검색어: principle (영어 - 신할리어)

it's principle!
ඒක ප්‍රතිපත්තිය.

thank you, mr. principle.
විදුහල්පතිතුමා.

i'm a man of principle
- බඩු කෙහේද ?

by principle, it's stupid.
- මූලධර්ම වලට අනුව, ඒක මෝඩයි..

i call it the nefario principle.
මං එකට කියන්නේ නෆාරියෝ නියමය කියලා.

where is that silly principle?
කොහෙද මේ අමන ප්‍රින්සිපල් ?

"the principle of communicating vessels."
සේරම එකිනෙකට සම්බන්ද වෙනවා.

- it's a matter of principle, baby.
- ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය ප්‍රශ්නයක් පැටියෝ.

in the stasi, we had a basic principle:
ආරක්ෂක අමාත්‍යාංශයෙදි, අපි එක මූලධර්මයක් පිලිපැද්ද.

the novikov principle of self-consistency, for example.
උදාහරණයකට ස්වයං-ස්ථායිතාවයට novikov මුලධර්මය උදාහරණයක් විදියට.

some weakness that could lead you to betray every principle you ever had.
දුර්වලතාවයක් එයාලව පාවා දෙන්න පොලබවන්න පුළුවන්! ඔයා ගරු කරපු සියලු නීති

thomas borby met with three other principle players behind the oil deal:
- තෝමස් බෝබි මේ තෙල් ගණුදෙනුව පස්සෙන් ඉන්න අනෙක් ප්‍රධාන ක්‍රීඩකයන් තුන් දෙනාවත් මුණ ගැහුනා:

if riddick comes back here without us, you go ahead, you kill him on general principle.
රිඩික් අපි නැතිව ආපහු මෙහාට ආවොත්, ඔයා ප්‍රධාන කොන්දේසීන් මත එයාව මරළ දාන්න.

so on the principle of playing to your strengths... he decided to make their cultivation his life's work.
ඉතින් ඔයාගෙ විදිහට කරනව කියන න්‍යායෙන්, he decided to make their cultivation his life's work.

this step is sanctioned by a very weak indifference principle. let us distinguish two cases. the first case, which is the easiest, is where all the minds in question are like your own in the sense that they are exactly qualitatively identical to yours: they have exactly the same information and the same experiences that you have. the second case is where the minds are “like” each other only in the loose sense of being the sort of minds that are typical of human creatures, but they are qualitatively distinct from one another and each has a distinct set of experiences. i maintain that even in the latter case, where the minds are qualitatively different, the simulation argument still works, provided that you have no information that bears on the question of which of the various minds are simulated and which are implemented biologically. a detailed defense of a stronger principle, which implies the above stance for both cases as trivial special instances, has been given in the literature.11 space does not permit a recapitulation of that defense here, but we can bring out one of the underlying intuitions by bringing to our attention to an analogous situation of a more familiar kind. suppose that x% of the population has a certain genetic sequence s within the part of their dna commonly designated as “junk dna”. suppose, further, that there are no manifestations of s (short of what would turn up in a gene assay) and that there are no known correlations between having s and any observable characteristic. then, quite clearly, unless you have had your dna sequenced, it is rational to assign a credence of x% to the hypothesis that you have s. and this is so quite irrespective of the fact that the people who have s have qualitatively different minds and experiences from the people who don’t have s. (they are different simply because all humans have different experiences from one another, not because of any known link between s and what kind of experiences one has.) the same reasoning holds if s is not the property of having a certain genetic sequence but instead the property of being in a simulation, assuming only that we have no information that enables us to predict any differences between the experiences of simulated minds and those of the original biological minds. it should be stressed that the bland indifference principle expressed by (#) prescribes indifference only between hypotheses about which observer you are, when you have no information about which of these observers you are.
සිරස්තලයක් එක් කරන්න