Hai cercato la traduzione di camel, goat, sheep da Inglese a Arabo

this is a geep, a goat-sheep hybrid.
هذا مروف. هجين ماعز، وخروف.

animals, goats, sheep ...
الحيوانات والماعز والخرفان

goats, sheep, pigs, even bulls.
ماعز ، خراف ، خنزير حتى الثيران

i grew up herding, looking after our livestock -- goats, sheep and cattle.
لقد نشأت في الرعي، أرعى ماشيتنا -- الماعز، الخراف والماشية.

he was, like, a low-level con guy who conned people out of money, goats, sheep...
هو كان رجل ذو مستوى منخفض من الخداع يخدع الناس من أجل المال عنزات، خِراف

the number of livestock has increased to about 26,000 head (cattle, goats, sheep).
وارتفع عدد رؤوس الماشية إلى نحو 000 26 رأس (بقر وماعز وغنم).

common technologies include investment in a wide portfolio of animals: cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, mules and poultry.
وتشمل التكنولوجيات الشائعة الاستثمار في مجموعة عريضة من الحيوانات وهي: الأبقار والماعز والأغنام والحمير والبغال والدواجن.

this has proved to be a success as we have been able to establish successful pilots in the program area with participation of indigenous people in goat/ sheep breeding, pisciculture, diary farming, water harvesting, etc.
وقد اثبت هذا النهج نجاحا حيث تمكنا من إقامة مشاريع رائدة وناجحة في مجال البرنامج بمشاركة السكان الأصليين في تربية الماعز/الخرفان، وتربية الأسماك، وصناعة الألبان، وتجميع المياه، إلخ.

it is estimated that, as of 15 march, over 110,000 misseriya nomads, with over two million cattle and 112,000 goats, sheep and donkeys were in the abyei area, with the largest concentration of nomads in the western corridor through alal and raigork and in the eastern corridor through um khariet and thurpader.
وتشير التقديرات إلى أنه اعتبارا من 15 آذار/مارس، حلّ بمنطقة أبيي ما يربو على 000 110 فرد من قبيلة المسيرية الرُحّل، يسوقون أكثر من مليوني رأس من الماشية، و 000 112 من الماعز والغنم والحمير، واستقر أكبر تجمّع للرحّل في الممر الغربي عبر علال وريقورك، وفي الممر الشرقي عبر أم خريت وتربادر.

palestinians stated that the continuation of the closure would oblige them to slaughter thousands of cows, goats, sheep and chickens. (ha'aretz, 12 august)
وقال الفلسطينيون إن استمرار اﻹغﻻق سيضطرهم إلى ذبح اﻵﻻف من البقر والمعز والغنم والدجاج. )هآرتس، ١٢ آب/أغسطس(

the directorate of livestock services (dls), under the ministry of fisheries and livestock, has plans to train 156,224 women farmers on livestock rearing (cow, buffalo, goat, sheep) during 2011-2012.
60- تخطط مديرية خدمات الثروة الحيوانية، تحت إشراف وزارة مصائد الأسماك والثروة الحيوانية، لتدريب 224 156 من المزارعات على تربية الماشية (البقر والجاموس والماعز والغنم) خلال الفترة 2011-2012.

letter dated 23 january 2005 from the permanent representative of the sudan to the united nations addressed to the president of the security council on instructions from my government, i wish to transmit to you a summary of the report of the commission of inquiry to investigate alleged human rights violations committed by armed groups in the darfur states established by the president of the republic on 8 may 2004. i should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated to the members of the council. (signed) elfatih erwa permanent representative annex to the letter dated 23 january 2005 from the permanent representative of the sudan to the united nations addressed to the president of the security council in the name of god, the merciful, the compassionate summary of the report commission of inquiry to investigate alleged human rights violations committed by armed groups in the darfur states khartoum, january 2005 contents * not included in the present document. in the name of god, the merciful, the compassionate commission of inquiry to investigate alleged human rights violations committed by armed groups in the darfur states summary of the report by decision no. 97 of 2004 the president of the republic established a commission of inquiry to investigate alleged human rights violations committed by armed groups in the darfur states. the decision specified the composition, terms of reference and powers of the commission to enable it to conduct its work in accordance with the commissions of inquiry act of 1954. the commission began its work by defining its legal basis and agreeing on the procedure for carrying out its mandate. the commission held 65 meetings, heard testimony from 288 persons and visited the three darfur states several times, going to 30 areas to establish the course of events, and taking evidence from witnesses under oath. it also met the local authorities, those of the states, the native administrations, the organizations of civil society and local and foreign relief organizations working in the darfur states. the commission requested and received from a number of ministries, from the states (wilayat), and from organs of central government and the states, all the relevant files and documents relating to its mandate. it also studied the reports prepared by all the missions that had visited the sudan representing the united nations, the african union, the organization of the islamic conference, the arab league and other organizations. the commission carefully studied all the successive reports issued by international human rights organizations such as amnesty international, human rights watch and the international crisis group, together with the reports of the commission on human rights in geneva. the commission also studied the resolutions of the united states congress, the european union and the security council and the proceedings of the negotiations between the armed opposition and the government held in n'djamena, abéché and abuja. the purpose of this was to shed light on the accusations made by one party against the other as well as any other accusations that could be ascertained. the commission transmitted the decision establishing it and the commissions of inquiry act to the armed opposition abroad and conferred several times with it, both in writing and by telephone, inviting the opposition to meet the commission at any time and in any place that might be agreed in order to listen to its views, but no meeting took place. to the extent possible, the commission documented all its proceedings in writing and in sound recordings and photographic records. the geographical and historical setting of darfur, the fact that it borders on three african states with a frontier strip 1,300 kilometres in length, its demographic structure which includes over 80 tribes, the overlapping of those tribes with neighbouring countries, the environmental and demographic changes that have occurred in the region as a result of drought and desertification, immigration from neighbouring countries, the large-scale proliferation of weapons in recent decades, the emergence of both secret and overt political organizations together with the resulting administrative changes and the repercussions of political developments on the darfur region of the sudan, together with other factors, all had to be taken into account by the commission as part of the mandate entrusted to it. what is now happening in darfur is essentially the product of all these factors, together with indiscriminate politicization which, in its turn, has had the effect of internationalizing the problem. according to the 1993 census, the population of darfur was 4,746,456, although the estimates of the central statistical bureau indicate that the current population of darfur is approaching 6 million. the surface area of darfur is 196,404 square miles, or about one fifth of the surface area of the sudan. it is inhabited by many different tribes of both arab and african stock but, over the centuries, the tribes have intermingled and become both ethnically and culturally mixed, resulting in the present-day society of darfur with its unique characteristics. throughout its history, darfur has seen numerous migrations from the north, east and west of africa and groups of darfur tribes have also migrated to various parts of the sudan. the diversity of the natural environment and the climate has given rise to diverse economic activities and means of livelihood. agriculture and stockbreeding remain the two main occupations of the population of darfur, together with cross-border trade which has developed considerably. land tenure in darfur is governed by established customs and traditions whereby the tribes live in defined areas known as “diyar” or “hawakir”. title to land is connected with the concept and exercise of authority under its various designations (sultan, king, superintendent, “dimungawi”, “shartai” (tribal leader), “farishah”, “umda” (village chief, sheikh) and also with economic activity and the movement of pastoralist tribes in the search for water and pasture. for centuries, the tribes of darfur lived in relative peace which was disturbed by disputes between pastoralists and farmers over resources. however, in accordance with prevailing customs, such disputes were settled by the native administration and under the auspices of the state. such customs remained an inseparable feature of the society of darfur and resulted in an agreed system governing camel tracks and regulating relations between farmers and pastoralists in the utilization of sites for agriculture and stockraising, and also of water resources. there were therefore numerous tribal peace conferences under the auspices of the provincial and central authorities which ended with agreements, the terms of which all parties endeavoured to implement. this was a unique feature of darfur and became part of its culture which was based on respect by all parties of the rights of the other parties and on convincing the tribes, with their different backgrounds, that there was no alternative to coexistence and that no tribal group could displace another. the commission counted over 36 armed inter-tribal conflicts during the period from 1932 to 2001, most of which were concerned with disputes over resources, but also including instances of reprisal, plunder and so forth. the commission notes that most of these controversies occurred between tribes with the same lineage, although some were between tribes of different stock. it is important to bear in mind that the native administration was one of the main factors of stability in the region, playing, as it did, an important role in the settlement of disputes and in regulating relations between tribes and cooperation with the municipal, provincial and federal authorities in that connection, until its dissolution in 1970, without any suitable alternative being found, led to an administrative and security vacuum. the break-up of the native administration also had the effect of exacerbating the disputes and gave rise to the emergence of acute inter-tribal rivalry and political polarization. the disputes were thus removed from their traditional framework to a regional one and took on national dimensions related to matters in the public arena such as marginalization, the division of authority, wealth and so forth. the decline in the level of economic development in darfur for a number of reasons mentioned in the report, the deterioration in services, the continuing changes in administrative arrangements and in the incumbents of various executive positions, the halting of development projects such as the west darfur development project, the savannah project and the ostrich farm project, the delay in the implementation of the western relief road, the prevalence of unemployment, the increase in the numbers of poorly educated people together with the proliferation of weapons and the ease with which they could be acquired, the prevailing instability in chad, the continuing changes in its ruling regime and the linkage between that and some of the sudanese tribes — all this led to the emergence of a culture of violence and to some practices alien to the society of darfur such as armed robbery. the latter became worse in the 1980s and gave rise to the emergence of semi-organized cross-border crime involving the smuggling of stolen livestock to neighbouring states. renegades from a number of tribes with differing ethnic affiliations, both from the sudan and abroad, took part in this in semi-organized groups to which the people of darfur came to refer as the “janjaweed”. other groups then appeared such as the tora bora, the peshmerga and armed militias. this led some tribes to set up armed groups for self-protection and to form alliances among themselves. in other words, the effect of the above-mentioned factors was to weaken the authority of the state and lower its prestige as compared to earlier times. this prompted the president of the republic to intervene several times to set up machinery on which he conferred wide-ranging powers, making them responsible for resolving the existing problems and extending the prestige of the state to the three darfur states. the situation in the country was characterized by troubled security, intraregional conflict and insurgency against the authority of the state. the native administration played a diminishing role, armed robbery became widespread and mutually contradictory administrative decisions were taken in an endeavour to address the prevailing problems without any regard for their immediate or future consequences, particularly their impact on land tenure and its relation to the exercise of authority. in addition, there was civil war in the country and the sudanese peoples liberation movement in the south was attempting to polarize the people of the outlying states under the slogan of the new sudan, and to resolve the issue of marginalization. in this climate, the issues were politicized, divorced from their traditional framework and took on regional dimensions, and the conflict became one between various groups on the one hand, and the state on the other. the controversy began with theoretical policy statements and ended in armed confrontation. following a succession of attacks on police stations in several areas, the martyrdom of some 500 members of the police force and the seizure of their weapons, there was a security vacuum. as a result, the conflicts between the various tribes, for the reasons mentioned above, became more serious while, for different reasons, tribal reprisals and the desire of some tribes to seize the land of others and to establish entities comprising the dominant tribes all conspired to politicize and internationalize the issue in a manner unprecedented in the history of the sudan. on 25 april 2003, the armed opposition attacked the city of el fasher, capital of north darfur and went on to attack kuttum on 1 august 2003, meleit in the same month and then kulbus, buram and tawila. this resulted in hostile action against the armed forces, the killing of more than 70 people, the destruction and burning of five aircraft, the destruction of public installations, particularly the hospitals of kulbus, meleit and buram, and attacks on symbols of public authority, such as the judiciary and offices of the public prosecutor, and on some members of the native administration and the murder and burning of numerous citizens and attacks on relief convoys. all this led to the intervention of the armed forces to provide security and protect the population, and also to a feeling of apprehension on the part of a number of tribes concerning possible aggression against them. these events resulted in grave violations of human rights, and brought suffering to the people of darfur, many of whom migrated to camps. in some cases, there were related instances of highway robbery which resulted in a scarcity of provisions and rising prices, all of which was the beginning of the problem which has now increased in scale and become internationalized. these events, which were reported by the news agencies and satellite television networks, gave rise to considerable legitimate concern on the part of international human rights organizations. some of these organizations, however, tended to exaggerate and to rely on inaccurate and contradictory information concerning events in darfur dictated in large part by political considerations. this resulted in concern about the problem on the part of certain states and within the united nations, and in accusations made against the sudan of ethnic cleansing, genocide and systematic rape. on the basis of the above, the commission began its investigation of the facts by listing all of the allegations of violations of human rights or crimes against humanity (see annex iii) involving the burning of villages, murder, rape, sexual violence, forcible transfer, internment, torture, abduction, shelling or bombing of civilians, endangering their lives, pillage of private property, genocide, ethnic cleansing and extrajudicial executions. the investigation measures comprised the holding of prolonged hearings with all parties, visits to the places that were alleged to have been the scene of the events leading to the violations, consultation of documents and papers, and the taking of statements under oath from numerous witnesses. after the commission had evaluated all of the above and discussed it in the light of international human rights law, the provisions of international humanitarian law, the statute of the international criminal court and relevant historical precedents, it concluded as follows: 19.1 grave violations of human rights had occurred involving the three darfur states in which all parties to the conflict had participated in varying degrees and these had inflicted human suffering on the people of darfur as a result of which people had migrated to the capitals of the darfur states or sought refuge in chad. 19.2 despite the gravity of the events in darfur, they did not constitute genocide because the conditions for genocide were not met. proof was not provided to the commission that any of the protected groups, whether ethnic, religious, racial or national, had suffered bodily or mental harm nor had they been deliberately and with evil intent subjected to conditions of life that were calculated to bring about their destruction, in whole or in part. the events in darfur were unlike what had occurred in rwanda, bosnia or cambodia where the state had pursued a set of policies leading to the destruction of a protected group. 19.3 it was proved to the commission that the events in darfur were the result of the factors mentioned in the report and of the circumstances that have been explained. proof was also provided that the description of the events as amounting to genocide was based on exaggerated figures relating to killings which, on investigation, were not confirmed (see section 13 of the report). 19.4 it was also proved that the armed forces had bombarded certain areas where elements of the armed opposition were hiding and that the bombardment had killed a number of civilians. the armed forces investigated the matter and compensated the victims in the areas of habila, umm gozin and tulu. the investigation is still under way with regard to events at wadd hajam. 19.5 it was also proved to the commission that armed opposition groups had committed similar acts, killing unarmed civilians and wounded military personnel in buram hospital and burning some of them alive. 19.6 it was also proved to the commission that many murders had been committed by tribes in dispute with one another amid a climate of conflict in areas such as sania deleiba and shattaya. 19.7 the killing of civilians in all the foregoing cases were violations of article 3, common to the geneva conventions of 1949 (see section 14 of the report). 19.8 killings committed under various circumstances by all parties to the armed conflict amount to a violation of article 3 common to the geneva conventions of 1949 but do not, in the view of the commission, amount to genocide because of the absence of elements constituting genocide, particularly the lack of proof that any of the protected groups were targeted and the lack of proof of criminal intent. 19.9 allegations were made concerning instances of extrajudicial execution by all parties but some of the allegations in this connection were not substantiated to the commission beyond doubt. accordingly, the commission recommended in certain specific cases mentioned in the report that a judicial inquiry should be conducted (see section 16 of the report). this is because any statements made to the commission are not admissible as evidence before any court in accordance with article 12 of the commissions of inquiry act of 1954, which states: “statements made during investigations conducted in accordance with this act shall not constitute admissible evidence before any court, whether civil or criminal”. 19.10 with regard to the crimes of rape and sexual violence, which had attracted the attention of the international media, the commission conducted investigations in all the states of darfur at different levels and heard witnesses under oath, including rape victims. the women involved were medically examined. the commission also consulted reports of the judicial commissions which had visited several areas of darfur, including camps for displaced persons. 19.11 the above proved to the commission that incidents of rape and sexual violence had been committed in the states of darfur but it was also proved that such acts had not been committed in such a systematic manner or on such a wide scale as to constitute crimes against humanity, as had been alleged. it was also proved to the commission that most of the rape cases had been reported against unidentified people, although investigation had led to the identification of a number of them, including 10 members of the regular forces. the minister of justice has lifted their immunity and they are now standing trial. most of the rape cases were committed by individuals in a climate of instability. the commission took note of the legal and linguistic implications of the word “rape” which was generally unknown to the women of darfur who believed that the word “rape” denoted violence to force a person to commit an act against that person's will, and not specifically rape (see section 17 of the report). regrettably, a collective rape had been videotaped, part of which had been shown outside the sudan. it was later discovered that the act had been contrived, some of the participants admitting that they had been persuaded to take part by the promise of payment (compact disc attached). 19.12 forcible transfer (deporta
رسالة مؤرخة 23 كانون الثاني/يناير 2005 موجهة إلى رئيس مجلس الأمن من الممثل الدائم للسودان لدى الأمم المتحدة بناء على توجيه من حكومتي، أرجو أن أبعث لسعادتكم موجز لتقرير لجنة تقصي الحقائق حول الادعاءات بانتهاكات حقوق الإنسان المرتكبة بواسطة المجموعات المسلحة بولايات دارفور والتي كان قد شكلها السيد رئيس الجمهورية في الثامن من أيار/مايو 2004م. وسأغدو ممتنا إن تكرمتم بتعميم هذه الرسالة ومرفقها على أعضاء المجلس. وتفضلوا بقبول أسمى آيات الاعتبار. (توقيع) الفاتح عروة المندوب الدائم مرفق الرسالة المؤرخة 23 كانون الثاني/يناير 2005 والموجهة إلى رئيس مجلس الأمن من الممثل الدائم للسودان لدى الأمم المتحدة بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم موجز التقرير لجنة تقصي الحقائق حول الادعاءات بانتهاكات حقوق الإنسان المرتكبة بواسطة المجموعات المسلحة بولايات دارفور الخرطوم يناير 2005