Vous avez cherché: interjection (Anglais - Russe)

interjection
Междометие

what is an interjection?
what is an interjection?

"ah" is an interjection.
"Ах" - это междометие.

the interjection of this issue by the representative of the united states of america for personal reasons, i suspect, is absolutely unacceptable.
Упоминание этого вопроса представителем Соединенных Штатов Америки, повидимому, по личным соображениям, является абсолютно неприемлемым.

similarly, it is prescribed that the interjection of a means of rebuttal constitutes a voluntary act of the accused and that the decision in the second instance constitutes res judicata, appeal only being allowed in the cases laid down by the law.
Предусматривается также, что представление контрдоказательств является добровольным актом со стороны обвиняемого и что решение во второй инстанции представляет собой res judicata, при этом обжалование разрешается лишь в случаях, предусмотренных законом.

:: the sudden interjection of a commercial transaction in a non-commercial setting should raise concern that there is no real or logical connection between the charitable cause and the proposed scheme.
* Внезапное возникновение коммерческой сделки в некоммерческой среде должно вызывать подозрение, что между благотворительной целью и предлагаемой схемой отсутствует реальная или логическая связь.

latin grammarian priscian defined interjections as "a part of speech signifying an emotion by means of an unformed word" (padley 1976:266). muller (1862) thought that interjections were at the limit of what might be called language. sapir (1921:6-7) said that they were "the nearest of all language sounds to instinctive utterance." bloomfield (1984[1933]:177) said that they "occur under a violent stimulus," and jakobson (1960:354) considered them exemplars of the "purely emotive stratum of language." while interjections are no longer considered peripheral to linguistics and are now carefully defined with respect to their grammatical form, their meanings remain vague and elusive. in particular, although interjections are no longer characterized purely in terms of emotion, they are still characterized in termsof "mental states." for example, wierzbicka ( 1992 :164) characterizes interjections as "[referring] to the speaker's current mental state or mental act." ameka (1992a:107) says that "from a pragmatic point of view, interjections may be defined as a subset of items that encode speaker attitudes and communicative intentions and are context-bound," and montes (1999:1289) notes that many interjections "[focus] on the internal reaction of affectedness of the speaker with respect to the referent." philosophers have offered similar interpretations. for example, herder thought that interjections were the human equivalent of animal sounds, being both a "language of feeling" and a "law of nature" (1966:88), and rousseau, pursuing the origins of language, theorized that proto-language was "entirely interjectional" (1990:71). indeed, such philosophers have posited a historical transition from interjections to language in which the latter allows us not only to index pain and express passion but also to denote values and exercise reason (d'atri 1995).2 thus interjections have been understood as a semiotic artifact of our natural origins and the most transparent index of our emotions. such an understanding of interjections is deeply rooted in western thought. aristotle (1984), for example, posited a contrastive relationship between voice, proper only to humans as instantiated in language, and sound, shared by humans and animals as instantiated in cries. this contrastive relation was then compared with other analogous contrastive relations, in particular, value and pleasure/pain, polis and household, and bios (the good life, or political life proper to humans) and zoe (pure life, shared by all living things). such a contrast is so pervasive that modern philosophers such as agamben (1995) have devoted much of their scholarly work to the thinking out of this tradition and others built on it such as idversus ego in the freudian paradigm. in short, the folk distinction made between interjections and language 2. d'atri (1995:124) argues that, for rousseau, " interjections . . .are sounds and not voices: they are passive registerings and as such do not presuppose the intervention of will, which is what characterizes human acts of speech." 468 f current anthropology volume 44, number 4, august-october 2003 proper maps onto a larger set of distinctions in western thought: emotion and cognition, animality and humanity, nature and culture, female and male, passion and reason, bare life and the good life, pain and value, private and public, and so on (see, e.g., lutz 1988, strathern1988).
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