Vous avez cherché: hypothesis (Anglais - Cingalais)

continuum hypothesis.
උපකල්පිත අඛණ්ඩතාව.

c/c/hypothesis
hypothesis

i maintain my hypothesis that:
මං ඒ උපකල්පනයන් පවත්වාගෙන ගියා:

given the many givens, your hypothesis was good.
දීපු එක සෑහෙන්න දුන්නා, ඔයාගෙ කල්පිතය හොඳ එකක්.

there's just no reliable way to test the hypothesis.
උපකල්පනයන් ගැන මනින්න මිනුමක් නැහැනේ..

i'm trying to solve the riemann hypothesis. uh-huh.
මම විසඳන්න හදන්නේ reimann කල්පිතය uh-huh.

i was testing a hypothesis i began to form back in victor nardin's hotel room.
මම් වික්ටර්ගෙ හෝටල් කාමරයෙදි කරපු උපකල්පනයක් පරීක්ෂා කලේ

so again, and i have to stress this, without certainty the leading hypothesis remains that their objective, their target is our water.
ඉතින්,නිශ්චිතවම නැතත් අපිට කියන්න වෙනවා... ...මේ ජිවින්ගේ එකම අරමුණ වෙලා තියෙන්නේ... ...අපි සතු ජලය ගෙනයාමයි.

this step is sanctioned by a very weak indifference principle. let us distinguish two cases. the first case, which is the easiest, is where all the minds in question are like your own in the sense that they are exactly qualitatively identical to yours: they have exactly the same information and the same experiences that you have. the second case is where the minds are “like” each other only in the loose sense of being the sort of minds that are typical of human creatures, but they are qualitatively distinct from one another and each has a distinct set of experiences. i maintain that even in the latter case, where the minds are qualitatively different, the simulation argument still works, provided that you have no information that bears on the question of which of the various minds are simulated and which are implemented biologically. a detailed defense of a stronger principle, which implies the above stance for both cases as trivial special instances, has been given in the literature.11 space does not permit a recapitulation of that defense here, but we can bring out one of the underlying intuitions by bringing to our attention to an analogous situation of a more familiar kind. suppose that x% of the population has a certain genetic sequence s within the part of their dna commonly designated as “junk dna”. suppose, further, that there are no manifestations of s (short of what would turn up in a gene assay) and that there are no known correlations between having s and any observable characteristic. then, quite clearly, unless you have had your dna sequenced, it is rational to assign a credence of x% to the hypothesis that you have s. and this is so quite irrespective of the fact that the people who have s have qualitatively different minds and experiences from the people who don’t have s. (they are different simply because all humans have different experiences from one another, not because of any known link between s and what kind of experiences one has.) the same reasoning holds if s is not the property of having a certain genetic sequence but instead the property of being in a simulation, assuming only that we have no information that enables us to predict any differences between the experiences of simulated minds and those of the original biological minds. it should be stressed that the bland indifference principle expressed by (#) prescribes indifference only between hypotheses about which observer you are, when you have no information about which of these observers you are.
සිරස්තලයක් එක් කරන්න