Vous avez cherché: predict (Anglais - Cingalais)

today, i'll predict your future.
අද මම ඔයාගේ අනාගතය වෙනස් කරන්නම්.

..i can predict how many notes it contains.
..මෙතන කොච්චර නෝට්ටු ප්‍රමාණයක් තියෙනවද කියලා.

i failed to predict your descent into addiction.
.. මම අසමත් උනා ඔයා මත්ද්‍රව්‍ය වලට ඇබ්බැහි වේවි කියලා කලින් දකින්න.

but if you know the algorithm, you can predict the code.
එත් ඔයා සුත්ත්‍රය දන්නවනම්, ඔයාට පුළුවන් පාස්වර්ඩ් එක අනුමාන කරන්න

and that makes it so that she can predict the future?
අන්න ඒක නිසාද ඇයට අනාගතය ගැන අනාවැකි කියන්න පුළුවන් උනේ?

- it's difficult to predict anything in coma patients.
බලන්න කොමා වගේ තත්වයකදි මුකුත් කියන්න අමාරැයි,

they teach you how to predict the weather at a box company?
ඒයාලා ඔයාට පටෝටි කොම්පැනියදෙි ඉගැන්නුවෙ කාලගුණෙ කියන්නද?

this makes it impossible to predict the access code at any given moment.
මේකයි ඒක බිදින්න බැරිව තිබුන හේතුව පාස්වර්ඩ් එක කිසිම වෙලාවක..

you'll recall she doesn't predict a very pleasant end for me.
ඔයාට මතක්වෙයි ඇය හොඳ අවසානයක් මට දුන්නේ නෑ.

yeah, and even if she can predict the future, she can't control it. nobody can.
ඔව් , අනාගතය ගැන ඇයට අනාවැකි කියන්න පුළුවන් උනත්, ඇයට ඒක පාලනය කරන්න බෑ∙ කාටවත්ම බෑ∙

you could attack the random number generator, make it spit out a pattern, so you could predict the code.
මේ ස්වයංක්‍රිය අහබු ඉලක්කම් ගණනය ක්‍රියා විරහිත කිරීමටම සිදුවෙනවා මේ පැටන් එක නැතිනම් අදුන ගන්න ඕනේ එතකොට, ඔබට පාස්වර්ඩ් එක අනුමාන කරන්න පුළුවන්.

and he also has no type or victim profile, which makes it almost impossible to predict when, where, or whom he might strike.
එයාට කිසිම විදිහක මරණ මිනිස්සුන්ගේ සමාන කමක් නැහැ ඒකෙන් හරිම අමාරුයි තීරණය කරන්න මොන වෙලාවේ හොහේදී කාට පහර දෙයිද කියලා!

look, my point is that... the only thing that anyone can predict about people with 100% certainty is that they'll change.
බලන්න, මගේ කාරණාව තමා ඒ... .. ඕනෙම කෙනෙක්ට දිවැසින් කියන්න පුළුවන් එකම දේ,

this step is sanctioned by a very weak indifference principle. let us distinguish two cases. the first case, which is the easiest, is where all the minds in question are like your own in the sense that they are exactly qualitatively identical to yours: they have exactly the same information and the same experiences that you have. the second case is where the minds are “like” each other only in the loose sense of being the sort of minds that are typical of human creatures, but they are qualitatively distinct from one another and each has a distinct set of experiences. i maintain that even in the latter case, where the minds are qualitatively different, the simulation argument still works, provided that you have no information that bears on the question of which of the various minds are simulated and which are implemented biologically. a detailed defense of a stronger principle, which implies the above stance for both cases as trivial special instances, has been given in the literature.11 space does not permit a recapitulation of that defense here, but we can bring out one of the underlying intuitions by bringing to our attention to an analogous situation of a more familiar kind. suppose that x% of the population has a certain genetic sequence s within the part of their dna commonly designated as “junk dna”. suppose, further, that there are no manifestations of s (short of what would turn up in a gene assay) and that there are no known correlations between having s and any observable characteristic. then, quite clearly, unless you have had your dna sequenced, it is rational to assign a credence of x% to the hypothesis that you have s. and this is so quite irrespective of the fact that the people who have s have qualitatively different minds and experiences from the people who don’t have s. (they are different simply because all humans have different experiences from one another, not because of any known link between s and what kind of experiences one has.) the same reasoning holds if s is not the property of having a certain genetic sequence but instead the property of being in a simulation, assuming only that we have no information that enables us to predict any differences between the experiences of simulated minds and those of the original biological minds. it should be stressed that the bland indifference principle expressed by (#) prescribes indifference only between hypotheses about which observer you are, when you have no information about which of these observers you are.
සිරස්තලයක් එක් කරන්න