibility for these crimes. 977. articles 25(3)(a) to (d) establish the modes of individual criminal responsibility under the statute, other than the “[r]esponsibility of commanders and other superiors”, which is addressed in article 28. under article 25(3)(a), an individual can be convicted of committing a crime: (i) individually; (ii) jointly with another; or (iii) through another person. under articles 25(3)(b) to (d), an individual can be convicted of: (i) ordering, soliciting or inducing a crime; (ii) acting as an accessory to a crime; or (iii) contributing to a crime committed by a group acting with a common purpose. 978. the pre-trial chamber decided, pursuant to article 61(7) of the statute, there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that mr lubanga committed the crimes charged, under article 25(3)(a), as a direct co-perpetrator. the chamber will limit its analysis of mr lubanga’s responsibility to this mode of liability. 979. in considering the scope of liability under article 25(3)(a) of the rome statute, the chamber notes, as set out above,2685 that the appeals chamber has stated that the provisions of the statute are to be interpreted in conformity with article 31(1) of the vienna convention on the law of treaties. 2686 hence, the relevant elements of article 25(3)(a) of the statute, that the individual “commits such a crime […] jointly with another […] person”, must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the language of the statute, bearing in mind the relevant context and in light of its object and purpose.2687 (1) the common plan or agreement 980. article 25(3)(a) stipulates that a crime can be committed not only by an individual acting by himself or through another person, but also by an individual who acts jointly with another. to establish liability as a co-perpetrator under article 25(3)(a), it is necessary there are at least two individuals involved in the commission of the crime. this is evident from the use of terms “jointly with another” in article 25(3)(a). 981. as the pre-trial chamber concluded, co-perpetration requires the existence of an agreement or common plan between the coperpetrators. this provides for a sufficient connection between the individuals who together commit the crime and it allows responsibility to be established on a “joint” basis.2688 982. as set out above, the pre-trial chamber decided that the plan “must include “an element of criminality”, although it does not need to be specifically directed at the commission of a crime.”2689 in the confirmation decision, it was held to be sufficient: (i) that the co-perpetrators have agreed: (a) to start the implementation of the common plan to achieve a non-criminal goal, and (b) to only commit the crime if certain conditions are met; or (ii) that the co-perpetrators (a) are aware of the risk that implementing the common plan (which is specifically directed at the achievement of a noncriminal goal) will result in the commission of the crime, and (b) accept such outcome. 2690 983. while the prosecution supports this interpretation,2691 the defence argues that in order to establish criminal liability on the basis of coperpetration, the common plan must be intrinsically criminal. it is argued that participation in a plan which “in itself is not criminal but merely capable of creating conditions conducive to the commission of criminal acts cannot be regarded as characterising the actus reus of criminal co-perpetration”. 2692 therefore, it is suggested “mere knowledge ‘of the risk that implementing the common plan will result in the commission of the crime’ is insufficient to engage criminal responsibility by way of co-perpetration.”2693 984. in the view of the majority of the chamber, the prosecution is not required to prove that the plan was specifically directed at committing the crime in question (the conscription, enlistment or use of children), nor does the plan need to have been intrinsically criminal as suggested by the defence. however, it is necessary, as a minimum, for the prosecution to establish the common plan included a critical element of criminality, namely that, its implementation embodied a sufficient risk that, if events follow the ordinary course, a crime will be committed. 985. in order to establish the statutory scope of this first objective requirement, the majority of the chamber finds guidance in the manner that the plan is mirrored in the mental element. a combined reading of articles 25(3)(a) and 30 leads to the conclusion that committing the crime in question does not need to be the overarching goal of the co-perpetrators. 986. the conscription, enlistment and use of children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities is said by the prosecution to have been the result of the implementation of the common plan.2694 under article 30(2)(b), intent is established if the person is aware that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. similarly, article 30(3) provides that “knowledge” of a consequence means awareness that it (the consequence) “will occur in the ordinary course of events”. hence, in the view of the majority, the mental requirement that the common plan included the commission of a crime will be satisfied if the co-perpetrators knew that, in the ordinary course of events, implementing the plan will lead to that result. “knowledge”, defined as awareness by the co-perpetrators that a consequence will occur (in the future), necessarily means that the co- perpetrators are aware of the risk that the consequence, prospectively, will occur. this interpretation is discussed in greater detail below in the section dealing with the mental element. 987. the majority of the chamber concludes that as to the objective part of this requirement, this means that the agreement on a common plan leads to co-perpetration if its implementation embodies a sufficient risk that, in the ordinary course of events, a crime will be committed. 988. furthermore, co-perpetration does not require that the agreement or the common plan is explicit in order for the individual conduct of each co-perpetrator to be connected.2695 finally, although direct evidence of the plan is likely to assist in demonstrating its existence, this is not a legal requirement. the agreement can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. (2) the essential contribution 989. the pre-trial chamber concluded that the contribution of the alleged co-perpetrator must be “essential”. 2696 it stated its conclusion as follows: in the view of the chamber, when the objective elements of an offence are carried out by a plurality of persons acting within the framework of a common plan, only those to whom essential tasks have been assigned – and who, consequently, have the power to frustrate the commission of the crime by not performing their tasks – can be said to have joint control over the crime.2697 990. the prosecution submits that co-perpetration requires that the accused has “functional control” over the crime: this means that, when conceiving the common plan, the accused must have been assigned a role that was central to the implementation of the common plan, in the sense that the common plan would not have been carried out in the manner agreed upon without that role being performed. this concept has been labelled as “functional control”. 2698 991. however, the prosecution qualifies this suggested requirement by submitting that as long as the accused was assigned a central role in the implementation of the plan, it will suffice if in retrospect it appears his or her contribution was substantial, rather than essential. a “substantial” contribution is said to be established when “the crime might still have occurred absent the contribution of the accused, but not without great difficulty”.2699 992. the defence contends that a “substantial” contribution is insufficient. it argues the contribution should be conditio sine qua non of the crime and this requirement must be assessed in light of the facts as they actually occurred, rather than assessed on the basis of the “role” assigned to the accused within the framework of a pre-agreed plan.2700 993. an analysis of the accused’s contribution gives rise to two interrelated questions. the first question is whether it is necessary for the prosecution to establish a connection between the accused’s contribution, taken in isolation, and the crimes that were committed. the second question relates to the nature of the contribution that gives rise to joint responsibility: should it be described as either “more than de minimis”, “substantial” or “essential”? 994. in the view of the majority of the chamber, the wording of article 25(3)(a), namely that the individual “commits such a crime […] jointly with another”, requires that the offence be the result of the combined and coordinated contributions of those involved, or at least two of them. none of the participants exercises, individually, control over the crime as a whole but, instead, the control over the crime falls in the hands of a collective as such.2701 therefore, the prosecution does not need to demonstrate that the contribution of the accused, taken alone, caused the crime; 2702 rather, the responsibility of the co-perpetrators for the crimes resulting from the execution of the common plan arises from mutual attribution, based on the joint agreement or common plan. 995. article 25(3)(a) must be read in the context of the section establishing the modes of liability, in accordance with the appeals chamber’s jurisprudence set out above.2703 996. both articles 25(3)(a) and (d) address the situation in which a number of people are involved in a crime. in the judgment of the majority, the critical distinction between these provisions is that under article 25(3)(a) the co-perpetrator “commits” the crime, whilst under article 25(3)(d) the individual “contributes in any other way to the commission” of a crime by a group of individuals acting with a common purpose. the majority’s view is that a systematic reading of these provisions leads to the conclusion that the contribution of the coperpetrator who “commits” a crime is necessarily of greater significance than that of an individual who “contributes in any other way to the commission” of a crime. 997. article 25(3)(c) establishes the liability of accessories – those who aid, abet or otherwise assist in the commission or attempted commission of the crime. in the view of the majority, principal liability “objectively” requires a greater contribution than accessory liability. if accessories must have had “a substantial effect on the commission of the crime”2704 to be held liable, then co-perpetrators must have had, pursuant to a systematic reading of this provision, more than a substantial effect. 998. the conclusion that principal liability must require more than accessory liability is supported, in the view of the majority, by the statutory provision on attempt liability (article 25(3)(f) of the statute). only those individuals who attempt “to commit” a crime, as opposed to those who participate in a crime committed by someone else, can be held liable under that provision. the same conclusion is supported by the plain language of articles 25(3)(b) and (c), which require for secondary liability that the perpetrator at least attempt to commit the crime. as such, secondary liability is dependent on whether the perpetrator acts. conversely, principal liability, which is closer to the violation of the legal interests protected by the norm, is not the subject of such dependence. hence, the majority concludes that this confirms the predominance of principal over secondary liability, which, in turn, supports a notion of principal liability that requires a greater contribution than accessory liability. 999. the majority is of the view that the contribution of the coperpetrator must be essential, as has been consistently and invariably established in this court’s jurisprudence.2705 the statute differentiates between the responsibility and liability of those persons who commit a crime (at article 25(3)(a)) and those who are accessories to it (at articles 25(3)(b) to (d)). it would be possible to expand the concept of principal liability (or “commission” or “perpetration”), to make it more widely applicable, by lowering the threshold that the accused’s contribution be essential. however, lowering that threshold would deprive the notion of principal liability of its capacity to express the blameworthiness of those persons who are the most responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern. instead, a notion of coperpetration that requires an essential contribution allows for the different degrees of responsibility to be properly expressed and addressed. 1000. the determination as to whether the particular contribution of the accused results in liability as a co-perpetrator is to be based on an analysis of the common plan and the role that was assigned to, or was assumed by the co-perpetrator, according to the division of tasks.2706 in the view of the majority what is decisive is whether the co-perpetrator performs an essential role in accordance with the common plan, and it is in this sense that his contribution, as it relates to the exercise of the role and functions assigned to him, must be essential. 1001. furthermore, the co-perpetrator’s role is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. this assessment involves a flexible approach, undertaken in the context of a broad inquiry into the overall circumstances of a case. 1002. the defence submits that co-perpetration requires “personal and direct participation in the crime itself”,2707 and that the responsibility of those who do not participate directly in the execution of a crime is reflected in article 25(3)(b) rather than article 25(3)(a).2708 it contends that article 25(3)(a) requires direct participation in the crime.2709 1003. however, the chamber agrees with the conclusions, firstly, of the pre-trial chamber that criminal liability in this context is “not limited to those who physically carry out the objective elements of the offence, but also include(s) those who, in spite of being removed from the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether and how the offence will be committed”. 2710 secondly, the chamber agrees with the prosecution that “[i]t is not necessary that the accused physically perpetrated any of the elements of the crimes or that he was present at the crime scene”.2711 1004. those who commit a crime jointly include, inter alia, those who assist in formulating the relevant strategy or plan, become involved in directing or controlling other participants or determine the roles of those involved in the offence. this conclusion makes it unnecessary for the prosecution to establish a direct or physical link between the accused’s contribution and the commission of the crimes. 1005. hence, the chamber is of the view that the accused does not need to be present at the scene of the crime, so long as he exercised, jointly with others, control over the crime. 1006. the majority therefore concludes that the commission of a crime jointly with another person involves two objective requirements: (i) the existence of an agreement or common plan between two or more persons that, if implemented, will result in the commission of a crime; and (ii) that the accused provided an essential contribution to the common plan that resulted in the commission of the relevant crime. these two requirements must be assessed on the basis of all the evidence related to the alleged crime. b) the mental element 1007. article 30 defines the requirement of “intent” by reference to three particular factors: conduct, consequence and circumstance. first, pursuant to article 30(2)(a), a person has intent if he or she “means to engage in the conduct”. second, under article 30(2)(b) and in relation to a consequence, it is necessary that the individual “means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events”. third, by article 30(3) “knowledge” “means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events”. 1008. as noted earlier, the pre-trial chamber decided that the subjective elements that the suspect must fulfil2712 are the following: (i) “[t]he suspect and the other co-perpetrators […] must all be mutually aware of the risk that implementing their common plan may result in the realisation of the objective elements of the crime, and […] must all mutually accept such a result by reconciling themselves with it or consenting to it”;2713 and (ii) “the awareness by the suspect of the factual circumstances enabling him or her to jointly control the crime”.2714 1009. the pre-trial chamber decided that the “cumulative” reference to “intent” and “knowledge” in article 30 means there must be a “volitional element” on the part of the accused. this encompasses not only situations in which the suspect: i) knows that his or her actions or omissions will bring about the objective elements of the crime, and ii) undertakes such actions or omissions with the concrete intent to bring about the objective elements of the crime (also known as dolus directus of the first degree) 2715 but also the “other forms of the concept of dolus”. 2716 the pre-trial chamber was of the view that these include: i) situations in which the suspect, without having the concrete intent to bring about the objective elements of the crime, is aware that such elements will be the necessary outcome of his or her actions or omissions (also known as dolus directus of the second degree);2717 and ii) situations in which the suspect (a) is aware of the risk that the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, and (b) accepts such an outcome by reconciling himself or herself with it or consenting to it (also known as dolus eventualis).2718 1010. the pre-trial chamber considered that within dolus eventualis “two kinds of scenarios are distinguishable”. first, if the coperpetrator was aware of a substantial risk that his conduct will bring about “the objective elements of the crime”, his intent can be inferred from the fact that he acted in the manner agreed in spite of this level of awareness.2719 second, if there was a low risk of bringing about “the objective elements of the crime”, “the suspect must have clearly or expressly accepted the idea that such objective elements may result from his or her actions or omissions”.2720 1011. the conscription or enlistment of children under the age of 15 or using them to participate actively in hostilities is said by the prosecution to have been the result of the implementation of a common plan.2721 the drafting history of the statute suggests that the notion of dolus eventualis, along with the concept of recklessness, was deliberately excluded from the framework of the statute (e.g. see the use of the words “unless otherwise provided” in the first sentence of article 30).2722 the plain language of the statute, and most particularly the use of the words �
ã © ste