您搜索了: rational (英语 - 僧伽罗语)

- we're both rational adults.
- අපි දෙන්නම බුද්ධිමත් වැඩිහිටියන්∙

variables are impossible to assign any rational value.
විචල්‍ය වලට බැහැ ආරෝපණය කරන්න ඕනෑම ... පරිමේය අගයත්.

i never said that the vector fields were rational functions.
මම කිව්වෙ නැහැ දෛශික ක්ෂෙත්‍ර පරිමේය ශ්‍රිත කියලා

i believe even the most rational mind can play tricks in the dark.
මම විශ්වාස කරනවා සිහිබුද්ධිය ඇති මනසකට පුළුවන් ප්‍රයෝග යොදන්න කළුවරේ.

it was one of the only rational responses to the irrational situation my life had become.
ඒ මගේ ජීවිතයට මෙහෙම දෙයක් කරපු එක ගැන

rational people may look at it like that, but we don't see a great many rational people here.
බුද්ධිමත් මිනිස්සු සමහරවිට ඒහැන එහෙම බලයි මටනං එහෙම බුද්ධිමත් මිනිස්සු මෙහේ පේන්නේ නෑ

- i don't think a rational adult drops a generator on top of a teenage boy, do you?
- මම හිතන්නෙ නෑ එක බුද්ධිමත් වැඩිහිටියකේ∙∙∙ ∙∙∙ ජෙනරේටරයක් ගැටවරයකේ මතට අත්හරිවි කියලා, එහෙම නේද?

this step is sanctioned by a very weak indifference principle. let us distinguish two cases. the first case, which is the easiest, is where all the minds in question are like your own in the sense that they are exactly qualitatively identical to yours: they have exactly the same information and the same experiences that you have. the second case is where the minds are “like” each other only in the loose sense of being the sort of minds that are typical of human creatures, but they are qualitatively distinct from one another and each has a distinct set of experiences. i maintain that even in the latter case, where the minds are qualitatively different, the simulation argument still works, provided that you have no information that bears on the question of which of the various minds are simulated and which are implemented biologically. a detailed defense of a stronger principle, which implies the above stance for both cases as trivial special instances, has been given in the literature.11 space does not permit a recapitulation of that defense here, but we can bring out one of the underlying intuitions by bringing to our attention to an analogous situation of a more familiar kind. suppose that x% of the population has a certain genetic sequence s within the part of their dna commonly designated as “junk dna”. suppose, further, that there are no manifestations of s (short of what would turn up in a gene assay) and that there are no known correlations between having s and any observable characteristic. then, quite clearly, unless you have had your dna sequenced, it is rational to assign a credence of x% to the hypothesis that you have s. and this is so quite irrespective of the fact that the people who have s have qualitatively different minds and experiences from the people who don’t have s. (they are different simply because all humans have different experiences from one another, not because of any known link between s and what kind of experiences one has.) the same reasoning holds if s is not the property of having a certain genetic sequence but instead the property of being in a simulation, assuming only that we have no information that enables us to predict any differences between the experiences of simulated minds and those of the original biological minds. it should be stressed that the bland indifference principle expressed by (#) prescribes indifference only between hypotheses about which observer you are, when you have no information about which of these observers you are.
සිරස්තලයක් එක් කරන්න