검색어: identical (영어 - 신할리어)

showed identical symptoms.
ඒ ආකාරයේම රේග ලක්ෂණ පෙන්නුවා∙

- identical in every detail.
- හැම අතින්ම සර්වසමය.

we're fraternal twins, not identical.
ඔයාලා කියන්නෙ මගෙ සහෝදරිය ය්වෙට් ගැන. අපි දෙන්න සර්වසම නෑ

he also owned a jacket identical to the one worn by the killer.
ඒ වගේම මිනී මරුවා පැලඳගෙන හිටිය විදිහේ කබායක් ඔහුට අයිතිව තියෙනවා.

we need to know what other victims have loved ones with identical injuries.
දැනගන්න ඕනේ මොන ගොදුරු වල ලගම අයටද එකම ආබාධ තියෙන්නේ කියලා.

and since your genome is identical to his, you could step into his shoes.
ඔයාගේ ජාන ඔහුට හොඳටම සමාන නිසා... ඔයාට එයාගේ තැන ගන්න පුලුවන්.

instead, unbeknownst to mr. rourke, he received and began to use an identical cell phone supplied by your company.
පේන හැටියට ඒක අතරමගදී ඔයා හෝ ඔයාගෙ වෙනත් සේවකයෙක් විසින් අරගෙන තියෙනවා. ඒ වෙනුවට, රෝක් මහත්තයා නාදුනන කෙනෙක්, ඔහුට ලැබුනට පස්සේ ඔහු එම සර්වසම දුරකථනය පාවිච්චි කරන්න පටන් ගත්තා

dr. cahill described a doctor with an approach identical to the one described by the neighbor who'd been visiting trent kelty.
දොස්තර චිලී තව දොස්තර කෙනෙක් ගැන කීවා මිනිහත් හරියටම ට්‍රෙන්ට් කෙල්ටිගෙ අසල්වැසියා කීවා වගේම තමයි.

every one of the good samaritan's victims had a family member with identical injuries -- fractured skulls, broken bones, torn retinas.
"හොද උදවුකරු" ගේ ගොදුරූ හැමෝගෙම පවුලේ කෙනෙක්ට එකම තුවාල තිබුනා. බිදුනු හිස්කබල්, කැඩුනු අස්ථි, ඉරුනු දෘෂ්ටිවිතාන

this step is sanctioned by a very weak indifference principle. let us distinguish two cases. the first case, which is the easiest, is where all the minds in question are like your own in the sense that they are exactly qualitatively identical to yours: they have exactly the same information and the same experiences that you have. the second case is where the minds are “like” each other only in the loose sense of being the sort of minds that are typical of human creatures, but they are qualitatively distinct from one another and each has a distinct set of experiences. i maintain that even in the latter case, where the minds are qualitatively different, the simulation argument still works, provided that you have no information that bears on the question of which of the various minds are simulated and which are implemented biologically. a detailed defense of a stronger principle, which implies the above stance for both cases as trivial special instances, has been given in the literature.11 space does not permit a recapitulation of that defense here, but we can bring out one of the underlying intuitions by bringing to our attention to an analogous situation of a more familiar kind. suppose that x% of the population has a certain genetic sequence s within the part of their dna commonly designated as “junk dna”. suppose, further, that there are no manifestations of s (short of what would turn up in a gene assay) and that there are no known correlations between having s and any observable characteristic. then, quite clearly, unless you have had your dna sequenced, it is rational to assign a credence of x% to the hypothesis that you have s. and this is so quite irrespective of the fact that the people who have s have qualitatively different minds and experiences from the people who don’t have s. (they are different simply because all humans have different experiences from one another, not because of any known link between s and what kind of experiences one has.) the same reasoning holds if s is not the property of having a certain genetic sequence but instead the property of being in a simulation, assuming only that we have no information that enables us to predict any differences between the experiences of simulated minds and those of the original biological minds. it should be stressed that the bland indifference principle expressed by (#) prescribes indifference only between hypotheses about which observer you are, when you have no information about which of these observers you are.
සිරස්තලයක් එක් කරන්න