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e/cn.4/sub.2/2001/35

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commission on enterprise, business facilitation and development

english/arabic please, specify two different languages
cost accounting systems 2005.1 1 1 learning outcomes after completing this chapter, you should be able to: compare and contrast marginal and absorption costing methods in respect of profit reporting and stock valuation; apply marginal and absorption costing approaches in job, batch and process environments; prepare ledger accounts according to context: marginal or absorption based in job, batch or process environments, including work-in-progress and related accounts such as production overhead control account and abnormal loss account. 1.1 introduction in your foundation studies (or equivalent) you should have already encountered the basic principles and concepts involved in cost accounting. specifically, you should be familiar with the manner in which the costs of objects and activities are determined through an exercise of cost allocation, apportionment and absorption. you should also be familiar with basic cost accounting practices such as stock valuation (lifo, fifo and average), profit determination (using marginal and absorption costing conventions), accounting in particular types of production environment (job, batch and process) and the principles of cost behaviour (fixed and variable). be aware that the cima examination scheme is a cumulative one and you should refer back to your earlier studies if you are unfamiliar with any of the topics referred to. in this chapter we will revisit these basic principles and develop our understanding of their use into more advanced areas. the content of this chapter will lead into an exploration of modern innovations in management accounting systems in chapter 8. 1.2 the difference between marginal costing and absorption costing you should already be aware that the difference between marginal costing and absorption costing lies in their treatment of fixed production overhead. with absorption costing, the fixed production overhead cost is absorbed into the cost of units and all stock items are valued at their full production cost. in contrast, marginal costing values all stock items at their variable or marginal cost only. fixed costs are treated as period costs and are written off in full against the profit for the period. since the two systems value stock differently, it follows that each will report a different profit figure for the period if stock levels alter. 1.3 preparing profit statements using each method the best way to demonstrate how profit statements are prepared for each of the methods is to look at a worked example. example using the information below, prepare profit statements for june and july using (a) marginal costing and (b) absorption costing. a company produces and sells one product only which sells for £50 per unit. there were no stocks at the end of may and other information is as follows: £ standard cost per unit: direct material 18 direct wages 4 variable production overhead 3 budgeted and actual costs per month: fixed production overhead 99,000 fixed selling expenses 14,000 fixed administration expenses 26,000 variable selling expenses 10% of sales value normal capacity is 11,000 units per month. the number of units produced and sold was: june july units units sales 12,800 11,000 production 14,000 10,200 study material p1 2 cost accounting systems 2005.1 1.3.1 profit statements using marginal costing a marginal costing will value all units at the variable production cost of £25 per unit (£18 £4 £3). profit statements using marginal costing june july £000 £000 £000 £000 sales revenue 640 550 less variable cost of sales: opening stock – 30 variable production cost (14,000 £25) 350 (10,200 £25) 255 350 285 closing stock (1,200 £25) 30 (400 £25) 010 variable production of sales 320 275 variable selling expenses 064 055 variable cost of sales 384 330 contribution 256 220 less fixed overhead: fixed production overhead 99 99 fixed selling expenses 14 14 fixed administration expenses 026 026 139 139 profit 117 081 1.3.2 profit statements using absorption costing fixed production overheads are absorbed on the basis of normal capacity which is often the same as budgeted capacity. you should recall that predetermined rates are used partly to avoid the fluctuations in unit cost rates which arise if production levels fluctuate. full production cost per unit £25 variable cost £9 fixed cost £34 per unit this full production cost of £34 per unit will be used to value all units under absorption costing. since the production level is not equal to the normal capacity in either june or july there will be under- or over-absorbed fixed production overhead in both months. it is probably easier to calculate this before commencing on the profit statements. june july £000 £000 fixed production overhead absorbed (14,000 units £9) 126 (10,200 units £9) 91.8 fixed production overhead incurred 099 99.0 over/(under) absorption 027 (7.2) fixed production overhead per unit £99,000 11,000 £9 per unit 3 management accounting – performance evaluation cost accounting systems 2005.1 profit statements using absorption costing june july £000 £000 £000 £000 sales revenue 640.0 550.0 less full production cost of sales: opening stock – 40.8 full production cost (14,000 £34) 476.0 (10,200 £34) 346.8 476.0 387.6 closing stock (1,200 £34) 040.8 (400 £34) 013.6 435.2 374.0 (over-)/under-absorbed fixed production overhead (note 1) (27.0) 7.2 full production cost of sales 408.2 381.2 gross profit 231.8 168.8 less selling/admin. expenses: variable selling expenses 64.0 55.0 fixed selling expenses 14.0 14.0 fixed administration expenses 026.0 026.0 104.0 095.0 net profit 127.8 873.8 note: if overheads have been over-absorbed then too much has been charged as a cost of production. this amount is therefore deducted to derive the full production cost of sales. if overheads are under-absorbed, the amount is added to increase the production cost of sales. 1.4 reconciling the profit figures as well as preparing profit statements using absorption costing and marginal costing, you should also recall how to reconcile the profits given by each method for the same period and by the same method for different periods. 1.4.1 reconciling the profits given by the different methods the profit differences are caused by the different valuations given to the closing stocks in each period. with absorption costing, an amount of fixed production overhead is carried forward in stock to be charged against sales of later periods. if stocks increase, then absorption costing profits will be higher than marginal costing profits. this is because some of the fixed overhead is forward in stock instead of being written off against sales for the period. if stocks reduce, then marginal costing profits will be higher than absorption costing profits. this is because the fixed overhead which had been carried forward in stock with absorption costing is now being released to be charged against the sales for the period. a profit reconciliation for the previous example might look like this: june july £000 £000 marginal costing profit 117.0 81.0 adjust for fixed overhead in stock: stock increase 1,200 units £9 per unit 810.8 stock decrease 800 units £9 per unit 0(7.2) absorption costing profit 127.8 (73.8) study material p1 4 cost accounting systems 2005.1 1.4.2 reconciling the profits for different periods you should also recall how to reconcile the profits for different periods using the same method. (a) for marginal costing, the unit rates and the amount of fixed costs charged each period are constant. therefore the only thing which could have caused the profit difference was the change in sales volume. the lower sales volume in july resulted in a lower contribution and therefore a lower profit (since the amount of fixed cost remained constant). the contribution per unit is £20 as follows: the marginal costing profit figures can be reconciled as follows: (b) for absorption costing the major part of the profit difference is caused by the change in sales volume. however a further difference is caused by the adjustments for underand over-absorbed fixed production overhead in each of the two periods. the profit per unit with absorption costing is £11 as follows: the absorption costing profit figures can be reconciled as follows: this may look confusing because both the under- and over-absorption are deducted. this is because the over-absorption for june made profit for that month higher, therefore it must be deducted to arrive at july’s profit. similarly, the under-absorption in july made july’s profit lower than june’s, therefore it must also be deducted in the reconciliation. 1.4.3 profit differences in the long term the two different costing methods produce profit differences only in the short term when stocks fluctuate. if stocks remain constant then there will be no profit differences between the two methods. £000 absorption costing profit for june 127.8 decrease in sales volume for july 1,800 units £11 profit (19.8) adjustments for under-/over-absorption june (27.0) july 0(7.2) absorption costing profit for july (73.8) £ per unit selling price 50 total production cost (34) variable selling cost 0(5) profit 0()11) £000 marginal costing profit for june 117 decrease in sales volume for july 1,800 units £20 contribution 036

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لجنة حقوق الإنسان اللجنة الفرعية لتعزيز وحماية حقوق الإنسان الدورة الثالثة والخمسون البند 4 من جدول الأعمال المؤقت الحقوق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والثقافية مذكـرة شفويـة مؤرخة في 19 حزيران/يونيه 2001 موجهـة إلى مفوضية الأمم المتحدة السامية لحقوق الإنسان من البعثة الدائمة للعراق لدى مكتب الأمم المتحدة في جنيف تهدي البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية العراق لدى مكتب الأمم المتحدة في جنيف تحياتها إلى مفوضية الأمم المتحدة السامية لحقوق الإنسان وتتشرف بأن ترسل إليها برفقته* مذكرة بشأن نظام العقوبات وما يُسمى بالعقوبات الذكية، مقدمة من جمهورية العراق إلى اللجنة الفرعية لتعزيز وحماية حقوق الإنسان في دورتها الثالثة والخمسين. وتغدو البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية العراق ممتنة لو تفضلت المفوضية السامية لحقوق الإنسان باتخاذ ما يلزم لتوزيع المذكرة كوثيقة من وثائق الدورة الثالثة والخمسين للجنة الفرعية في إطار بند جدول الأعمال المعنون "الحقوق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والثقافية". * المرفق مستنسخ كما ورد، وباللغتين العربية والإنكليزية فقط. الأمم المتحدة e distr. e/cn.4/sub.2/2001/34 31 july 2001 original: english/arabic
sub-commission on the promotion and protection of human rights fifty-third session item 4 of the provisional agenda economic, social and cultural rights note verbale dated 19 june 2001 from the permanent mission of iraq to the united nations office at geneva addressed to the united nations high commissioner for human rights the permanent mission of the republic of iraq to the united nations office in geneva presents its compliments to the united nations high commissioner for human rights and has the honour to transmit, attached, a note on the system of smart sanctions,* submitted by the republic of iraq to the sub-commission on the promotion and protection of human rights at its fifty-third session. the permanent mission of the republic of iraq would be grateful if the united nations high commissioner for human rights would take the necessary measures to distribute this note as a document of the fifty-third session of the sub-commission under the item of the provisional agenda entitled: “economic, social and cultural rights”. annex note concerning the sanctions regime imposed on iraq and the so-called “smart sanctions”, submitted by the government of the republic of iraq to the sub-commission on the promotion and protection of human rights at its fifty-third session under item 4 of the provisional agenda entitled “economic, social and cultural rights” in the light of sub-commission on human rights resolution 2000/25 entitled “adverse consequences of economic sanctions” in which it decides to continue its examination of sanctions regimes at its fifty-third session under item 4 of the provisional agenda entitled “economic, social and cultural rights”, the government of the republic of iraq would like to point out that the economic sanctions regime imposed on iraq was based on security council resolution 661 (1990) and on two other resolutions, namely 665 (1990) and 670 (1990). the sanctions against iraq are the most comprehensive in the history of the united nations, particularly since they are in fact intended to isolate iraq and its 23 million people from the outside world. it is now clear that the war of aggression waged against iraq in 1991 was targeted at the iraqi infrastructure in order to compound the economic destruction and psychological ruin of the iraqi people and push iraq back into the pre-industrial age, as expressly stated by the former united states secretary of state, james baker, in 1990. following the end of the war in february 1991, the iraqi people faced a terrible crisis of survival owing to the destruction of power plants, water purification facilities, food depots, sewage treatment plants, oil wells, hospitals and other targets. the effects of the economic embargo extended to include all aspects of life and delayed progress and the process of cultural revival in iraq. today, the iraqi people are facing destruction and genocide by a weapon that is no less dangerous than weapons of mass destruction, namely that of the economic embargo. the current situation in iraq demonstrates that malnutrition and the spread of disease are firmly linked to mortality among the under-fives. an increase in the diseases of malnutrition has been widely noted and such diseases are one of the serious problems from which the children in iraq suffer. statistics also show that the incidence of malnutrition has increased sharply, having risen from 18.7 per cent in 1991 to 26.7 per cent in 1998. statistical information further indicates that infant and child mortality rates have been similarly affected; since imposition of the embargo in 1990, a total of 622,887 children under the age of five have so far died as a result of diarrhoea, pulmonary and respiratory diseases and malnutrition. among the over-fives and the elderly, a further 897,530 people have died from cardiac disease, hypertension, diabetes and malignant tumours. in the field of education, the total enrolment rate in child nurseries in iraq fell from 8.2 per cent in 1991 to 3.7 per cent in 2000, and although primary education has been compulsory in iraq since 1978, a proportion of children between the ages of 6 and 11 remain outside the system, parents being forced by the need to earn sufficient income to postpone the day when their children start school. the 1998 report of the minister of education shows that, during the period 1990-1998, approximately 22.6 per cent of children were not enrolled in school. in 2000, 82.5 per cent of males were enrolled in primary schools, compared with 69 per cent of females. overall enrolment among children of primary school age fell from 92.3 per cent in 1990 to 86.3 per cent in 2000. the oil-for-food programme it might initially appear to some that the security council has not disregarded the negative impact of the continuing embargo against iraq, in which connection they refer to the establishment of the humanitarian programme adopted pursuant to security council resolution 986 (1995). at least that is the position of united states and united kingdom officials. in this regard, it should be stated that the united nations oil-for-food programme has been prevented from attaining its humanitarian objectives for a variety of reasons, including the complexity of the measures adopted by the security council for implementation of the memorandum of understanding and interference by the united states of america and the united kingdom in its implementation. unfairness has also been seen in the distribution of revenues from the sale of iraqi oil, added to which have been the persistence of the united states of america and the united kingdom in placing contracts on hold on imaginary pretexts, the bureaucracy in the way that contracts are submitted, an accumulation of the monies allocated for united nations operational and administrative costs, the removal of vast sums for the reparations fund and inadequate financial management, as revealed in the report of the secretary-general on the office of internal oversight services (a/55/436) in the section entitled “office of the iraq programme”. in scores of letters addressed to the secretary-general of the united nations and in contacts with the united nations humanitarian coordinator in iraq and the office of the iraq programme in new york, the government of iraq has endeavoured to reveal the facts which it has discovered in its experience with the so-called humanitarian programme, which it expected to put an end to the deterioration in the living conditions of inhabitants under the unjust embargo. no serious moves, however, have so far been made to remedy these discrepancies. the shortcomings which have been diagnosed cannot possibly create an effective system that would satisfy the humanitarian needs of the iraqi people. in this connection, we should like to recall the opinion firmly expressed by the second of the panels established by the security council under the chairmanship of ambassador celso amorim to examine the humanitarian situation in iraq in 1999, which, in paragraph 58, annex ii of document s/1999/356, stated that “the humanitarian situation in iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the iraqi economy, which in turn cannot be achieved solely through remedial humanitarian efforts”. this clearly means that the cure is the lifting of the embargo. security council resolution 1284 (1999) and the draft resolution on so-called “smart sanctions” following the end of the activities of the panels chaired by ambassador amorim and the debate on their reports, the united kingdom, with clear united states support, made strong efforts to submit a new resolution, a process which took several months. as a result, security council resolution 1284 (1999) was adopted on 17 december 1999 and on 19 december 1999, iraq declared that it would not deal with that resolution because it did not respond to iraq's legitimate call for the lifting of the embargo and it made no mention whatsoever of the aggression against iraq and the daily breach of its sovereignty by the imposition of the aerial exclusion zones by the united states of america and the united kingdom. iraq stated at the time that the objectives of the united states of america and the united kingdom in the resolution was to mislead international public opinion, because the concept of “suspension” contained in the resolution was new - a concept that required a long and complicated series of new and unclear conditions that could have been interpreted in so many ways that the resolution had no guarantee that the suspension would in fact take place. furthermore, the time scales mentioned in the resolution were artificially long and were laid down to suit the domestic situation in the united states of america in an election year. they also showed the intention of the united states of america and the united kingdom to perpetuate the illegal aerial exclusion zones over northern and southern iraq, as well as the acts of military aggression against iraq, the illegitimate united states intervention in iraq's internal affairs and its overt attempts to change the national political system in iraq. iraq further made it clear that, in both substance and form, the resolution was an illegal redrafting of security council resolution 687 (1991). iraq also made clear that the stringent and vague conditions surrounding the new and illusory concept of “suspension” were fresh conditions that were not stipulated in previous resolutions. they were placed there in order to ensure that any suspension, if ever it were to take place, would have no substance or benefit for iraq and would also constitute an arbitrary restriction of iraq's sovereignty over its economy and resources. although the situation remained unchanged, the international campaign to lift the sanctions on iraq and to end the crime of genocide being perpetrated against the people of iraq continued and escalated. with the coming to power of the new united states administration at the beginning of this year, united states officials began to state that the embargo imposed on iraq was “faltering” and resembled “swiss cheese”. they also stated that one of the major concerns of the new administration was to “revitalize” the sanctions against iraq. this concept of revitalization began to take form shortly thereafter, when the united states of america and the united kingdom submitted a draft resolution to the security council on the so-called “smart sanctions”, which were claimed to be a lessening of sanctions on people and a strengthening of sanctions on the iraqi government. we should not forget that the new united states administration opened its file on dealing with iraq with an act of aggression on the night of 16 february 2001. reasons for rejection of the draft resolution on so-called “smart sanctions” the government of iraq rejected the draft resolution on so-called “smart sanctions”, the reasons for which can be summarized as follows: the draft resolution replaces the current system for the approval of humanitarian food contracts that is based essentially on allowing all civilian items to enter iraq, excluding the dual-use items annexed to security council resolution 1051 (1996), which are items with civilian uses that can also be used to build weapons of mass destruction. contracts for such items are not approved until iraq agrees to the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification (suspended since 16 december 1998). iraq submitted no contracts for the import of items in this category during the last nine phases. the proposed new system increases the list of dual-use goods to include all military items and the dual-use items contained in the wassenaar arrangement dual-use and munitions list, which are unrelated to weapons of mass destruction, as well as other civilian items, including: training, cargo and civil aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft spare parts and aircraft components; airborne navigation equipment and airborne radar equipment; explosive detection systems, including those used in airports; communications equipment, including civilian items such as optical fibre cables for use in public telephone exchanges, wireless equipment and digital processing equipment; information security and encryption equipment; mining and drilling equipment; oil well pipes; laboratory equipment; magnetic recorders; trailers and loaders with a carrying capacity greater than 30 metric tonnes; computer hardware and software. there is insufficient scope here to cite many examples of the nature of the items which, under the resolution, are regarded as dual-use items. by examining the lists, however, it can be said that performance and activity in the sectors of industry, agriculture, higher education, scientific research, transport, communications and petroleum would be very adversely affected and could cease altogether with the passage of time. the new regime authorizes the united nations monitoring, verification and inspection commission (unmovic) to review any contract which is submitted and determine whether it relates to dual-use items. if so, it forwards the contract to the security council committee established by resolution 661 (1990) for a decision in that connection. under the new regime, the list of prohibited items is therefore expanded and unmovic plays the role previously performed by the committee established under resolution 661 (1990) of reviewing civilian contracts. the united states of america thus absolves itself from responsibility for placing contracts on hold on the pretext of dual use by shifting that responsibility onto unmovic. the regime also creates a new mechanism for monitoring the supply of (conventional) military equipment to iraq, whereas under security council resolutions 687 (1990) and 700 (1991) it is states which are responsible for preventing the export of arms and related materiel to iraq. the quarterly reports of the secretary-general on the implementation of this embargo do not indicate that any violations have occurred since it was first imposed in 1991. all forms of commercial transaction between iraq and its neighbours are subject to a regime, monitored by the united nations, under which iraq is not permitted to obtain any hard currency. the two proposals for this regime represent a choice between a trade-off whereby iraq exports oil against which it imports nothing other than humanitarian items and a process whereby iraq exports oil and places the funds in an escrow account in neighbouring states from which it then purchases humanitarian items, under united nations supervision, by means of disbursements from that account. this regime operates hand in hand with the positioning of united nations personnel at border points for the purpose of monitoring trading activities between iraq and its neighbours. the cost of the united nations personnel is also covered by the escrow account. this proposed new regime comprises elements of interference that undermine not only the sovereignty of iraq but also that of its neighbouring countries, which must agree to open a united nations account for the deposit of monies paid for imported iraqi oil. they must also agree to the presence of united nations inspectors on their territory for the purpose of monitoring trade between them and iraq. in addition, this regime imposes a ceiling on the volume of oil which neighbouring states are entitled to import from iraq (150,000 barrels per day). moreover, it abolishes the earlier procedure approved by the united nations under which jordan was excluded from the comprehensive sanction measures imposed on iraq and permitted to import oil against the export of jordanian civilian goods. the draft resolution proposes a system for compensating neighbouring states for losses incurred as a result of their application of the comprehensive sanctions imposed against iraq under security council resolution 661 (1990), a procedure which is inconsistent with the spirit of international law, with the prevailing interpretation of article 50 of the charter of the united nations and with security council resolution 699 (1990) relating to requests from states for assistance pursuant to article 50 of the charter. the general understanding is that the united nations and its agencies, international financial institutions and states benefiting from the imposition of sanctions either compensate third states which are injured by losses incurred as a result of their compliance with the sanctions regime or exclude them from carrying out the embargo, as in the case of jordan. it is also understood that states which are victims of sanctions against them and which suffer fundamental damage as a result of the imposition of sanctions should not be asked to compensate third states which suffer partial damage owing to the imposition of those sanctions. the draft resolution proposes a formula for the inspection of civil aircraft in neighbouring states prior to their arrival in iraq and that iraq should bear the costs of such inspection. this formula contravenes security council resolution 670 (1990), specifically in regard to passenger flights. even the legal counsel of the united nations does not support the view that the prior approval and inspection of passenger flights to iraq are a requirement under resolution 670 (1990). the proposed draft resolution abolishes the distribution plan submitted by the government of iraq, as well as the procedures established in the memorandum of understanding and most of those under security council resolution 986 (1995), including extension of the 180-day operation period for each phase of the oil-for-food programme (for which a period of 190 days is proposed). it also lends permanence to the programme and turns it into a substitute for lifting of the sanctions against iraq. the draft resolution places new restrictions on companies wishing to import oil from iraq and seeks new criteria for the selection of such companies in accordance with which the secretary-general will choose the companies nominated. conclusions regardless of the source, the government of iraq categorically rejects any formula for so-called “smart sanctions” and will maintain a firm position about which there is no illusion. we do not believe that any state or authority or sane person can expect another state to participate in a project which has the ultimate objective of ending its existence as a sovereign entity. the plan of the united states of america and the united kingdom, the french ideas and proposals and any attendant concepts will entail a full expropriation of the fate of the iraqi state and people in all fields - politics, economics, development, trade, industry, finance and society. iraq's rejection of such plans and their ultimate objectives therefore rises to the level of a “struggle for national independence”, whatever the sacrifices involved. the so-called “smart sanctions” are but a new facet of neo-colonialism. the government of iraq refuses to see its people transformed into a mere consumer society - a society that eats but does not think, that enjoys but does not produce - and for whom? for foreigners. from the very beginning, the security council has dealt with the iraqi people in an unfair manner with respect to food, medicine and some civilian humanitarian requirements. under the unjust embargo regime and the oil-for-food programme, no allowance is made for the mind, for culture, for information, for the fabric of society, for industrial, agricultural and scientific advancement - for what is needed to run a state. the reason behind this deliberate denial is not difficult to comprehend. from the outset, the goal of imposing and perpetuating such a harsh and unjust embargo against iraq was political. simply put, the goal was to change the national politica